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Abstract 
  
The Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard is the most important and, because 
of its flexible nature and its status as a ‘catch-all’ provision, most controversial 
investment protection standard in international investment treaties. The standard 
imposes the most far-reaching obligation of any aspect of such treaties. This thesis’ core 
contention is that the current investment tribunals’ interpretation of the FET standard 
prioritises the interests of foreign investors and neglects the perspectives of host 
developing countries. Therefore there is a pressing need to reconceptualise the 
interpretation of the FET standard. In service to depicting the perspectives of host 
developing countries, this thesis advances an understanding of classifications such as 
‘developing’ and ‘developed’ that reflects the issues and challenges that these countries 
face in the investment dispute context, such as their lack of resources, administrative 
capacity, technology, and infrastructure, as much as the economic and social level of 
development international organisations generally emphasise in their classifications. It 
addresses socio-political circumstances such as political instability, social unrest, conflict 
and its aftermath, social and political transition, and economic crises and their impact 
on host developing countries in the investment dispute context. Through a detailed 
study of the approaches they have taken to such issues in their interpretation of the 
breach of FET standard in disputes involving host developing countries, it shows that 
current investment tribunals have taken inconsistent and inadequate approaches to the 
issues host developing countries face. It argues that a reconceptualised interpretation of 
the FET standard which acknowledges the developmental issues and challenges this 
thesis has identified would accommodate the needs of the host developing countries 
while continuing to give reasonable protections to foreign investors and therefore serve 
the needs of the system as a whole.   
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Study 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The principal contention of this thesis is that international investment tribunals, in the 
interpretation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) standard, have prioritized 
investors’ protection over the developmental issues and challenges of the host 
‘developing countries.’1 Therefore, there is a pressing need to revisit the interpretation 
of the FET standard by investment tribunals from the perspective of the host 
developing countries in receipt of foreign direct investment (FDI). Within this 
overarching argument, this thesis aims to (i) identify the key problems in the 
interpretation of the FET standard by the current investment tribunals from the 
perspectives of developing countries and (ii) to consider how the FET standard might 
be re-conceptualised to remedy these problems in order to facilitate more host 
developing country sensitive interpretation of the standard in the future.   
                                                          
1 Convergent with the various phrases used to describe the large number of countries implicated within 
the discussions presented within Chapter 4 of this thesis, the phrase ‘developing countries’ is used 
throughout as a generic term. A structural bias in favour of the investors in the international investment 
regime has been discussed by some scholars. See e.g., Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Public Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 12-43. Also see e.g. Gus Van Harten, ‘Perceived Bias in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Michael Waibel and others (eds),  The Backlash Against Investment 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2010) 433; M Sornarajah, ‘A Developing Country Perspective of 
International Economic Law in the Context of Dispute Settlement’ in Asif H Qureshi (ed), Perspectives in 
International Economic Law (Kluwer Law International 2002) 83, 103; David Schneiderman, ‘Judicial Politics 
and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes’ (2010) 30 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 383; Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law : 
Reconciling Policy and Principle (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 2; M Sornarajah, ‘The Retreat of 
Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Catherine A Rogers and Roger P Alford (eds),  The 
Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 293; M Sornarajah, ‘The Fair and Equitable 
Standard of Treatment: Whose Fairness? Whose Equity’ in Federico Ortino, Lahra Liberti, Audley 
Sheppard and Hugo Warner (eds) Investment Treaty Laws: Current Issues II (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law 2007) 167, 174. Such concerns for structural bias in in international law in general 
has been examined by other scholars, see generally e.g., Anthony Angie,  Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of the International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International 
Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press 2011).   
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The key arguments of this thesis are: (i) that the FET standard serves as a core (if not 
the core) protection instrument for foreign investors; (ii) that despite wide variations in 
constructions there remains sufficient similarity across the investment treaties to argue 
that there is an overarching and singular concept of FET that can be the subject of the 
detailed analysis in this thesis; (iii) that there is a need to identify a concept of 
development that is appropriate in the context of investment disputes, and that this will 
assist investment tribunals to deal with host developing countries more appropriately; 
(iv) that investment tribunals have adopted a wide variety of different approaches to the 
interpretation of the obligations created by the FET standard and the fact that the 
tribunals have largely failed to consider adequately certain pivotal developmental issues 
and challenges (v) as a consequence, that there is a need for a re-conceptualised FET 
standard which would provide a broader scope for investment tribunals to address the 
needs of host developing countries.  
 
The thesis provides three different case studies in relation to different issues faced by 
host developing countries in investment disputes — (i) social and political 
circumstances (i.e.  political crises and other serious socio-political circumstances faced 
by developing countries); (ii) transitory status (i.e. situations where the country is in 
transition from communism to a market based economy) and (iii) economic crises. 
These case studies will be utilized to demonstrate the thesis’s core argument.  
  
This present chapter will provide a background to the study, the research questions 
addressed, the methodology adopted for the research and an outline of the individual 
chapters. The next section will describe the choice to focus on the treatment of host 
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developing countries by investment tribunals in their interpretation of the FET 
standard.  
1.2 Background of the Study  
 
1.2.1 International Investment Law and the Settlement of Disputes 
 
The domain of international investment law is one of most complex areas of 
international law and its breadth is still expanding.2 A number of bilateral and regional 
investment treaties, customary international law, the jurisprudence developed by the 
investment tribunals, and some soft law instruments adopted under the United Nations 
(UN) provide the basis for international investment law.3 While a considerable number 
of international treaties cover a wide range of areas of international activity,4 no single 
comprehensive treaty deals with international investment law.5 This absence has not 
however restricted the ever expanding body of the law regulating foreign investment; 
almost three thousand investment treaties6 provide regulation, a majority of which are 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs)7, although many free trade agreements (FTAs)8 and 
regional investment treaties also exist. In addition to this large number of investment 
treaties an escalating body of arbitral jurisprudence has shaped the content of 
investment law over the past two decades. 
                                                          
2 For and overview of international investment law in general see e.g. Asif H Qureshi and Andreas R 
Ziegler,  International Economic Law  (3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) Chapter 14.  
3 Surya P Subedi, ‘International Investment Law’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 727; See generally e.g., Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008); Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: 
Reconciling Policy and Principle (n1).  
4 For example the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982; The Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1975; or the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
1990.  
5 Subedi, ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 727.  
6 See e.g. <http://www.iisd.org/investment/law/treaties.aspx.> accessed 2 September 2014.  
7 For country specific BITs see e.g.  
<http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-
specific-Lists-of-BITs.aspx> accessed 25 August 2014.  
8 Which generally includes substantive provisions dealing with investment.  
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BITs have been popular because governments and investors believe they help to create 
an effective mechanism of ‘depoliticization’ of investment disputes.9 Investment treaties 
generally contain a variety of core provisions on investment protection standards, such 
as the FET, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, national treatment, full 
protection and security, protection against expropriation, umbrella clauses, protection 
against arbitrary and discriminatory measures, and a clause containing the dispute 
settlement mechanism for the parties.  Most rely on the existing instruments of 
international investment arbitration, primarily the World Banks’ (WB) International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) based on the ICSID Convention 
of 196510 and the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) of 1958.11 ICSID has become the main 
forum for settlement of investment disputes between foreign investors and the host 
countries. Many treaties refer to the arbitration rules created by the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 197612 to govern claim filing by foreign 
investors.13 The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), however, 
provides for its own dispute settlement mechanism.14 Other treaties require the use of 
commercial arbitration such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). These do not exclude investor-state 
                                                          
9 Subedi ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 747.  
10 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(the ICSID Convention) signed in Washington on 18 March 1965 and entered into force on 14 October 
1966. See generally Moshe Hirsch, The Arbitration Mechanism of The International Centre For the Settlement Of 
Investment Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 11-15; John Graham Merrills, International Dispute 
Settlement (Cambridge University Press 2011) 113; Christoph H Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009). 
11 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
New York Convention) signed in New York on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959. 
12Arbitration Rules of UNCITRAL, UN General Assembly Resolution 31/98 of 1976 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-
e.pdf>accessed 5 July 2014.  
13 Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (UNCTAD 2003) 35 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20031_en.pdf> accessed 25 August 
2014.  
14 Article 1120 of NAFTA provides for consent to alternatively under the ICSID Convention, under the 
Additional Facility and under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976.  
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arbitration despite a clear difference between classical commercial arbitration and 
investment arbitration between a foreign investor and the host country.15 There are 
some regional arbitration centres, one example being the China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).16  
 
1.2.2 Developing Countries in Investment Dispute Arbitration  
 
The bulk of the FDI flows into developing and former communist countries.17 Dodge 
observed that investment treaties have been until recently ‘reciprocal in theory but not 
in fact, for it is generally only the less developed country that bears the risk of being 
sued.’18 This research focuses particularly on the claims against host developing 
countries because foreign investors have made a large number of them, and their 
implications for these countries raise concerns. This concern is reflected in the statistics 
provided below.   
 
Gallagher and Shresthra have produced a detailed and in-depth study that reveals the 
scope of the problem, providing statistics on claims and the economic effects of the 
compensation foreign investors have received.19 Their study responds in part to Susan 
Franck’s econometric analysis studying the relationship between the development status 
of the host government and awards, both in terms of win-loss and amounts in each 
                                                          
15 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 3) 225.  
16 For disputes in various other institutions see e.g. Julian DM Lew, ‘Fundamental Problems in 
International Arbitration’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Julian DM Lew (eds), Pervasive Problems in International 
Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2006) 1-3. 
17 Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 1) 6. 
18 William S Dodge, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement between Developed Countries: Reflections on the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, 3. 
Also see Philippe Sands, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Penguin 2006) 141. 
19 Kevin P Gallagher and Elen Shrestha, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries: A Re-
Appraisal’ (2011) 12 Journal of the World Investment and Trade 919. On an account of implications of 
financial burdens of the Awards against developing countries with particular reference to cases against 
Argentina see e.g., Bernard Hoekman and Richard Newfarmer, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements, 
Investment Disciplines and Investment Flows’ (2005) 39(5) Journal of World Trade 949, 965-966.  
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award.20 Studying the data on awards up to 2007, she found no significant relationship 
between the development status of the host country, development status of the 
arbitrator, and the outcome of the arbitration. A number of scholars have disputed this 
finding,21 including Harten, who provides an account of elaborate statistics on the 
disputes initiated against the developing countries and the amount of the award 
rendered against them and their economic effect.22 Gallagher and Shresthra’s study is 
more recent, which is why this thesis uses it here, along with a recent study by the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO).23 
 
Gallagher and Shresthra show that the average claim US investors have brought against 
host developed countries has been around 150 million USD, while the average claim 
against host developing countries is around 451 million USD.24 Furthermore, the 
available data and statistics from UNCTAD show larger numbers of investment claims 
against developing countries than developed countries.25 Similarly, Harten’s research 
shows that the primary target of the foreign investors in ICSID cases to date have been 
                                                          
20 Susan D Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2009) 50 Harvard 
International Law Journal 435.  
21 Gus Van Harten, ‘The Use of Quantitative Methods to Examine Possible Bias in Investment 
Arbitration’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 859-882; Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: a View from 
Political Science’ in Kate Miles Chester Brown (ed),  Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press 2011) 606-627.  
22 Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 1) 31-33.  
23 Press Release, Food and Water Watch, World Bank Court Grants Power to Corporations, 30 April 
2007 <http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/pressreleases/world-bank-court-grants-power-to-
corporations/> accessed 25 August 2014; Also see e.g. Sarah Anderson and Sara Grusky, Challenging 
Corporate Investor Rule : How the World Bank’s Investment Court, Free Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties have Unleashed a New Era of Corporate Power and What to do About it, (Institute for Policy Studies 
2007) < https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/images/water/world-water/bank-
policy/ICSID_print.pdf> accessed 25 August 2014;  Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment 
Treaties: A Review  (UNCTAD, 2005) <http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf> accessed 27 
August 2014; Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note, No.1 May 
2013, 1, (UNCTAD 2013)<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf> 
accessed 27 August 2014.  
24 Gallagher and Shrestha (n 19) 927. Also see e.g. Gus Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaties as a 
Constraining Framework’ in Shahrukh Rafi Khan and Jens Christiansen (eds), Towards New 
Developmentalism: Market as Means Rather Than Master (Routledge 2011) 158.  
25 Gallagher and Shrestha (n 19) 923. 
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middle-size capital importing countries, especially Latin American countries and the 
former Soviet bloc.26   
Gallagher and Shresthra describe the impact of investor’s claims thus:  
‘such claims are in much larger proportion to the respective developing country 
share of foreign investment flows. “Upper middle income” developing nations 
only receive 10 percent of global FDI, but are subject to 46 percent of the 
claims. “Lower middles income” developing countries only receive 9 percent of 
global FDI inflows, but are subject to 29 percent of all claims. The “low 
income” developing nations receive less than one percent of FDI flows but are 
subject to five percent of the total claims.’27 
Further they state,  
‘[the] average award against developing countries relative to their annual 
government expenditure is 0.53% or 99 cents per capita. The average award 
amount Canada is liable for is 0.003% of its annual government spending and 
translates to 12 cents per capita. Thus compared to a developed country, the 
award amounts have a higher impact on the economy of developing countries.’28 
 
A recent UNCTAD study shows that in 66 percent of the new cases filed in 2012, the 
respondent states were developing or transition economies.29 The study also shows that 
at least 95 governments have responded to one or more investment treaty arbitrations, 
among which 61 were developing countries, 18 were developed countries and 16 were 
countries in transition.30 The study reveals that some developing countries have faced 
                                                          
26 Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 1) 32-33. 
27 Gallagher and Shrestha (n 19) 925.  
28 Gallagher and Shrestha (n 19) 927. 
29 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (n 23) 1.  
30 Ibid 4.  
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multiple disputes; Argentina has responded to the most (52 cases), followed by 
Venezuela (34), Ecuador (23) and Mexico (21).31  
 
The US based NGO Food and Water Watch has expressed concern on the increasing 
number of cases initiated against developing countries and their outcomes.32 As it 
stated, of disputes against national governments in 2007,   
‘93 percent of the cases involve low- or middle-income developing countries…. 
ICSID tribunals have ruled in favor of the investor and ordered the government 
to pay compensation in nearly 70 percent of cases.’33 
These statistics call attention to the importance of the treatment host developing 
countries receive from investment tribunals.34 Withdrawal from the ICSID system by 
some developing countries, including Venezuela35 and Ecuador,36 is also suggestive of 
serious problems. 
 
1.2.3 FET Standard in International Investment Treaties  
 
The FET standard is perhaps the most popular standard for the investors in 
international law in bringing a claim in an investment dispute.37 Foreign investors 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 See e.g. Food and Water Watch, ‘World Bank Court Grants Power to Corporations’ (n 23).   
33 Ibid. Also see e.g. Anderson and Grusky ‘Challenging Corporate Investor Rule’ (n 23).  
34 This concern has been expressed by the Bolivian President who stated, "Governments in Latin 
America and I think all over the world never win the cases. The transnationals always win.” See e.g. 
Jamaica-Gleaner, “Venezuela to Sell Off US Refineries,” Taipei Times, 1 May 2007 <http://jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20070501/business/business1.html> accessed 27 August 2014; Also see e.g. James 
M Roberts, ‘If the Real Simón Bolívar Met Hugo Chávez, He’d See Red’ The Heritage Foundation, 
August 2007) 
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/08/if-the-real-simoacuten-boliacutevar-met-hugo-
chaacutevez-hed-see-red> accessed 27 August 2014.  
35See e.g. Sergey Ripinsk, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’ 
<http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-
achieve/ > accessed 20 August 2014.  
36 See e.g. <http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-422-1266?service=arbitration> accessed 20 August 2014.   
37Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n1) 168; Sornarajah, ‘The Retreat of 
Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n1) 287; Christoph Schreur, ‘Fair and Equitable 
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frequently invoke it in investor-state disputes, with a considerable amount of success. 
Legal scholars have called it the ‘golden rule’ of investment treaties,38 acknowledged its 
‘almost ubiquitous presence’ in investment litigation,39 and called it the ‘alpha and 
omega’ of investor state-arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.40 It has a potentially 
elastic nature that aggrieved foreign investors when seeking compensation for host 
countries’ actions favor. Dolzer and Schreur call attention to this elasticity, saying the 
standard’s purpose is to fill the gap other treaty standards may leave.41 An UNCTAD 
study says almost every current investment dispute uses the FET standard, and that 
unfair administrative or governmental conduct that falls under no specific treaty 
obligation and the FET standard fills this gap.42 The majority of disputes this thesis will 
discuss included a claim of breach of FET standard. As a ‘catch-all’,43 FET is the most 
important and far-reaching standard among the international investment treaties. 
Sornarajah has raised concerns over the frequent use of the standard.44 Likewise 
UNCTAD observed in a study that, 
‘There is a great deal of uncertainty concerning the precise meaning of the 
concept, because the notions of “fairness” and “equity” do not connote a clear 
set of legal prescriptions in international investment law and allow for a 
significant degree of subjective judgment. Some tribunals have read an extensive 
list of disciplines into the FET clause, which are taxing on any State, but especially 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (2005) 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 357; Harten, International 
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 1) 87.  
38 Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law f Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010) 218.  
39 Rudlof Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (2005) 39   
International Lawyer 87.  
40 Charles Brower, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2002) 96 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 9.  
41 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 3) 122. 
42 Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II 
(UNCTAD 2012) 7 <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf> accessed 20 May 2014.  
43 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 1) 168.   
44 Sornarajah, ‘The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 1) 287.  
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on developing and least-developed countries; lack of clarity persists regarding the 
appropriate threshold of liability.’45 [Emphasis added] 
 
Therefore although the standard is the most important standard in investment treaties, 
the frequent use of the standard by foreign investors has nevertheless created a risk for 
the developing countries. The expansive interpretation of the FET standard by 
investment tribunals was one of the reasons for Bolivia withdrawing from ICSID in 
2007, following an allegation that the ICSID tribunals have tailored the standard in 
favour of the foreign investors.46 
 
1.2.4 Scholarship on the FET standard  
 
There are a wide range of scholarly writings on the FET standard, and considerable 
controversy about it.47 This section will discuss some of this literature in order to 
                                                          
45Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (UNCTAD 2012) 43< 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf > accessed 2 September 2014.  
46 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n1) 170.  Also see e.g. Fernando 
Cabrera  Diaz, ‘Bolivia Expounds on Reasons for Withdrawing from ICSID Arbitration System’  
Investment Treaty News, 27 May  2007; Gabriela Molina, ‘Ecuador Wary of World Bank Arbitration in 
Occidental Case’ The Washington Post, 11 May  2008.  
47 For an account of scholarly writings on the standard see, e.g. Stephen Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ (1999) 70 British Yearbook 
of International Law 99; Dolzer, ‘Fair And Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard In Investment Treaties’  
(n 39);  Brower, ‘Fair And Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (n 40); Katia 
Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments’ in August Reinisch (ed),  
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008) 111; Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment  (Oxford University Press 2008);  Francis A 
Mann, ‘British Treaties For The Promotion And Protection of Investments’ (1999) 52 The British Year 
Book of International Law  242; Hussein Haeri, ‘A Tale Of Two Standards: ‘Fair And Equitable 
Treatment’ and The Minimum Standard In International Law’ (2011) 27(1) Arbitration International 27; 
Graham Mayeda, ‘Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair And Equitable Treatment In Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ (2007) 41(3) Journal of World Trade 273; Roland Kläger, ‘Fair And Equitable Treatment: A 
Look at The Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy And Fairness’ (2010) 11(3) Journal of World 
Investment and Trade 435; Roland Kläger,  Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2011); Stephen W.  Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment 
Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law’ (2006) 3(5) Transnational Dispute Management; Peter 
Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 527; Thomas 
Westcott, ‘Recent Practice on Fair and Equitable Treatment” (2007)8 Journal of World Investment and 
Trade 409; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Normative Basis of “Fair and Equitable Treatment” in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2008)46 Archiv des Völkerrechts 74; Christoph Schreur,  ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (2005) 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 357; Patrick G Foy and 
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explain the common elements in approaches to interpretation, although a majority of 
scholars do not significantly define the term. They have placed emphasis upon the 
summarisation of the case law and discussed the contents of the standard identified by 
the arbitral jurisprudence.  The inherent vagueness of the standard is a key element that 
scholars invariably identify.  
 
A number of scholars argue the essence of the FET standard is fairness and equity. 
While this leaves these concepts open to interpretation, it is also the case that some 
argue fairness and equity do not play such clear roles in the standard. Kläger, for 
example, called the concept indeterminate, stating, ‘the underlying rationale of fairness 
and equity guiding the application of the standard is still very much an enigma which 
has yet to be properly addressed.’48 Muchlinski asserts that in this context the concepts 
of ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ are to a large extent interchangeable.49 This understanding 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Robert JC Deane, ‘Foreign Investment Protection Under Investment Treaties: Recent Developments 
Under Chapter 11 Of North American Free Trade Agreement’ (2001)16(2) ICSID Review- Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 299; J Christopher Thomas, ‘Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, 
State Practice and the Influence of Commentators’ (2002)17(1) ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 21; Patrick Dumberry, ‘The Quest To Define “Fair And Equitable Treatment” For Investors 
Under International Law-The Case of The NAFTA Chapter 11 Pope And Talbot Awards’ (2002)3 
Journal of World Investment 657; Barnali Choudhury, ‘Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law’ (2005) 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 
287; Christoph H Shcreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interaction with other Standards’ 
(2007) 4(5) Transnational Dispute Management; RH Kreindler, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment-A 
Comparative International Law Approach’ (2006) 3(3) Transnational Dispute Management; Theodore 
Kill, ‘Don’t Cross the Streams: Past and Present Overstatement of Customary International law in 
Connection with Conventional Fair and Equitable Treatment Obligations’ (2008) 106 Michigan Law 
Review 853; Sornarajah, ‘The Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment: Whose Fairness? Whose Equity’ 
(n1)167; Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (2010) 43 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 43; J Roman Picherack, ‘The Expanding Scope 
of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Have Recent Tribunals Gone Too Far? (2008) 9 Journal of 
World Investment and Trade 255; M Klein Bronfman, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: An Evolving 
Standard’ in Armin von Bogdany and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) Max Planck Year Book of United Nations 
Law  Vol. 10 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 610; Jeand Kalicki and Suzana Medeiros, ‘Fair, Equitable 
and Ambiguous: What is Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law? (2007) 22(1) 
ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 24; Courtney C Kirkman, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: 
Methanex v. United States and the Narrowing Scope of NAFTA Article 1105’ (2003) 34 Law and Policy 
in International Business 343; Ignaciopinto-León, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under International Law: 
Analysing the Interpretation of the NAFTA Article 1105 by NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals’ (2006) 15 
Currents International Trade Law Journal 3.  
48 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and 
Fairness’ (n 47) 435.  
49 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 531 
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therefore suggests that fairness implies, among other things, equity. Muchlinski also 
opines that ‘equity’ itself is defined not only as synonymous with ‘fairness’ but ‘also the 
application of the principles of justice to correct or supplement the law.’50  
 
Therefore, there is an explicit connection between FET and notions of equity.51 
Nevertheless, Muchlinski thinks that the standard remains considerably uncertain.52 
Similarly Dolzer described ‘fair and equitable’ as ‘open-ended language’ that may 
amount to a ‘catch-all’ provision which embraces a very broad number of governmental 
acts.53 Haeri also asserts that, even though the arbitral tribunals have ‘etched out 
recognisable, if evolving, parameters’ of the standard in investment disputes in the last 
decade, its ambit and threshold nevertheless remained largely indeterminate.54 Schreuer 
also thinks that the FET standard is ‘relatively imprecise’ and that its meaning ‘will often 
depend on the specific circumstances of the case at issue.’55 Choudhury thinks that this 
‘amorphous’ standard has created misunderstandings among the academics, 
governments, and investors regarding its scope.56 Picherack expressed concern over the 
fact that, since the scope of the FET standard in different international investment 
treaties largely remains unresolved, the ‘differences in the interpretation and application 
of the standard may translate into differences of hundreds of millions of dollars in 
tribunal awards.’57 Similarly, Kalick and Medeiros also think that, despite the growing 
importance of the standard, its ‘content and parameters remain ambiguous, uncertain 
and subject to debate.’58 Dolzer and Stevens in their book assert that, ‘nearly all recent 
                                                          
50 Ibid 532; Also see e.g. HW Fowler, FG Fowler and RE Allen (eds), Concise Oxford Dictionary (8th 
edn, Claredon Press) 396. 
51 See e.g., Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 129-132.  
52 Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprise and the Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 635.  
53 Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (n 39) 87-88.  
54 Haeri (n 47) 27. 
55 Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (n 37) 364. 
56 Choudhury (n 47) 297.  
57 Picherack (n 47) 255.  
58 Kalicki and Medeiros (n 47) 25. 
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BITs require that investments and investors covered under the treaty receive “fair and 
equitable treatment,” in spite of the fact that there is no general agreement on the 
precise meaning of this phrase.’59  
 
Kläger considers FET a sophist norm (a flexible norm) as suggested by Franck.60 On 
that basis he thinks that it allows the production of more reasonable and just answers by 
directly invoking equitable standards.61 In his words,  
‘In relation to fair and equitable treatment this means that the norm’s 
determinacy defects do not necessarily lead to its illegitimacy, but rather provide 
the possibility of introducing notions of justice and fairness into its concept as a 
norm. The tension between legitimacy and equity appears, therefore, to be an 
element that is inherent in the very nature of fair and equitable treatment.’’62 
 
He further opines that ‘the vagueness of this norm triggers fervid controversies on the 
concrete meaning of fair and equitable treatment and causes great difficulties in its 
judicial application on particular factual situations.’63 Vasciannie describes the vague 
nature of FET as follows:  
‘Notwithstanding its currency in investment instruments, however, the fair 
and equitable standard still prompts a number of difficult questions in 
international law. So, for example, the precise meaning of the concept is 
sometimes open to enquiry, not least because the notions of ‘fairness’ and 
‘equity’ do not automatically connote a clear set of legal prescriptions in 
some situations. Broadly speaking, most legal systems strive to achieve 
                                                          
59 Rudlof Dolzer and Margrete Stevent, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 58. 
60 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990) 74-75. 
61Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (n 47) 143. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid 315.  
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fairness and equity as a matter of course; however, when parties to a treaty 
agree, as a matter of positive law, that fair and equitable treatment must be 
granted to foreign investors, it may be presumed that the parties accept a 
common standard of treatment. One of the challenges in this area of law is 
to identify the main elements of this common standard, if indeed they 
exist.’64   
 
Kläger in his seminal work on the standard finds that FET is ‘not equipped with some 
intrinsic meaning, but is rather of an integrative and dynamic nature enabling the 
establishment of inter-systemic linkages within the international legal system.’65 He 
argues that the arbitrators do not want to engage in such a ‘shaky and controversial area 
as the doctrinal concept of the fair and equitable treatment.’66 Kläger claims, however, 
that certain patterns of arguments have emerged within the arbitral jurisprudence to fill 
in the gap of the concept of the standard ‘with a sense of content.’67 He terms such 
patterns of arguments as the ‘topoi’, as a source of those arguments upon which the 
arbitrators decide a case.68 These topoi are legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, 
fair-procedure, transparency, and proportionality.69 
 
Tudor’s extensive work construes FET as a ‘standard’ which represents a particular type 
of norm.70 She emphasises its nature as a broad and indeterminate concept, a 
discretionary power of the arbitrator/judge, the flexible nature which allows the 
investor to adapt to new situations, a link between law and society, a reference point of 
                                                          
64 Vasciannie (n 47) 101. 
65 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 115. Also see Kläger, ‘Fair and 
Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and Fairness’ (n 47).  
66 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 116.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Tudor (n 47) 114-115. 
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which is average social conduct, and a reference to conformity of national law with 
international law.71 But none of these elements clearly defines what the standard entails.  
 
Schill suggests that the concept of FET is an embodiment of the rule of law.72 
Therefore he suggests applying a comparative law methodology to identify the common 
features of the two doctrines. He refers to the object and purpose of the investment 
treaties, which aims to protect and promote foreign investment flows and economic 
growth in the host country, to provide a normative justification of this approach.73 
However due to indeterminacy of the concept of rule of law in international law, other 
scholars contest his view.74  
 
Different scholars have emphasised different elements and principles as vital to explain 
the FET standard. Dolzer makes an argument that the FET standard is closely tied with 
the protection of foreign investor’s legitimate expectations.75 Others describe these 
expectations as a major component of the standard.76 Schreur, for example, thinks that, 
although FET ‘may be reminiscent of the extralegal concepts of fairness and equity’, it 
should not be confused with the concept of ex aequo et bono.77 He further opines that 
FET ‘is a legal concept that is susceptible to interpretation and application by a tribunal 
without an authorization by the parties to go beyond the law and to apply equitable 
principles.’78 Vasciennie explains the two approaches to the meaning of the standard.79 
                                                          
71 Ibid 115. 
72 See e.g. Schill ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule 
of Law’ (n 47). 
73 Ibid. 30-31. 
74 See e.g. Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 127-128.  
75 Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (n 39) 100-106. 
76 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 3) 135; Abhijit PG Pandya and Andy 
Moody, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration: An Unclear Future’ (2011) 15 Tilburg 
Law Review 93, 105; Vasciannie (n 47) 99.  
77 Schreur, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (n 37) 365.   
78 Ibid.    
79 Vasciennie (n 47) 102-105. 
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The first approach is the plain meaning approach based on Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of the Treaties, 1969: where a straightforward assessment to be 
made whether the particular treatment in question was fair and equitable to the 
investor.80 The second approach is the ‘equating approach’ where the standard is 
explained with reference to minimum standard under international law.81 However he 
also describes the difficulties of these two approaches to explaining the term. The 
inherent vagueness makes it difficult to explain the standard using the plain meaning 
approach as the term in itself is subjective and that there is no body of law or existing 
legal precedents as to what is ‘fair and equitable’. It is also complicated to explain it on 
the basis of the ‘equating’ approach as the principles which form the basis of the 
minimum standard under international law are themselves very contentious. There is 
considerable debate between the developed and developing countries over whether this 
has become part of customary international law. 82 Vandevelde in the title of his article 
suggests that he is proposing ‘a unified theory’ of the FET standard.83 However he 
actually explicates four principles—reasonableness, consistency, non-discrimination, 
and transparency—and attempts to categorise all past arbitral awards using the FET 
into either one or more of these categories. Muchlinski in his thought-provoking article 
suggests that investor conduct should shape the application of the FET standard as 
well.84  
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Ibid 103. 
81 Ibid 104. 
82 Ibid 102-105. 
83 See e.g., Vandevelde ‘A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (n 47). 
84 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor’ (n 47).  
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Overall, while scholars have tried to identify certain elements or contents of the FET 
standard to explain its meaning, none of these elements amount to an exhaustive list of 
contents, and all commentators agree on the standard’s inherent vagueness. Rather, 
each author has made an empirical study of past awards to define the standard. It is to 
be noted that, no scholar has applied this concept in any depth from the perspective of 
the host developing countries. Those very few who have touched on the issue have 
discussed the matter in terms of the role of investment treaties and FDI on 
development in host developing countries or from the view point of investor’s 
responsibility for the risk in investing in developing countries or with reference to 
investment treaty standards of protection in general.85 These commentaries do not 
particularly focus their discussion on the FET standard. These also do not 
comprehensively discuss and analyse how the tribunals have treated the development 
issues of the host developing countries. However there is a wide range of scholarship 
and commentary on the arbitrator’s scope to apply discretionary powers in the 
interpretation of the FET standard.  These discretionary powers provide enough space 
for the overarching argument of this thesis; that the arbitrators need to reconceptualise 
the FET standard to address the host developing countries perspectives. The following 
section will focus on the scholarship which discusses the importance of the arbitrators’ 
discretionary powers in interpretation of the standard from the perspectives of the host 
developing countries.   
 
                                                          
85 See e.g., Mayeda (n 47); Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47); Andrew Newcombe, ‘Sustainable 
Development and Investment Treaty Law’ (2007)8 Journal of World Investment and Trade 357; Maria 
Gritsenko, ‘Relevance of the Host State’s Development Status in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Freya 
Baetens (ed), Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 346; Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Are Investment Treaty Standards Flexible Enough to Meet the Needs of 
Developing Countries’ in Freya Baetens (ed),  Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives  
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 337.  
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1.2.5 The Importance of the Arbitrators’ Discretionary Powers in Interpreting 
FET 
 
An OECD report describes the vagueness of the FET standard as an intentional 
measure to give arbitrators scope to articulate the necessary principles.86 Similarly, 
Tudor identifies FET as a standard representing particular types of norms and including 
various elements, one of which is ‘a large margin of manoeuvre left to the 
arbitrator/judge and a very flexible character, which allows it to adopt to a variety of 
circumstances.’87 Her analysis encompasses the fact that, in contrast to a rule, a standard 
is a norm that demonstrates a relatively lesser degree of textual precision and therefore 
allows the decision maker a relatively high degree of discretion.88 Accordingly she 
concludes that the standard has no “stable or fixed content”89 and that it ‘allows a 
continuous adaptation of the law to the changing social and economic circumstances’.90 
Accordingly she thinks that judge and arbitrators have a creative role and that they 
exercise their discretionary power by taking into account ‘the average values and 
behaviours of a society at a given moment in time’.91 Accordingly she argues that the 
FET standard depends on the particular facts of each case, the evolutionary nature of 
the standard, and arbitrators’ appreciation of a country’s general situation.92 In her 
words, ‘The vague and abstract notion of FET becomes concrete and it is the arbitrator 
                                                          
86 Fair and Equitable Standard in International Investment Law Working Papers on International 
Investment Law No. 2004/3 (OECD 2004) 2 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2014. However for a criticism of this view adopted in OECD report see e.g., 
Sornarajah, ‘The Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment: Whose Fairness? Whose Equity’, (n 1) 167-
181. On this point Sornarajah argues that the early treaties did not create compulsory arbitration. 
Therefore in his view at least as far as the older treaties are concerned, this reason for inclusion of the 
FET standard may be doubted. He further goes on with more extreme views that, this explanation 
assumes that in a document that contains limitations on their sovereignty, the state parties agreed that a 
casually appointed arbitrator should have the capricious discretion as to show their sovereignty and 
should be limited in the future.   
87 Tudor (n 47) 115.  
88 Kathleen M Sullivan, ‘Forward: The Justice of Rules and Standards’ (1992) 106 Harvard Law Review 
22, 58-59. 
89 Tudor (n 47) 133. 
90 Ibid 121. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid 129-133. 
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who—in the case of FET—breathes life into the standard.’93 She describes the 
arbitrators as having discretionary powers to consider the circumstances of the host 
countries surrounding the investment disputes without facing allegation of deciding the 
matter ex aequo et bono.  
 
Harten’s commentary on the international investment law regime also supports Tudor’s 
view of arbitrators’ powers: ‘Under the investment Treaties, it is clear that the scope and 
the substance of the adjudicative role is expressed at a high level of generality and that 
this allocates considerable discretion to arbitrators.’94 He considers an element of 
discretion and policy choice to be inherent and reasonable in any adjudicative process 
and notes that people may differ on how much discretion is appropriate.95 Harten 
further opines that ‘…behind the investor rights approach is a normative construction 
of investor protection as something so vital, so dominant, as to be treated [as] an end in 
itself.’96  In the context of FET, Harten’s view is useful to understand the scope of the 
arbitrators to accommodate the perspectives of the host developing countries. As 
Harten opines, ‘..where a dispute tests the limits of the adjudicative process in general, 
because of its complexity or the treaty’s ambiguity, adjudicators should afford a margin 
of appreciation to the discretionary policy choices of domestic institutions.’97 
Accordingly Harten asserts, ‘It is true that most of the treaties favour the historical 
position of capital-exporting states, and as such, investor protection, but there remains 
room for discretion.’98 
 
                                                          
93 Ibid 132. 
94 Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 1) 122. 
95 Ibid 123.  
96 Ibid 139.  
97 Ibid 145.   
98 Ibid 132.   
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Muchlinski also opines that the element of equity inherent in the standard in the legal 
sense refers to a degree of flexibility arising out of sensitivity with the need to apply 
rules with discretion implying that equity as an aspect of international law.99 Therefore 
this gives the scope for the arbitrators to consider the particular circumstances of the 
host country and make a proper balance between the host countries’ interest and the 
investors’ interests in light of equity. Emphasising the importance of considering the 
context of the standard, Muchlinski states,  
‘A purely literal approach to the interpretation of legal terms is often very 
incomplete. The term(s) in question must be reviewed in the light of the context 
and policy behind their use. In this connection, it should be recalled that the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, as part of the wider international minimum 
standard of treatment for aliens, has been described as an evolving one that is 
not ‘frozen in time’ and that it is a constant process of development. 
Accordingly, the meaning of the standard should be determined in the context 
of the value system that underlines the international investment protection 
treaties in which these terms can be found.’100 
 
Accordingly Muchlinski raises the concern that too much investor protection will create 
an impression that the ‘national sovereignty has been given up to control by faceless 
international tribunals, whose decisions may restrict the regulatory powers of host 
countries.’ 
 
Hart’s statement that, where the meaning of law is doubtful, the judges have the 
discretion to ‘make a choice’ by way of weighting and balancing extra-legal interests and 
                                                          
99 Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprise and the Law (n 52) 636. 
100 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 533. Also see Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprise and the Law (n 
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the moral values, provides a response to such concerns.101 The advocates of legal 
positivism suggest that the free and creative activity of the judges or arbitrators should 
decide complicated cases.102 By contrast Kläger argues that the vagueness of a norm like 
FET could reveal a ‘penumbra of uncertainty,’ as Hart describes, by giving the decision 
maker ‘a certain leeway’.103 Accordingly, Kläger asserts, ‘fairness discourse on fair and 
equitable treatment’ needs to ‘accommodate the inevitable tension between the political 
pull to change and the economic rationale for stability.’104 He calls on arbitral tribunals 
to justify why they give particular weight to the facts of the disputes and to explain why 
one argument has more success than another.105  
 
Thomas Franck’s seminal theory on fairness in international law,106 although he does 
not discuss it in relation to the FET standard, makes a valuable contribution in relation 
to concepts of fairness in international investment law.107 He suggests that fairness 
discourse can balance the tension between stability and change inherent in foreign 
investment.108 He stated, ‘the power of a court to do justice depends….on the 
persuasiveness of the judges’ discourse, persuasive in the sense that it reflects not their 
own, but society’s value preferences.’109 Referencing this, Kläger argues ‘Fair and 
equitable treatment invites arbitrators ‘…to do justice’, but thereby also discloses the 
tension that relates to the legitimacy of their decisions.110 According to Franck, such 
                                                          
101 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn., Claredon Press 1997) 132 and 200. 
102Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 120. On legal positivism in 
international law see e.g. Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, (6th edn,  Cambridge University Press 
2008) 49 et seq 
103 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 148; Hart, Concept of Law (n 
101) 12. 
104 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 150. Such balancing function 
also has been pronounced in Saluka Tribunal. See e.g. Saluka vs. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 
March 2006 Para 300. 
105 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 152. 
106 See e.g., Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2008).  
107 Ibid ‘Chapter 14: Fairness in International Investment Law’ 438-478 
108 Ibid 438-441. 
109 Ibid 34. 
110 Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (n 47) 144.   
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tension is to be managed within a fairness discourse.111 He describes important features 
of such discourse in international investment law as follows: 
‘The discourse may be dispute-specific or it may be general and normative. In 
either instance, however, it will be about the tension between change and 
stability, as also about the extent to which law should reflect political or 
economic imperatives. It will also be about balancing the social need to induce 
capital growth against political claims to redistribute justice. However intense 
the dispute, there is more at stake for the system than the specific interests of 
the disputing parties. The most important source of development capital for 
poor countries is the private sector of rich ones. That makes it an essential 
global priority that a transnational compact between investors and host 
governments be built—investment agreement by investment agreement, treaty 
by treaty, and state practice by state practice—and that its perceived fairness in 
text and in operation give it the elasticity needed to accommodate the inevitable 
tension between the political pull to change and economic rationale for 
stability.’112   
 
In the international investment dispute context, the fact that the majority of the 
disputes concerning breach of the FET standard arise due to some regulatory actions 
taken by the host country produces this tension between change and stability. This 
produces inherent tension when the host country seeks, in response to, for instance, a 
crisis situation or for an important public interest, to change the regulatory policy that is 
likely to affect the foreign investment. On the other side, the investors seek the stability 
to ensure that the legal environment under which they invested should remain stable so 
that their investment is unaffected. As this thesis will show, the facts of disputes make 
                                                          
111 Ibid 144.   
112 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 106) 441.  
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the tensions between political needs for change and the economic rationale for stability 
Franck describes evident.  
 
In sum, a number of scholars have identified the tension between foreign investors and 
host countries regarding the scope of the FET standard, but no clear way to mitigate 
this tension emerges. As Kriebaum states there is enough inherent flexibility in the FET 
standard to consider the perspectives of the host developing countries; in her words:  
‘It is generally acknowledged that the standard of fair and equitable treatment is 
relatively broad and that its application depends on the precise facts of each 
case. The investor's legitimate expectations at the time of the investment are 
frequently considered by tribunals when violations of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard are at stake. It stands to reason that the level of development 
as well as the economic, social and political circumstances prevailing in a 
particular country at the time of the investment are relevant to the 
reasonableness of an investor's expectations.’113[footnotes in the original text 
omitted] 
 
Accordingly she further argues that ‘there is flexibility in the legal standards in 
investment law to take account of the different stages of development across 
nations’.114The question therefore arises: do arbitrators in fact adequately consider the 
perspectives of host developing countries in their interpretation of the FET standard? 
Of equal importance, do they demonstrate explicitly that they have done so in their 
decisions? As Kläger states,  
                                                          
113 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under 
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‘A doctrinal approach that amounts to nothing more than the categorisation of 
lines of jurisprudence, in order to simplify fair and equitable treatment by the 
specification of factors and fact situations possibly indicating a breach of the 
standard, is unable to guide arbitrators in difficult cases. This is because such a 
lowering of complexity will never lead to a scheme that is detailed enough so as 
to cover all difficult cases. Therefore, a comprehensive doctrinal concept needs 
to go beyond a mere analysis of case law and be capable of indicating, in 
difficult cases as well, what justificatory arguments are admissible.’115 
 
This thesis examines whether the arbitrators have appropriately taken into account the 
perspectives of host developing countries and whether they have adequately articulated 
them in their judgements; have they taken into account developing countries 
perspectives in a manner which sufficiently addresses the developmental challenges of 
these host countries relevant to the particular investment dispute? Kläger’s view 
accurately describes the approaches of the current investment tribunals, particularly 
with reference to difficult cases. Despite the lack of a precise meaning of the standard, 
the arbitral tribunals have developed some broad principles for the application of the  
FET standard. These broad principles include good faith, obligation of full protection 
and security,116 freedom from coercion and harassment,117 denial of justice and due 
process,118 lack of arbitrariness and non-discrimination,119 transparency and stability,120 
                                                          
115 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in International’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 121. 
116 See e.g. Occidental Exploration and Production Company vs. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA No. UN 
3467, Award 1 July 2004 Paras 180-192; Azurix vs. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Award 14 July 2006 Para 408; For a comprehensive discussion on the standard of full protection and 
security see e.g. Giuditta Cordero Moss, ‘ Full Protection and Security’  in  August Reinisch (ed)  
‘Standards of Investment Protection’ (Oxford University Press 2008) 131-150. 
117 Pope & Talbot vs. Canada, Award 10 April 2001, 7 ICSID Reports 102. For a detailed discussion on 
Pope & Talbot  see e.g. Dumberry (n 47 )  
118 See e.g. Metaclad Corporation vs. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award 30 August 2000, 
5 ICSID Reports 212 Para 91; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. vs. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Award 12 April 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 178 Para 143; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A vs. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/02, Award 29 May 2000, 43 International Legal 
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legitimate expectations of the investor,121 and the principle of proportionality.122 
However, the tribunals have discussed the FET standard according to these principles, 
but more from the perspective of investors rather than host countries. They have not 
come up with any concrete list of elements relevant to developing countries in order to 
interpret the standard appropriately in each and every case and in complicated 
situations. Thus Small has rightly said:  
‘It is too early to say whether we are witnessing a sign of evolution of the 
international custom as it is also too early to establish a definitive list of 
elements for the interpretation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard 
since the jurisprudence is still constantly evolving.’123  
 
These ever expanding interpretations rendered by the tribunals are not sufficient to 
address the difficult issues, as Kläger rightly points out. Therefore this thesis identifies 
some of the difficult cases that demand a reconceptualised interpretation of the FET 
standard, which would accommodate the challenges and difficulties of the host 
developing countries in difficult situations that this thesis identifies. Thereby it seeks to 
suggest how future tribunals might reconceptualise the FET standard with a view to 
accommodate the needs of host developing countries.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Materials (2004) 133 Para 162; Mondev International Ltd vs. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/99/2, Award 11 October 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 192 Para 96. 
119 CMS Gas Transmission Company vs. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 12 
May 2005 44 International Legal Materials (2005) 1205 Para 290; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. And MTD Chile 
S.A vs. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award 25 May 2004, 12 ICSID Reports 6; PSEG 
Global vs. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award 19 January 2007. 
120 Tecmed (n 118) Paras 167, 172 and 173; Emilio Agustín Maffezini vs. The Kingdom of Spain, Award 
13 November 2000, 5 ICSID Report 419 Para 83. 
121 CMS (n 119) Para 284;  Saluka (n 104) Para 302; LG & E Energy Corp, LG & E Capital  Corp and LG 
&E International Inc. vs. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability Award 
3 October 2006, 46 International Legal Materials (2007) 36.  
122 SD Myers vs. Government of Canada, Partial Award, 12 November 2000, 40 International Legal 
Materials 1408 Paras 263-264; Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil SA vs. Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award 18 August, 2008 Para 320. 
123 Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Development’ (n 47) 130. 
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1.3 Contribution of the Study  
 
Very few theoretical and even fewer in-depth case studies look at the issues host 
developing countries face and the economic and socio-political contextual background 
of these countries in relation to investment disputes. A number of scholars have argued 
in favour of taking a host developing country’s level of development before rendering 
any awards against them,124 without comprehensively covering the full range of issues 
host developing countries incur. Existent scholarship has to date only engaged with a 
few selected awards which have been broadly criticized for unfairly affecting specific 
host countries.125 These studies have also offered a broader discussion in relation to all 
investment protection standards and have not focused specifically on the FET standard. 
The large volume of investment disputes against developing countries and the constant 
presence of the FET standard in all these disputes makes an in-depth study of the FET 
standard necessary from a development perspective. This thesis aims to examine the full 
range of approaches to determine how the tribunals might adequately address the socio-
political and economic contextual background of each host developing country. It will 
examine how the FET standard can be reconceptualised from the perspectives of host 
developing countries. It aims to make a significant contribution to the literature in the 
following ways.  
                                                          
124 See e.g. Nick Gallus, ‘The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development  on International 
Investment Treaty Standards of Protection’ (2005) 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 711; 
Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113); Kriebaum, ‘Are Investment Treaty Standards Flexible Enough to Meet the Needs of 
Developing Countries’ (n 85) ; Gritsenko (n 85) 341; Muchlinski discusses the relevance of investor’s 
conduct in investment disputes, suggesting the term ‘caveat investor’ which implies that the investors 
have a responsibility to know the risk of investing in developing countries and needs to considered 
keeping in mind that risk when taking any decision against the host developing countries. See e.g. 
Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47).  This phrase has also been used by another author, see e.g. L Yves 
Fortier and Stephen L Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know it 
When I see it, or Caveat Investor’ (2004) 19 ICSID Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 293.  
125For example the Awards against Argentina in the event of their economic crisis.  See e.g. Amin George 
Forji, ‘Drawing the Right Lessons from ICSID Jurisprudence on the Doctrine of Necessity’ (2010) 76 
Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 44; Michael 
Waibel, ‘Two Words of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 637; LF Castillo Argañarás, ‘CMS Gas Transmission Company vs. The Republic of 
Argentina-The Defense Raised by Argentina’ (2004) 1 Transnational Dispute Management (2004). 
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First, this thesis provides a detailed analysis of the historical development of the FET 
standard, with particular reference to the role developed and developing countries have 
played and their conflicting interests over investor protection standards. To understand 
the debates and controversies surrounding the scope of the standard and its relation to 
the minimum standard of treatment under international law and customary international 
law, this thesis adopts a unique classification of the construction of the FET standard 
that exists across different investment treaties.  
 
Second, this thesis identifies the complexity of classification of countries put forward by 
different international organisations based on economic and social criteria of 
development and the diversity that exists across these countries. But the thesis argues 
that these different classifications by different international organisations do not 
provide much useful guidance in understanding the issues relevant to host developing 
countries in an investment dispute context. The thesis identifies a series of 
developmental issues which are relevant to the investment disputes. It calls for the 
particular challenges of the host developing countries due to those issues to be taken 
into account by the investment tribunals in order to deal with these large group of host 
countries more appropriately.  
 
Third, this thesis provides an elaborate and detailed examination of the interpretation of 
the FET standard of key arbitral awards affecting host developing countries to 
demonstrate the full range of different approaches of the interpretation adopted by the 
current investment tribunals. Such approaches will also demonstrate how the tribunals 
have addressed (for the most part, inadequately) the host developing countries 
perspectives in the investment disputes.  
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Fourth, this thesis identifies the key problems of such interpretation of the FET 
standard rendered by the current investment tribunals. It points out the inadequacy of 
such approaches towards the issues faced by developing countries and in some 
instances the inconsistencies on substantive issues where, in the majority of the cases, 
tribunals have failed to adequately address key developmental challenges.  
 
Fifth, this thesis argues that it is possible to reconceptualise the FET standard to 
consider the perspectives of host developing countries, accommodating the challenges 
that these host developing countries face due to their particular circumstances to reflect 
better the notions of fairness and equity inherent in the standard.   
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 
The primary research questions that this thesis examines are as follows:  
(i) What are the different constructions of the FET standard in different 
investment treaties and how do those different constructions affect the 
arbitral tribunals’ interpretation of the scope of the standard? Despite these 
various constructions, is there an overarching and singular concept of the 
FET standard that this thesis can examine in detail?  
(ii) Are the different classifications of countries adopted by different 
international organisations useful to understand the developmental issues of 
the host developing countries in an investment dispute context?  
(iii) How might the tribunals might identify a concept of development and host 
developing countries that is appropriate to the investment dispute context?  
(iv) What are the different approaches the current investment tribunals have 
adopted to interpret the FET standard in the disputes against developing 
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countries? To what extent have they taken into account the particular 
developmental issues and the contextual background of those countries 
relevant to the investment dispute (i.e. their socio-political and economic 
conditions or their transitory status)?  
(v) What are the key problems of such interpretation of the FET standard by 
the current arbitral tribunals and why are these significant for the host 
developing countries?   
(vi) How might the FET standard encompass the perspectives of host 
developing countries, and thereby accommodate productively the 
developmental issues, challenges and other circumstances of the host 
developing countries relevant to investment disputes? 
 
1.5 Methodology  
 
This thesis uses a qualitative method of research to suit its interpretative approach, 
analysis, and character. Based upon evaluating the literature and scholarship on the 
issues, debates, commentaries, and controversies surrounding the research theme, it 
focuses on materials available in libraries. The method includes an in-depth 
investigation from the historical point of view to describe the development of the 
concept of the FET standard and various constructions of the standard in the current 
BITs and other investment treaties; a critical analysis and examination of selected 
arbitral awards to demonstrate the full range of approaches adopted by the current 
tribunals to address the developmental issues and the economic and socio-political 
contextual background of the host developing countries on an alleged breach of the 
FET standard.  The arbitral awards, various international investment treaties (including 
BITs, regional and multilateral treaties), and Conventions on international investments 
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provide the primary sources. The secondary sources include reference books, research 
journals, working papers, websites, and other relevant publications by international 
organisations.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis   
 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters.  
 
Chapter 1, the present chapter, provides an introduction to the thesis by providing a 
brief background of the issues and framework of the research topic, the existing 
scholarship on the standard, presenting the research questions, its contribution to 
existing knowledge, and the methodology used to conduct the research.   
 
Chapter 2 provides an account of the historical development of the FET standard; 
showing that it emerged under the auspices of multinational treaties which never came 
into force. But the standard survived because developed countries pushed it forward in 
numerous BITs.  The chapter also discusses the various events that have contributed to 
the development of the standard in various investment treaties, with particular reference 
to the role developed and developing countries have played in the process of drafting 
and adoption of such treaties.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an elaborate account of different constructions of the FET 
standard in various investment treaties. It discusses the significance of different 
constructions for the interpretation of the standard by investment tribunals. Ultimately 
it concludes that despite the differences in different constructions, there is sufficient 
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similarity across different treaties to support the claim that an all-embracing concept of 
the FET standard can be the subject of detailed analysis within this thesis.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the complexity of classification of developing 
countries by different international organisations and scholars who have written on this 
issue. The chapter concludes by suggesting the need for a concept of developing 
countries that is appropriate for the investment dispute context.  
 
Chapter 5 makes an in-depth analysis of selected arbitral awards to demonstrate the 
wide range of approaches current arbitral tribunals have adopted to address the 
developmental issues of the host developing countries relevant to their socio-political 
circumstances. This includes consideration of developing countries who are facing 
political crises or other serious socio-political issues, which are a significant factor for 
these countries and form an important contextual background to the disputes. It argues 
that the tribunals in some instances have been inconsistent in their approach to this 
issue and in many instances have inadequately addressed the socio-political context of 
the host developing country. 
 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion on some selected arbitral awards to demonstrate the 
various approaches the current tribunals have adopted in relation to countries in 
transition. These countries have become the centre of attention after the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union. This chapter argues that, in addressing the particular transitory 
status of these countries, the tribunals have inadequately addressed the particular issues 
and challenges of these countries relevant to the investment dispute in question and also 
in some instances have been inconsistent.   
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Chapter 7 provides a detailed discussion of arbitral awards in cases where the dispute 
arose out of the economic crisis of the host developing countries. This chapter argues 
that in the majority of the cases the tribunals dealing with the issue have done so 
inadequately and in some instances have come up with inconsistent decisions about the 
substantive issues relating to the state of necessity which is pivotal for a host country in 
the event of such a national crisis.  
 
Chapter 8 identifies the key cross-cutting problems of the current investment tribunals’ 
interpretations of the FET standard discussed in the preceding three chapters and the 
significance and impact of such interpretations for host developing countries. It 
concludes the thesis by discussing how the FET standard can be reconceptualised from 
the perspectives of the host developing countries, taking into account the countries’ 
developmental issues and the socio-political and economic conditions that form a 
contextual background to the dispute. It also summarises the arguments the thesis has 
made and its overarching argument.  
 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
This introductory chapter has established a foundation and overview for the thesis. 
Crucially, it explains the FET standard’s status as the most popular investment 
protection standard and its frequent use by foreign investors against host developing 
countries. It has also explained that, due to the high volume of disputes against 
developing countries and the significant economic impact of these disputes upon these 
countries, it is necessary to revisit the current approaches of the investment tribunals in 
their interpretation of the FET standard. It has also demonstrated that the existing 
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scholarship on the standard has universally agreed that vagueness is a core feature of the 
standard and that this provides arbitrators with leeway to exercise discretionary powers 
in their interpretation of it. It points outs that there is minimal scholarship investigating 
the interpretation of the FET standard from host developing countries’ perspectives in 
investment disputes.  
 
With these premises, this thesis aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the current 
arbitral awards demonstrating the inadequate and inconsistent approaches tribunals 
have adopted in their interpretation of the standard against host developing countries. It 
will argue how the FET standard can be reconceptualised from the perspectives of host 
developing countries.   
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Chapter 2 
The Historical Development of the FET Standard in International 
Investment Treaties 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will provide a detailed discussion of the historical development of the FET 
standard in different international investment treaties over the years.  It discusses, in 
chronological order, selected events that have influenced the inclusion of the FET 
standard as well as its language in different investment agreements and treaties at the 
regional, multilateral, or bilateral level. Contextualising these developments in the 
context of the socio-economic-political events in world history over the relevant period 
of time, it makes particular reference to the role played by the capital exporting 
developed countries and capital importing developing countries, as well as their 
conflicting interests in relation to the substantive issues those treaties address. This 
chapter will demonstrate that capital exporting developed countries advanced the 
development of the FET standard in multilateral agreements, and then more 
successfully in bilateral settings. Initially, many developing countries, particularly those 
from Latin America, appeared hostile to these developments, but developing countries 
increasingly have acquiesced to the inclusion of the FET standard; it has become an 
almost ever-present feature of international investment law.    
 
 
35 
 
2.1.a Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCNs) During the 
Eighteenth Century – The Starting Point of Investment Agreements   
 
The FCNs are the forerunners of modern BITs. In the late eighteenth century the 
United States initiated certain treaties to establish commercial relations with a number 
of leading European economic powers, including France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain containing rules on investment protection.126 These US 
FCNs did not contain any reference to terms like ‘fair’ or ‘equitable’ prior to the Havana 
Charter of 1948. However they provided a certain degree of protection to foreign 
investors through other investment protection standards.  
 
2.1. b The First Appearance of the FET Standard– The Havana Charter 1948 
 
The Havana Charter was a multilateral text prepared to establish an International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) of 1948.127 Article 11(2) empowered the ITO to make 
recommendations and promote bilateral or multilateral agreements on measures 
designed ‘(i) to assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts 
and technology brought from one Member country to another.’128 While this use of ‘just 
                                                          
126 See Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (1993) 14 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 621, 624; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 U.C. Davis Journals of International Law and Policy 157, 158. See e.g. 
US–Spain Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, 27 October 1795; US–Great Britain Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce and Navigation, 19 November 1794; US–Morocco Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 
January 1787; US–Prussia Treaty of Amity and Commerce, July 1785; US–Sweden Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce, 3 April 1783; US–The Netherlands Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 8 October 1782; US–
France Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 6 February 1778.  
127 Full text of the charter can be found at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf> accessed 
30 August 2014. Post-WWII, the United States first proposed establishing an international organisation 
with the aim of focusing primarily on trade matters in its Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and 
Employment of 1945. Along with the focus on international trade, an important objective of the Charter 
was to encourage economic development, especially in developing countries and to foster ‘the 
international flow of capital for productive investment’ (Article I). As a result the Havana Charter 
contained a number of provisions concerning foreign investment, and on the relationship between the 
State and foreign investor.   
128 International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. I (UNCTAD 1996) 4, 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/dtci30vol1_en.pdf> accessed 30 August 2014  
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and equitable’ established the precedent, the charter itself did not seek to guarantee this 
standard of treatment for investors; it merely authorised the ITO to recommend the 
inclusion of this standard in future agreements.129 Thus Vasciannie opines that Article 
11(2) was even less than a ‘pactum de contrahendo’130— less than an agreement to conclude 
a treaty or to include certain clauses in future treaties.131 This first post-war multilateral 
effort on trade and investment came to an unsuccessful conclusion and hence the 
Charter never came into force due inter alia to the US decision to abandon it in 1950.132  
However, the concept of FET it had introduced survived and found its place with a 
stronger position in the subsequent investment agreements, particularly in BITs.  
 
2.1.c The Bogota Agreement 1948 
 
During the same period, at the regional level, the Ninth International Conference of 
American States in 1948 adopted the Economic Agreement of Bogota, an agreement 
covering, among other things the provision of adequate safeguards for foreign 
investors.133 Article 22 of the draft agreement stated,  
‘Foreign capital shall receive equitable treatment. The States therefore agree 
not to take unjustified, unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would 
impair the legally acquired rights or interests of nationals of other countries 
in the enterprises, capital, skills, arts or technology they have supplied.’ 
                                                          
129 From the investors’ and capital exporting countries’ point of view, the fact charter’s inability to 
guarantee any protection of the standard, together with the fact that other provisions in the text only 
provided qualified protection in matters concerning expropriation and currency restrictions, paved the 
way for limiting the usefulness of the Charter.   
130 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and (n 47) 
110. 
131 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 31. 
132 On the discussion on politics behind the Havana Charter see e.g. Subedi, ‘International Investment 
Law’ (n 3) 732–733. 
133 Text of the agreement can be found at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-43.html> 
accessed 22 August 2014. 
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In addition to this, under Article 22 the states agreed not to set up ‘unreasonable or 
unjustified impediments that would prevent other states from obtaining on equitable 
terms the capital, skills, and technology needed for their economic development.’ The 
Bogota Agreement implies that all foreign capital, not simply the capital held by 
nationals of contracting states, should benefit from the standard.134 However like the 
Havana Charter, the Bogota Agreement failed to come into force for lack of support.135 
 
2.1.d Introducing FET in US FCN Treaties after the Havana Charter 
 
US FCN treaties began to use the terms ‘equitable’ and ‘fair and equitable’ treatment 
after the Havana Charter of 1948.136 For example, Article I (1) of the 1954 Treaty 
between Germany and the United States reads, ‘Each Party shall at all times accord fair 
and equitable treatment to the nationals and companies of the other Party and to their 
property, enterprises and other interests.’137 But the FET standard did not appear in 
every US FCN treaty. For instance, the US FCN Treaty with China did not contain any 
reference to the FET standard. 138 
 
                                                          
134 A significant majority of the multilateral and regional treaties and draft treaties are articulated in a 
different manner, clearly stating that the host country is liable only to the investors of other contracting 
parties, e.g., Article 1(a), Draft OECD Convention; Article 1, Draft Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI); Article 1105, NAFTA; Article 10, Energy Charter Treaty; Article IV (2), ASEAN 
Treaty.  
135 For discussion on the draft Bogota Agreement see, e.g. Raymond Dennett and Robert K Turner (eds), 
Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. X, (Princeton University Press, 1948) 515–527; Seymour J 
Rubin, Private Foreign Investment—Legal and Economic Realities (John Hopkins Press, 1956) 82; EI Nwogugu, 
The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries (Manchester University Press, 1965) 141. 
136 US FCN treaties with Ireland (1950), Greece (1954), Israel (1954), France (1960), Pakistan (1961), 
Belgium (1963) and Luxembourg (1963) contained the express assurance that foreign persons, properties, 
enterprises, and other interests would receive ‘equitable treatment’ while others, including those with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ethiopia, and the Netherlands used the terms ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
for a similar set of items involved in the foreign investment process. See e.g. Tudor (n 47) 19. 
137 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 29 October 1954, US-Federal Republic of Germany, 
273 UNTS 4.  
138 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Republic of China, signed at Nanking, 4 November 1946; came into force on 30 November 1948; for text 
see,  (1949) 43(1) The American Journal of International Law  27. 
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2.1.e The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention 1959 
 
The next major development concerning the standard was the Abs-Shawcross Draft 
Convention on Investment Abroad of 1959.139  In Article I it stated that  
‘Each party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
property of the nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall be 
accorded the most constant protection and security within the territories 
shall not in any way be impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures.’ 
While these words resembled those in most US FCN treaties, the Draft lacked the right 
of establishment for investors the US FCN treaties had established. However, due to its 
origin and because of its emphasis on investor protection, a number of scholars have 
described the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention as favouring the interests of capital 
exporting countries.140  
 
2.1.f The first BIT in 1959 and subsequent wave of BITs  
 
Pakistan and Germany signed the world’s first BIT in 1959,141 and it made no reference 
to the FET standard or  to phrases like ‘fairness’ or ‘equity’, but as BITs have 
proliferated in the 1960s, FET clauses became almost a common feature in BIT 
                                                          
139 The Draft Convention represented a private initiative by a number of European businessmen and 
lawyers and headed by Hermann Abs and Lord Shawcross. Text can be found at 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobedeleted/iia/docs/compendium/en/137%20volume%205.pdf> 
accessed 22 August 2014.  
140 See, e.g. Arthur Larson, ‘Recipients’ Rights Under and International Investment Code’ (1960) 9 Journal 
of Public Law  172, especially see at 172–175;  at 172 he states, ‘The principal flaw in the Draft Convention 
is its one sidedness. In form it is even-handed. That is, at every point the rights it confers and duties it 
exacts apply identically to “each party”. In same way, as Anatole France pointed out, the law forbids both 
the rich man and the poor man to sleep in the park. In substance, however, the entire concern of the 
Convention is the protection of the rights of the investor. There are no provisions motivated by concern 
for the rights of the host country.’  
141 Pakistan–Germany BIT, signed on 25 November 1959 and entered into force on 28 November, 1962 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/investment_pakistan_germany.pdf> accessed on 22 August 2014. 
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programmes.142 The international community’s failure to reach a consensus on a 
multilateral treaty has, in part, prompted the profusion of BITs since the 1950s; in 
effect, the major capital exporting countries have used BITs as a means of achieving 
their expectations, which were difficult to achieve at the multilateral level.143 European 
countries started the proliferation of BITs when they started enjoying considerable 
success in negotiating BITs, which fundamentally differed from the US FCNs in that 
they were devoted exclusively to investment protection.144  
 
For many developing countries BITs were a tangible way of indicating their receptivity 
to foreign investments and inviting the developed countries to invest. This trend has 
influenced the bargaining power of developed countries. BITs have become a popular 
and accepted instrument to promote and protect the inflow of foreign investment. 
However, the acceptance of BITs in Latin America is particularly noteworthy,145 since 
these countries have relied for decades on the Calvo doctrine in their foreign relations 
practice.146 The doctrine suggested that it would be inappropriate to offer higher 
                                                          
142 For a listing of several countries that entered into BITs in the 1960s see Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History 
of International Investment Agreements’ (n 126) 169–170. Also for a brief account of the development 
of the American BIT program see Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of 
the United States’  (1988) 21 Cornell International Law Journal  201, 209. 
143 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 125 citing Eileen Denza and Shelagh Brooks, ‘Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom 
Experience’ (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 908; Also see e.g., Salacuse The Law 
of Investment Treaties (n 38) 88–90. 
144 By 1967 it appeared that no country was willing any longer to conclude a US FCN treaty, and thereby 
the FCN programme in the US expired in that year.  See e.g. Kenneth J Vandevelde, United States 
Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1992) 19–20, See Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (n 126) 624–625. 
145 Latin American countries were the first group to gain independence from the European colonial 
powers. After independence these countries decreed that foreign investors were not entitled to any 
greater protection than that offered to their own domestic investors. They also deemed that sovereign 
governments could expropriate foreign investors’ properties with compensation. See e.g. Subedi, 
‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 729. Historically these developing countries favoured the Calvo 
doctrine while developed countries suggested state responsibility should protect the foreign investors. See 
e.g. Subedi, International Investment Law : Reconciling Policy and Principle  (n 1) 72.  
146 The Argentinean jurist and diplomat Carlos Calvo established the principle that foreigners’ are entitled 
to no better treatment than nationals of a host state and that the exclusive jurisdiction of the host state’s 
courts should establish the rights of foreigners. Thus the doctrine stated that customary international law 
did not require that the expropriation undertaken by the host country should be accompanied by 
‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’. The popular ‘Calvo Doctrine’ gained huge popularity 
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standard of protection to foreign investors than to locals, as some countries might not 
have attained the level of economic development required or have not acquired a 
developed legal system to offer such protection.147  The acceptance of international law 
standards in BITs and opening recourse to investor state dispute settlement represented 
a fundamental change in Latin American foreign policy in the 1960s.148  
 
2.1. g FCNs in the 1960s  
 
Investment protection became the primary purpose of the US FCNs after World War II 
(WWII).149 Originally the FCNs focused on provisions to protect the property of US 
nationals in the territory of the treaty partner.150  The United States signed FCN treaties 
with a number of Latin American and Asian countries between 1948 and 1966.151 By 
1967 there appeared to be no other countries willing to conclude a US FCN treaty.152 
                                                                                                                                                                    
among the Latin American states in relation to treatment of aliens. The doctrine also later found its 
apogee in the UN General Assembly resolutions relating to the New International Economic Order in 
the 1970s. See e.g. Article 2(2) (c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. On the Calvo 
doctrine see generally e.g. Donald Shea, The Calvo Clause (Minnesota University Press, 1955); Wenhua 
Shan, ‘Calvo Doctrine, State Sovereignty and The Changing Landscape of International Investment Law’ 
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Expropriation of Alien Property’ (1981) 75 The American Journal of International Law 553; Burns H 
Weston, ‘The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties and Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth’ (1981) 
75 The American Journal of International Law  437.  
147 Subedi, ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 730.  
148  Stephen W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 
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149 Herman Walker, Jr, ‘Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present 
United States Practice’ (1956) 5  The American Journal of Comparative Law 229, 230. 
150 Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (n 144) 14–19. 
151 For a detailed discussion see e.g. Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (n 
126) 624–625. For a detail discussion on later US FCN treaties see e.g. Harry C Hawkins, Commercial 
Treaties and Agreements (Rinehart 1951); Herman Walker, Jr, ‘Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation’ (1958) 42 Minnesota Law Review 805; Walker, ‘Treaties for the Encouragement and 
Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice’ (n 149) 229; Robert R Wilson, ‘A 
Decade of Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50 The American Journal of International Law 927; Robert R 
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International Law 262;  Robert R Wilson, ‘Property Protection Provisions in United States Commercial 
Treaties’, (1951) 45 The American Journal of International Law 83; Robert R Wilson, The International Law 
Standards in Treaties of the United States (Harvard University Press 1953).  
152 Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (n 126) 624; Vandevelde, United 
States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (n 150) 19. 
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They generally targeted developed countries, particularly European countries.153 The US 
FCN programme expired in 1966,154 and the FCN treaties it created contained very 
similar investment protection clauses, including the FET standard as well as other 
clauses like protection against expropriation, and full protection and security, though 
they varied on particular points of substance.155 Their main purpose was to promote 
international trade by establishing closer commercial and political relations between the 
contracting parties, especially in the aftermath of WWII.156  
 
2.1.h OECD Draft Convention of the Protection of Foreign Property, 1963 and 
1967 and its influence  
 
The Draft Convention of the Protection of Foreign Property developed by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was first 
published in 1963157 and revised in 1967.158 As the most influential of early post-war 
drafts on investment, it contained in Article 1, entitled  ‘Treatment of Foreign Property’ 
which closely followed the Abs-Shawcross Draft but carries more weight as precedent. 
It stated: 
‘(a) Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
property the nationals of the other Parties. It shall accord within its territory 
the most constant protection and security to such property and shall not in 
                                                          
153 In contrast the first wave of US BITs mostly existed between the United States and developing 
countries that had not necessarily been associated with the economic policy of Western Europe or the 
United States. See e.g. Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (n 126) 627.  
154 The last two FCNs were signed in 1966. See e.g. US–Togo Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, 8 
February 1966; and US–Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations and Exchange of Notes, 27 
May 1966.  
155 See, e.g. Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and 
Practice’ (n 47) 109–112. 
156 See e.g. Walker, ‘Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present 
United States Practice’ (n 149) 229, 231.  
157 For the text of the 1963 Draft Convention, see (1963) 2 International Legal Materials 211–267. 
158 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 1967, OECD Publication No. 23081, 
reprinted in (1968) 7 International Legal Materials 117–143.  
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any way impair the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal 
thereof by unreasonable or discriminatory measure.’159 
 
The Draft OECD Convention was never opened for signature. As a non-ratified treaty 
its importance lies mainly in the fact that it emphasised the protection of foreign 
investors at a time when developing countries and some developed countries generally 
favoured national control over FDI.160 It also excluded reference to the national 
standard of treatment at that time but required states to ensure ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ ‘at all times’, an approach which placed higher emphasis on the FET 
standard than most earlier instruments. Given the economic and political influence the 
OECD acting as a group wielded, the Draft Convention represented the dominant 
trends and perspectives among capital exporting countries in investment matters.161  
 
These two drafts conventions, i.e. the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment 
Abroad, 1959 and the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 
proposed by the OECD in 1967, which generally reflect the perspective of capital 
exporting countries, adopted the language of ‘just and equitable treatment’ in setting out 
basic protections for foreign investors. Therefore a primary study shows that the 
multilateral treaty efforts among the capital exporting countries share their tendency to 
favour the FET standard (or close equivalents). This became a common feature of 
BITs.  BITs between capital exporting and capital importing countries, which began to 
proliferate after the early 1960s, have generally included the FET standard.162 Most 
                                                          
159 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 1967 reprinted in  (1968) 7 
International Legal Materials 117, 119. 
160 International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (n 128) xxi. 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/dtci30vol1_en.pdf> accessed 1 September 2014  
161 See, e.g. Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and 
Practice’ (n 47) 112. 
162 This tendency to use the term in the early 1960s and particularly a flow in the 1970s onwards to a 
greater extent also reflects the general movement at the global level towards more liberalized economic 
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OECD countries used the Draft OECD Convention as a basis for their investment 
agreement negotiations.  Thereby the OECD model and its systematic use also refers to 
this standard as defined by the Draft Convention.163 
 
When the OECD initiated its Draft Convention, the international climate could hardly 
have been less favourable to multilateral protection for foreign investment. A coalition 
of developing countries, as well as socialist and communist countries, had made an open 
attempt to challenge the customary international law rules on property protection in the 
UN General Assembly. They opposed the protection of foreign investment by 
customary international law because they perceived this as either an obstacle to their 
political independence or as an impairment to the organisation of their economy.164 
Both of these groups aimed at abolishing the customary international law requirement 
to provide compensation for the expropriation of foreigners, a position that the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 1803 reflected in 1962 when it established ‘Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, relying on one of the most powerful doctrines of 
international law – the sovereignty of states. Subedi argues that this was not an attempt 
to rewrite the existing law completely, but rather to provide a new direction to the law 
on foreign investment that would accommodate the needs for economic sovereignty 
                                                                                                                                                                    
relations between the States. Due to the eventual demise of Cold War antagonism resulting in an opening 
up of former communist States to Western capital, and particularly due to the strong encouragement and 
support from the Western countries and its allies of various multinational financial institutions and also to 
encourage the flow of capital in their own territory, there has been an inclination of the capital importing 
countries to adopt a laissez-faire economic policy to encourage foreign investment. This aperture has been 
accompanied by greater safeguards for foreign investors, which encompasses inclusion of FET clauses in 
the BITs.  See generally e.g., Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘Sustainable Liberalism and International Investment 
Regime’ (1997-98) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 373; Stephen Vasciannie, ‘The Namibian 
Foreign Investments Act: Balancing Interests in the New Concessionary Era’ (1992) 7 ICSID Review — 
Foreign Investments Law Journal 114.  
163 See e.g., Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (n 42). 
164 Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (n 148) 37.  
44 
 
and states’ rights of self-determination, recognising economic sovereignty as an intrinsic 
part of the state’s sovereignty.165  
 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 of 1974, which contained the ‘Declaration 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ (NIEO), also 
characteristic of the international climate at the time. The resolution declared ‘the right 
of nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals’, encompassing ‘an 
expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State.’166 Since developing countries 
favoured NIEO, one major concern was regulating the foreign investment in a manner 
more favourable to developing countries.167 
 
The development leading up to the proclamation of NIEO in the 1970s also illustrates 
why developing countries almost unanimously opposed the protection of international 
property and consequently would not support the OECD Draft Convention of 1967. 
Even some of the OECD member states were reluctant to support it. In particular 
Greece, Portugal, and Turkey considered certain provisions of the 1967 Draft to be too 
favourable to capital exporting countries and foreign investors.168 The United States did 
not actively push for the conclusion of a multilateral convention within the OECD and 
this led to the failure of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention. In recognition of the 
ideological divide between capital exporting and capital importing countries on the 
appropriate level of foreign investment protection, the Draft Convention was never 
                                                          
165 Subedi, ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 733.  
166 On the politics and economics connected with the NIEO, see e.g. Jagdish N Bhagwati, The New 
International Economic Order (MIT Press 1978); Jeffery A Hart, The New International Economic Order: Conflict 
and Co-operation in North-South Economic Relations (Palgrave Macmillan 1983).  
167 Subedi ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 735; generally see e.g. Kamal Hossain (ed) Legal Aspects of 
the New International Economic Order (Frances Pinter 1980.   
168 Anthony C Sinclair, ‘The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment 
Protection’ (2004) 20 Arbitration International 411, 432.  
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opened for signature.169 Walker opines that the necessary ‘consensus concerning the 
sanctity of private property, the advantages of private enterprises, and the acceptability 
of alien participation in the country’s economy’ simply did not exist at the time.170 
 
Despite the fact that it was not opened for signature, the 1967 Draft Convention was 
recommended to OECD members as a model for the conclusion of BITs with 
developing countries.171 The Draft Convention demonstrably influenced the Model 
BITs of France, the United Kingdom,172 and the United States.173 The pedigree of many 
BITs is, therefore, linked to the efforts within the OECD in the 1960s to establish an 
investment framework on a multilateral basis. The multilateral effort within the OECD 
also largely explains the reasons for the homogeneity of many BITs.174 
 
2.1.i World Politics in the 1970s and its Influence on Investment Treaties and the 
FET Standard  
 
It is interesting to see that, bilateral efforts at investment agreements would succeed 
where their multilateral counterparts had failed. The early proponents of BITs had a 
number of purposes in their minds for these treaties. One reason was that capital 
exporting countries favoured BITs as a response to the claims made by many 
developing countries during the 1970s to enforce the Calvo doctrine. This doctrine 
                                                          
169 Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 59) 2; stating that ‘the reason for this was in part due 
to the fact that the Convention was originally intended to be a multilateral instrument applicable to all 
countries, not only to OECD members….The controversy surrounding other well-known multilateral 
instruments of that period, however, reflected more accurately the deep divisions in the international 
community on what in fact constituted “recognized principles” in the area of foreign investment law’.  
170 Walker ‘Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States 
Practice’ (n 149) 229, 241.  
171 Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (n 148) 39. 
172 See e.g. Denza and  Brooks (n 143) 910.  
173 K Scott Gudgeon, ‘United States Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1986) 4 International Tax and 
Business Lawyer 105, 111.  
174 Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 59)2 et seq.  pointing out that, ‘OECD countries have 
continued to review their policies in this respect within the OECD Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises’.  
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rejected the idea that expropriation needs to be accompanied by ‘prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.’  
 
The Calvo doctrine dominated for a century in foreign relations in Latin America, as well 
as in the Soviet bloc, as these countries became fierce opponents of international 
protection of property.175 A group of developing countries advanced this opposition in 
the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 3281, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (CERDS) in 1974. CERDS provided that the law of expropriating 
states would measure compensation for expropriation.176 CERDS seemed to challenge 
the standard of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation as well as asserting that 
there was no international minimum standard at all.  
 
Developed countries sought the network of BITs, embracing the standard of ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation’, to counter the assertions made by the developing 
countries’ that customary international law no longer required expropriation to that 
standard.177 Though direct expropriations are now rare, the introduction of the FET 
standard in BITs gave the capital exporting countries recourse to a remedy against a 
broad range of actions that might amount to indirect expropriation of foreign investors 
in the host developing countries.178   
                                                          
175 See e.g. Report of the Centre on Transnational Corporations on Work on the Formulation of the 
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc E/C. 10/1985/s/2 
Excerpted in Louis Henkin, International Law : Cases and Materials (2nd edn, West Group 1987) 1049–1051. 
176 Article 2. 2(c ) of CERDS provided that ‘ Each State has the right to nationalize, expropriate or 
transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the 
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances 
that State considered pertinent’.  
177 Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (n 152) 21; Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (n 126) 625. 
178 Vandevelde, ‘US Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave’ (n 126) 625. Another reason for the 
popularity of BITs was to depoliticise the investment disputes. Traditionally the remedies available to 
foreign investors whose investment was expropriated or otherwise affected by some actions of the host 
state was subject to the involvement of the investor’s government in the dispute. The BITs established 
the legal remedies for investment disputes which do not require the involvement of the investor’s own 
government. See e.g. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (n 152) 29–31. 
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It appears that at the multilateral and regional level many of the investment agreements 
did include reference to the FET standard, but not with a directly binding obligation. 
Any stipulation of the standard appeared only in a preamble or was demonstrated in 
other ways with an intent that such foreign investors should be subject to such 
treatment.  The hortatory approach in those agreements only created an incentive, 
rather than a binding obligation, for the signatory states to treat the foreign investors 
fairly and equitably.179 However the BITs were different in their construction as they 
included the FET standard as a binding obligation rather than merely being non-binding 
aspiration.   
 
2.1.j UN Documents 1983 
 
The UN made an effort to recognise the FET standard in dealing with transnational 
corporations, as the Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (CTC) 
exemplifies. Its 1983 version in Article 48, it contained that ‘Transnational corporations 
should receive [fair and] equitable [and non-discriminatory] treatment [under] [in 
accordance with] the laws, regulations, and administrative practices of the countries in 
which they operate [as well as intergovernmental obligations to which the Governments 
of these countries have freely subscribed] [consistent with their international 
obligations] [consistent with international law].’180 In 1988 when the CTC finally 
formulated a draft code of conduct, it became clear that states have so many areas of 
                                                          
179 Bronfman (n 47) 625. 
180 International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (n 128) 172. The brackets are original and 
reflect the provisional stage of the drafting. < http://unctad.org/en/Docs/dtci30vol1_en.pdf> accessed 
1 September 2014.  
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major disagreement that the UN Commission on the CTC itself seemed acquiescent 
with the possibility of the states adopting an internationally agreed upon code.181 
 
2.1.k The MIGA Convention 1985 
 
The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Agency of 1985 (the MIGA 
Convention)182 requires the availability of FET as a precondition for extending 
insurance cover. The OECD originated the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI),183 which places emphasis on fairness in the investment process. The draft 
preamble indicates that ‘fair, transparent and predictable investment regimes 
complement and benefit the world trading system.’ Under the heading ‘General 
Treatment’, it specifies that,  
‘Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments in its territory of 
investors of another Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full 
and constant protection and security. In no case shall a Contracting Party 
accord treatment less favourable than that required by international law.’184 
 
However, MIGA does not seek to create a direct obligation on countries to provide 
such treatment to investors.185 Again this represents the non-binding nature of the 
                                                          
181 Subedi, ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 736. 
182 MIGA Convention reprinted in International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (n 128) 202, 
219. 
183 Draft text can be found at <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf> accessed 22 
August 2014. 
184 Section IV, Article 1.1, MAI. In contrast to the OECD Draft, the Draft MAI provides for national 
treatment and most favoured nation standards in addition to the fair and equitable treatment. Section III, 
Articles 1 and 2, respectively.  
185Article 12 of MIGA dealing with ‘Eligible Investments’ provides in part:  ‘(d) In guaranteeing an 
investment, the Agency shall satisfy itself as to : ... (iv) the investment conditions in the host country, 
including the availability of fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment.’ Article 
12(d) rather stipulates that, in order to guarantee an investment, MIGA must satisfy itself fair and 
equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment exist in the host country concerned. Although 
this provision does not create liability on a host State where there has been a breach of the FET standard, 
it is designed to create an incentive for the foreign investors to favour locating their investment in 
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standard at the multilateral level. Significantly, the developed countries supported 
MIGA as a means to an international system of investment guarantee for investing in 
developing countries.186 However, some OECD member states and civil society 
objected that the document did not ensure a proper balance between the interests of 
foreign investors and host countries.187   
  
2.1.l The ASEAN Treaty 1987  
 
Sections a–k have described the historical development of the treaties. Sections l–t 
describe more recent events as developing countries’ attitude towards the FET standard 
have shifted. In an early sign of the shift, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) adopted the Agreement for Promotion and Protection of Investments in 
1987 (the ASEAN Treaty),188 which supports the promotion of private investment 
among treaty parties in order to promote development and economic cooperation. Its 
Article IV (2) references the FET standard:  
‘All investments made by investors of any Contracting Party shall enjoy fair 
and equitable treatment in the territory of any other Contracting Party. This 
treatment shall be no less favourable than that granted to investor of the 
most-favoured-nation.’  
 
This shift of attitude of some developing countries demonstrates how they begin to 
accept FET as an integral standard in investment treaties.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
countries which offer that standard of treatment. MIGA Convention in International Investment 
Instruments; A Compendium (n 128) 219. 
186 For a brief discussion on MIGA see e.g. Subedi, ‘International Investment Law’ (n 3) 737.  
187 Ibid.   
188 This is an Agreement among Governments of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Text can be found at <http://www.aseansec.org/12812.htm> 
accessed 22 August 2014. 
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2.1.m The Lomé IV 1990 
 
Lomé IV, 1990189 reflects the perspective of a significant cross section of both capital 
exporting and capital importing countries. Article 258(b) of Lomé IV binds the African, 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP)190 Group of States and members of the European 
Union to the FET standard in relation to nationals of each state party to the 
Convention. This acknowledges the importance of private investment in promoting 
development and cooperation, and reflects the growing acceptance of the standard 
among mainly capital importing developing countries.  
 
2.1. n The World Bank Guidelines 1992  
 
 The Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment,191 adopted by the 
Development Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in 1992, in their section III dealing with 
‘Treatment’ called for FET: 
‘2. Each State will extend to the investments established in its territory by 
nationals of any other State fair and equitable treatment according to the 
standards recommended in these Guidelines.’192  
These guidelines are non-binding, but Article III (2)–Article III (3) states,  
                                                          
189 An unofficial text can be found at 
<www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=379> accessed 22 August 
2014.  Lomé IV was ratified by 12 developed European countries on the one part and 68 developing 
countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.  
190The ACP was created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975. 
191 World Bank—Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment (1992) 31 International 
Legal Materials 1366.  
192 World Bank—Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 7 ICSID Review, (1992) 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 297, 300.  
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‘Each State will extend to investments established in its territory by nationals of 
any other State fair and equitable treatment according to the standards 
recommended in these Guidelines…. 
(a) With respect to the protection and security of their person, property 
rights and interests, and to the granting of permits, import and export 
licenses and the authorization to employ, and the issuance of the necessary 
entry and stay visas to their foreign personnel, and other legal matters 
relevant to the treatment of foreign investors as described in Section 1 
above, such treatment will, subject to the requirement of fair and equitable treatment 
mentioned above, be as favourable as that accorded by the State to national 
investors in similar circumstances. In all cases, full protection and security 
will be accorded to the investor’s rights regarding ownership, control and 
substantial benefits over his property, including intellectual property.’ 
[Emphasis added]  
 
This approach suggests that when treatment of a foreign investor falls short of any of 
the recommended standards, a country has failed to satisfy the overreaching 
requirement of FET. Vasciannie opines that, in this respect, the Guidelines are likely to 
provide a convenient reference point for assessing the content of the FET standard in 
the future, bearing in mind the limitations of placing reliance on an instrument not 
prepared with the direct input of developing and developed countries.193 Similarly, 
Rubin argues that, although the guidelines may be credible, the process involved in their 
preparation left the overall document ‘somewhat short of “soft law.”’194 
                                                          
193 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 119. 
194 Seymour J Rubin, ‘Introductory Note on “‘World Bank: Report to the Development Committee and 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment”, (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 
1363. 
52 
 
 
2.1.o NAFTA 1992 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Treaty of 1992 contains the 
FET standard in its Article 1105 under the rubric ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’. It 
reads ‘Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable and full protection and 
security.’195 
 
A number of BITs between developed countries and their developing counterparts use 
similar language. Prince argues that this provision of NAFTA indicates that the 
Agreement incorporates ‘customary international law principles obligating the host 
country to accord fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security to 
investments in its territory’.196 However, Vasciannie, whilst acknowledging that this view 
is plausible, expresses a different opinion. Vasciannie argues that the particular 
formulation in Article 1105 allows for an alternative view:  
‘NAFTA incorporates international law, and contemplates that international law 
allows States to provide fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
On the latter interpretation, Article 1105 implies no judgment on whether States are 
obliged to provide fair and equitable treatment in customary international law.’197  
 
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the debates and controversies on NAFTA 
Article 1105. 
                                                          
195 NAFTA 1994, (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 639.  
196 Daniel M Prince, ‘An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-
State Dispute Settlement’ (1993) 27 International Lawyer   727, 727–728. 
197 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 117.  
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2.1.p The Energy Charter Treaty 1994 
 
At the regional level, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of 1994, reflecting the 
perspectives of capital exporting countries, contains elaborate language around the 
requirement of FET, with specific reference to stable and transparent conditions. 
Article 10 Para 1 of the Charter provides: 
‘Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments 
in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all 
times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and 
equitable treatment.’198 
 
This language reflects the influence of the OECD Draft of 1967, since both instruments 
pledge to ensure FET ‘at all times’. While ECT is sector specific and its scope is limited 
to the European continent, its parties include several countries which are currently 
reliant on capital importation as part of their basic strategy for economic development, 
i.e. the countries in transition, which gives the FET provision particular weight.199 
 
2.1.q MERCOSUR  
 
MERCOSUR member countries signed the Colonial Protocol on Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments within MERCOSUR, 1994.200 Article 3, under the 
                                                          
198 ECT 1994, (1995) 34 International Legal Materials 381, 389. 
199 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 117. 
200 The MERCOSUR in English means the Southern Common Market. This is an economic and political 
agreement among some Latin American countries. The member states of MERCOSUR are Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Bolivia. The official website of MERCOSUR is available only 
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heading ‘Treatment’, expressly grants investors from other MERCOSUR country ‘at all 
times a fair and equitable treatment’. More generally, the Protocol on Promotion and 
Protection of Investments coming from states, not parties to MERCOSUR signed in 
August 1994, in Article 2(C) under the heading ‘Investment Protection’, extends ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ to investments of investors from third states. These treaties 
have not yet to come into force, but considering the conventional attitude of the Latin 
American states, they reflect a notable change in MERCOSUR member countries.201  
 
2.1.r The Pacific Basin Charter on International Investments 1995  
 
The Pacific Basin Economic Council approved the Pacific Basin Charter on 
International Investments, 1995202 through its Committee on Foreign Investments. The 
Council comprises representatives of the international business community from over 
twenty countries including both capital importing and capital exporting countries. This 
Charter also shows high regard for the principles of fairness, by stating that domestic 
legislation affecting foreign investment should be ‘fair and reasonable among all types 
of investors’ and also that government policies on investment should be applied on a 
fair basis.203  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in Spanish and Portuguese see e.g. <http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/> 
accessed 22 August 2014.  
201 For text in Spanish see, respectively International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. II 
(UNCTAD 1996) 513 <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/dtci30vol2_en.pdf> accessed 30 August 2014. An 
unofficial translated version of the January, 1994 text can be found at 
<http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/mercosul/coloni-e.asp> accessed 30 August 2014. 
202 For text see International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. III (UNCTAD 1996) 375 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/dtci30vol3_en.pdf> accessed 1 September 2014.  
203 Ibid.  
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2.1.s OECD Draft Negotiating Text for MAI 1998  
 
The OECD Draft Negotiating Text for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment of 
1998 provided for FET and the standard of constant protection and security.204 At the 
same time international law was preserved as a residual standard: ‘1.1. Each Contracting 
Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of another Contracting 
Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security required 
by international law.’205 
 
2.1.t Treaties with No FET  
 
Today few BITs or IIAs lack the FET standard. The IIAs that do not contain an FET 
clause include Australia–Singapore FTA (2003),206 New Zealand–Singapore FTA 
(2001),207 the New Zealand–Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
(2005),208 India–Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (2005),209 
Albania–Croatia BIT (1993),210 the Croatia–Ukraine BIT (1997),211 and a number of 
BITs concluded by Turkey. This exclusion reflects unwillingness on the part of parties 
                                                          
204 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the main negotiating text can be found at 
<http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf> accessed 30 August 2014. From the outset of 
the deliberations on this draft agreement, it was agreed that the fair and equitable standard would be 
included in the text; see, e.g. OECD, ‘A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Committee 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise (CIME) and the Committee on Capital 
Movement and Invisible Transactions (CMIT)’, Doc. OECD/GD(95) 65, (1995) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/cmitcime95.htm> 30 August 2014.  
205 MAI negotiating text at p. 56 <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2014 
206 <http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/PS200913-ig-SAFTA.pdf> accessed 1 
September 2014.  
207 <http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/NewZealand-Singapore.pdf> accessed 1 
September 2014.  
208 <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/thailand/thainzcep-december2004.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2014.  
209 <http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/India-singapore.pdf> accessed 1September 
2014.  
210 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/9> accessed 1 September 2014.  
211 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/895> accessed 1 September 2014.  
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to the agreement to subject their regulatory measures to review under this standard.212 
The fact that the vast majority of investment treaties have included the standard, 
suggests that countries that have excluded the FET standard have done so with 
particular purpose. The avoidance of the standard reflects the fear of being exposed to 
this standard of protection and the fear of the ‘catch all’ power of the standard.213 
However these are isolated exceptions among almost three thousand BITs that are in 
existence.214  
 
2.2 The FET Standard in International Investment Treaties as It Stands Today  
 
As this chapter has described, the FET clause does not convey the same legal result in 
every multilateral or regional instrument. More particularly, the meaning varies from 
one treaty to another depending on the context. Consequently, the type of protection 
offered will also not be constant215 and also sometimes does not have a binding effect.216 
However, although many of these multilateral efforts did not ultimately result in 
enforceable treaties, what Salacuse calls the ‘epistemic community of international 
lawyers and negotiators’ adopted it and this would become a principle channel for its 
diffusion and development among countries.217 The soft formulation of the FET 
standard at a multilateral and regional level reflects the fact that, at the multilateral level, 
it has been extremely difficult for the parties to negotiate multilateral investment rules as 
                                                          
212 Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II 
(n 42) 18.    
213 Subedi, International Investment Law Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 1) 2. 
214 See, e.g. Jack Coe, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2002) 96 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 9, 18; Mohamed I Khalil, ‘Treatment of Foreign 
Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1992) 8 ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal 
339. 
215 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 122. 
216 See, e.g., The Havana Charter and MIGA Treaty discussed above.  
217 Salacuse The Law of Investment Treaties (n 38) 219. 
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it remains unfeasible for them to come to a unanimous consensus on an all-embracing 
multilateral investment regime.218 
 
The FET standard emerged as a core investment protection standard in international 
investment law during the post-WWII era. Although different developing countries 
opposed investment agreements at the multilateral level, and the efforts to create those 
treaties generally failed, a number of resistant countries gradually signed BITs 
encompassing the FET standard in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
Still, some countries, particularly Latin American countries, determinedly avoided FET 
throughout the greater part of the post-WWII period.219 These countries preferred to 
maintain national control over their foreign investments and thus adopted national 
treatment provisions in their BITs rather than FET due to the influence of the famous 
Calvo doctrine.220 Therefore we see that, post-WWII, the influence of a new economic 
order era, unity of developing countries on sovereignty over their natural resources in 
the 1970s and the dominance of the Calvo doctrine among the Latin American and 
other developing countries did still influence the shape of investment treaties as well as 
the FET standard. However, since the 1980s even these Latin American countries have 
begun to incorporate the FET standard into their trade agreements.221 BITs which omit 
reference to FET standard are quite exceptional.222 Ever since then, the standard has 
become an indispensable element for international investment treaties and consequently 
                                                          
218 Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (n 47) 13. 
219 See, e.g., Decision 24 on ‘Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, 
Patents, Licenses and Royalties’ dated 1977 and Decision 291 on ‘Common Code for the Treatment of 
Foreign Capital and on Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties’ dated 1991 both adopted by the 
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement; for text see respectively (1977) 16 International Legal Materials 
138 and (1991) 30 International Legal Materials 1288. 
220 See discussion above in 2.1.i World Politics in the 1970s and its Influence on Investment Treaties and 
the FET Standard 45 .  
221 See the discussion above in 2.1.q MERCOSUR 53.  
222See, e.g., Coe (n 214); Khalil (n 214).  
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in investment dispute arbitration.223 To emphasise its importance in international 
investment law, Salacuse describes the concept as follows: ‘Indeed, one would say that 
fair and equitable treatment is, to employ Hans Kelsen’s concept from his Pure Theory of 
Law (1934), the grundnorm or basic norm of the investment treaty system.’224 With very 
few exceptions, the FET standard has developed over the course of time into a 
common clause in most investment treaties. It has become one of the core features of 
modern investment treaties. A survey of over 500 BITs in 2002 found that 
approximately 90 per cent of them had FET clauses.225 The concept of FET standard  
originally created in multilateral treaties has therefore become a key element in BITs, 
and through this process the standard has become a principle of international law and a 
‘fundamental norm of the emerging global regime for international investment.’226 
 
However, these BITs do not reflect a single formulation of the FET standard.227 Thus 
Dolzer has rightly observed that, after a close scrutiny of the text of the BITs, it appears 
that the drafters of those treaties considered it desirable to include a general standard, in 
addition to the specific rules, which would cover such issues and matters relevant for 
the desirable extent of protection, which did not fall under the specific rules.228 Chapter 
3 explores these various constructions of the standard in different BITs.   
 
 
 
                                                          
223 Harten, ‘Investment Treaties as a Constraining Framework’ (n 24) 164.  
224 Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (n 38) 219. 
225 See, e.g. Coe (n 214). Also see e.g. Khalil (n 214)— In his study Khalil examines 335 BITs from the 
early 1960s to the 1990s and found that only 28 did not expressly include the standard, and that in 1996 
cases, the FET standard was combined with the national and most favoured nation standards.  
226 Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (n 38) 219. 
227Discussed in Chapter 3  
228 Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (n 39) 89. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the FET standard from the orientation of its genealogy and 
its historical development in international investment law, with particular focus on the 
role developed and developing countries has played. It has traced the standard from its 
initial stage of development, when international economic agreements at the multilateral 
and regional levels mostly employed a hortatory reference to the standard, rather than 
making it a binding obligation. Although most of the post-WWII multilateral efforts on 
trade and investment did not come to a successful conclusion, the concept of FET 
survived as a binding obligation in the vast majority of BITs in force today. While some 
international agreements omit the standard, it has become a fundamental principle of 
international investment law, and the vast majority of investment treaties and 
agreements contain it.   
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Chapter 3 
Different Constructions of the FET Standard in Investment Treaties 
 
3.1 Introduction   
The preceding chapter has demonstrated that over time the concept of FET has 
become a common feature in BITs. The scope of FET has been hotly debated, not least 
by host countries fearing that it might become a ‘catch all’ provision that foreign 
investors can invoke against virtually any adverse treatment.229 The different wording 
used in different treaties in relation to FET has complicated the issue, and the tribunals 
have varied their interpretation in accordance with the construction of the treaty 
language. This impacts the outcome of particular disputes.  
 
This chapter will discuss the different constructions of FET in different investment 
treaties and the associated issues and controversies surrounding the standard depending 
on the particular construction. It will argue that, despite differences in construction, 
there remains sufficient similarity across different treaties to support the claim that there 
is an overarching and singular concept of FET that can be the subject of detailed 
analysis. It will also argue that connecting the standard with other standards within the 
text of each treaty can productively limit the ambit of the FET standard. However, the 
most common form of limitation, by connecting FET to key principles of international 
law, does not clearly limit the scope of the FET standard. This is because the relevant 
international legal principles are not well defined, nor is their applicability in the context 
of international investment law well understood.     
 
                                                          
229 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Law and Principle (n1) 168.  
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3.2 Different Construction of FET in Investment Treaties   
 
Investment treaties do not adopt a uniform approach to the standard and the tribunals 
have not adopted a uniform approach to its interpretation. Scholars have categorised 
the different constructions of the FET standard in existing international investment 
treaties230; this thesis builds on this work to adopt three broad categories. These are  
(A) FET minus - which refers to those treaties where treaty framers have connected the 
definition of the standard to other concepts that define, and appear to limit its scope.  
(B) Simple FET where the FET clause is formulated without any reference to 
international law, customary international law, or any other limitation, 
                                                          
230 Salacuse had divided them under two headings, namely (a) that FET merely reflects the international 
minimum standard requirement by customary international law; or (b) that the standard is autonomous and 
additional to general international law, see e.g. Salacuse,  The Law of Investment Treaties (n 38) 222–227. Laird 
has depicted three variations of the standard, i.e. (a) the additive provision, indicating that the provision 
would appear to consider the FET standard is in addition to whatever treatment international law 
requires; (b) the inclusive provision, meaning that the FET standard is subsumed under international law, 
not a separate or autonomous standard of treatment; and (c) the customary international law provision, 
meaning that the FET standard is customary international law.  He also opines that arbitral tribunals have 
not applied these three variations differently when a claim is made solely under the FET standard.  He 
also argues that, whether one characterizes the FET standard as being customary international law or not, 
as additive to or included in international law, the question remains, what is the substantive content of 
FET standard?  See e.g. Ian A Laird, ‘Betrayal, Shock and Outrage—Recent Developments in NAFTA 
Article 1105’ in Todd Weiler (ed), NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future 
Prospects (Transnational Publisher, Inc, New York 2004) 49, 51–54. In 2007 UNCTAD grouped the 
various formulations into seven categories, see e.g. Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-
2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, UNCTAD (2007) 30–33  
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf> accessed 22 August 2014.  Marshall summarises 
the different constructions of the standard as ‘(a) Treaties that grant investments fair and equitable 
treatment without making any reference to international law or to any other criteria to determine the 
content of the standard; (b) Treaties that state that investments will receive fair and equitable treatment 
no less favourable than accorded to its own investors or to investors of any third State; (c)Treaties that 
couple the fair and equitable treatment standard with an obligation to abstain from impairing the 
investment through unreasonable or discriminatory measures; (d) Treaties that require investments to be 
granted “fair and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law”; (e) Treaties 
that similarly require fair and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law, 
but that in addition expressly identify some requirements of the standard. These specific inclusions may 
broaden the scope of the standard; (f) Treaties that make the fair and equitable treatment standard 
contingent on the domestic legislation of the host country; (g) Finally, some recent BITs and free trade 
agreements provide a more precisely defined scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard. They 
oblige the contracting parties to accord covered investments treatment in accordance with the minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law. Some also make it express that fair and 
equitable treatment is part of the minimum standard and does not create additional substantive rights.’ 
See e.g. Fiona Marshall, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Agreements’  Issues in 
International Investment Law, Background Papers for the Developing Country Investment Negotiators’ 
Forum Singapore, 1–2 October 2007, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 4–5 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_fair_treatment.pdf> accessed 1 September 2014. 
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(C) FET plus – which refers to treaties which combine the FET standard with an 
additional substantive obligation, such as full protection and security, prohibition of 
denial of justice, prohibition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures, obligations of 
MFN, or guarantee of protection and security.  
 
It is suggested that this novel categorisation of FET is an important mechanism for 
understanding the differentiation in construction of the clause across different 
investment treaties, and the implications of that differentiation for how different 
versions of the FET clause will be interpreted by tribunals. Each of these three 
categories are explained in detail below.  
 
3.2.A FET Minus 
 
FET minus refers to those treaties where treaty framers have connected the definition of 
the standard to other concepts that define, and appear to limit, its scope. This category 
includes treaties which have combined the FET clause either as a standard with the 
minimum standard under international law generally or under customary international 
law. A considerable volume of sources have drawn on the perspective of capital 
exporting countries.231 This is the most controversial formulation of the FET standard. 
The minimum standard here largely refers to the treatment of aliens. The FET standard 
then simply means the standard which international law or customary international law 
guarantees for aliens. A number of other regional and bilateral treaties have also limited 
the scope of the FET standard by combining it with other principles, which will be 
discussed below. But before going into discussion of different FET minus provisions, it 
                                                          
231 See e.g. Pamela B Gann, ‘The US Bilateral Investment Treaty Program’ (1985) 21 Stanford Journal of 
International law  373; Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (n 52) 636–639.    
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is also necessary to shed some light on the notion of the minimum standard under 
international law generally or under customary international law.  
 
3.2.A.a Minimum Standard under International Law or Customary International 
Law   
 
In the twentieth century the colonial powers envisaged the notion of the ‘international 
minimum standard’ to protect their nationals and property.232 This evolved into a 
concept of international law and customary international law233 as a shield to protect 
foreign nationals from all kinds of violations, regardless of their identity as investors.234 
Roth supplied the classical definition of the international minimum standard: ‘the 
international standard is nothing else but a set of rules, correlated to each other and 
deriving from one particular norm of general international law namely, that the 
treatment of an alien is regulated by the law of nations.’235 The landmark decision of the 
US–Mexico General Claims Commission in the Neer claim Award (1926) provided the 
foundational understanding of the international minimum standard for the protection 
of aliens. 236 The classical dictum states:  
                                                          
232 For general discussion on the minimum standard as developed under international law as a response to 
protect property of the investors from a post-colonial perspective, see generally Pahuja (n1) Chapter 4. 
Also see e.g. M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd, edn, Cambridge 2010) 8–20, 27–
37. 
233 The ‘general and consistent practice of states’ that they follow out a sense of legal obligation (opinion 
juris) forms customary international law. See e.g. Continental Shelf Case (Libya vs. Malta) ICJ, Judgment 
dated 3 June 1985, Para 27. 
234 See e.g. Elihu Root, ‘The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad’ (1910) 4(3) American 
Journal of International Law Proceedings 517; Edwin M. Borchard,  The Diplomatic Protection of the Citizens 
Abroad’ (The Banks Law Publishing Co. 1915) 177; The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) 
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1965 Para 165.2.  
235 See Andreas H Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (A.W. Sijthoff, 1949) 
127.  
236 The United States presented this claim to the US–Mexico Claim Commission on behalf of the family 
of Mr. Paul Neer, who was killed in Mexico under obscure circumstances. The claim stated that the 
Mexican government had shown a lack of diligence in prosecuting those responsible and that it ought to 
reimburse the family. The Commission found that the Mexican authorities’ failure to apprehend or 
punish those guilty of the murder of the American citizen did not per se violate the international minimum 
standard on the treatment of aliens. See e.g. Neer Claim (US vs. Mexico Opinion) US–Mexico General 
Claims Commission, 15 October 1926, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 4, 60–66.  
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‘the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the rest of 
international standards…the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an 
international delinquency should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to 
wilful neglect of duty, or an insufficiency of governmental action so far 
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency 
proceeds from the deficient execution of a reasonable law or from the fact 
that the laws of the country do not empower the authorities to measure up 
to international standard is immaterial.’237 
 
The assumption that a standing body of customary rules as agreed by the nations 
protecting an alien in another country,238 which a host country must fulfill,239 
characterises this interpretation. It presumes a host country may be responsible under 
international law240 and the violation of this norm may open the way for international 
action on behalf of the injured alien against the host country, provided that the alien has 
exhausted local remedies.241  
 
The scope of the standard has been debated from its very inception, although it aims to 
reflect a common standard of conduct which the majority of the nations have accepted. 
Scholars such as Roy questioned it as early as 1961;242 Roth critiques the assumption 
                                                          
237 Neer Claim Award (n 236) 61–62. 
238 See e.g. Marcos Orellana, ‘International Law on Investment: the Minimum Standard of Treatment’ 
(2004) 1(3) Transnational Dispute Management.  
239 Shaw (n 102) 824.  
240 Over time, treaties began to tie the minimum standard to the doctrine of state responsibility in 
international law for injuries to aliens. See generally e.g. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case 
(Greece vs. UK) (1924) PCIJ, Judgment dated 30 August 1924; Panevexys-Saldututiskis Railway Case 
(Estonia vs. Lithuania) (1938) PCIJ, Judgment dated 28 February 1938; Charzow Factory Case (Germany 
vs. Poland) (1928) PCIJ, Judgment dated 17 September 1928.   
241 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2003) 502.  
242 See generally, SN Guha Roy, ‘Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of 
Universal International Law?’ (1961) 55 American Journal of International Law 863. 
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that a common standard exists: ‘The law of treatment of aliens, as part of international 
law, lacks uniformity, not only with regard to rules of positive law but still to a greater 
extent as regards the fundamental concepts underlying its structure.’243 Nations continue 
to debate the concept of this ‘minimum standard’ in international law;244 while 
protection of aliens in foreign lands prevailed in international law in the late nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth century, the atrocities of WWII increasingly focused 
judicial and academic commentary on universal human rights. Therefore there was a 
shift in the discourse from the rights of a particular group like ‘foreigners’ or ‘aliens’ in 
international law to the rights of ‘all’ as human beings.245 Opposition to the standard 
was influenced by the Calvo doctrine246 of equal rights for locals and foreigners, and the 
applicability of domestic legislation and local courts for the settlement of investment 
disputes, largely came from Latin America.  
 
Therefore from the above discussion it is clear that the standard developed under 
international law and customary international law is one of the main standards to 
protect aliens in international law. But the scope of the standard is uncertain and very 
much contested. In various investment treaties, the minimum standard under 
international Law or customary international law is combined with the FET standard. 
The implications of this form of ‘FET minus’ are discussed below. 
 
                                                          
243 Roth (n 235) 61 and 87.  
244 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment  (n 232) 140–141 and 328; AO Adede, ‘The 
Minimum Standards in a World of Disparities’ in R.S.J Macdonald and D.M Johnston (eds.),  The Structure 
and Process of International Law (Oxford University Press 1983) 1001; Matthew C Porterfield, ‘An 
International Common Law of Investor Rights?” (2006) 27 University of Pennsylvania International 
Journal of Economic Law 79, 81–84. 
245 Tolga Yalkin, ‘The International Minimum Standard and Investment Law: The Proof is in the 
Pudding’ EJIL: Talk! (Blog of European Journal of International Law) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/international-minimum-standard/> accessed 30 August 2014. 
246 See Chapter 2 for discussion of the Calvo doctrine in 2.1.i World Politics in the 1970s and its Influence 
on Investment Treaties and the FET Standard 45.   
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3.2.A.b FET as a Standard Combined with International Law Generally 
 
The first group of treaties discussed here combine FET with a reference to international 
law in general, thereby appearing to subsume it under international law.247 For example 
multilateral treaties such as the ECT248 and bilateral treaty such as the Croatia–Oman 
BIT (2004).249 Article 4(1) of the France–Mexico BIT (1998) provides one form of 
wording:  
‘Either contracting party shall extend and ensure fair and equitable 
treatment in accordance with the principles of international law to 
investments made by investors of the other contracting party in its territory 
or in its maritime area, and ensure that the exercise of the right thus 
recognised shall not be hindered by law or in practice.’250 
 
By describing FET as an obligation ‘in accordance’ with international law, treaties with 
this wording call on the tribunals to limit the scope of FET to within the sources of 
international law.251 This creates an obligation for the tribunals to review the sources of 
international law to judge an alleged breach of conduct. An UNCTAD study suggests 
that the divergent scope of international law makes the process of discerning all these 
divergent principles of international law a daunting task for the Tribunals.252   
 
By contrast, the Croatia–Oman BIT states, ‘Investments or returns of investors of 
either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall be accorded 
                                                          
247 Laird (n 230) 52. 
248 Article 10(1) of the ECT; Chapter IV, Article 1.1 of the 1998 OECD Draft MAI also falls into this 
category. 
249 Croatia–Oman BIT (2004) <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia_oman.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2014.  
250 France–Mexico BIT (1998) <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/mexico_france.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2014. 
251 The sources of international law derive from Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice.  
252 Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (n 
42) 23.   
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fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international law and provisions of this 
Agreement.’ 253 Article 2(3) (a) of the Bahrain–United States BIT (1999) states, ‘Each 
Party shall at all times accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security; and shall in no case accord treatment less favourable than 
that required by international law.’254 By referring to the FET obligation as being ‘no 
less’ than that of international law, treaties such as these imply that FET is not strictly 
linked to principles of international law. Rather international law here sets the floor of 
protection an investor can claim, and the standard may accommodate other 
requirements of the treaty itself. This construction of FET is effectively closer to the 
autonomous standing of the FET standard, thereby giving the arbitrators more freedom 
to interpret the standard255 (see discussion on Simple FET below). 
 
An UNCTAD study shows that this construction of FET with reference to 
international law prevents the use of a ‘purely semantic approach’256 to the standard and 
a literal interpretation of it. Reference to international law in general implies that FET is 
a body of standards of principles civilised nations have recognised as the proper due of 
foreign investors. This does not limit FET to being part of customary international law. 
Kläger argues that the FET standard is not expressly limited to the minimum standard 
as contained in international customary law, but takes into account the full range of 
international law sources, including general principles and modern treaties and other 
conventional obligations.257 Laird believes that this reflects the ‘inclusive provision 
approach’ which is less narrow and allows one to conclude that the FET standard is 
                                                          
253 Croatia–Oman BIT (2004) <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia_oman.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2014.  
254 Bahrain–United States BIT (1999) <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_bahrein.pdf> 
accessed 30 September 2014.  
255 Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (n 
42) 23. 
256 Ibid 22. 
257 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 271–280. 
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included under the sources of international law, or as part of customary international 
law or both.258 To date judicial and academic jurisprudence has not considered this 
approach. One good reason for this is that if FET truly means the existent international 
minimum standard, there is no need to create a BIT to invoke it.259  
 
3.2.A.c FET as a Standard Combined with Customary International Law 
 
Treaties that combine FET with the minimum standard of treatment under customary 
international law invoke the most controversy. This restrictive approach attempts to 
limit the scope of FET to the extent of protection accorded to aliens under customary 
international law. Examples include NAFTA Article 1105260 and the US and Canada 
model BITs. The US Model BIT 2012 in Article 5 (1) states that, ‘Each party shall 
accord to covered investments treatments in accordance with customary international 
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.’261 As a 
further clarification, the next paragraph states,  
‘For greater certainty…the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens [is] the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full 
protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive 
rights.’ 
 
                                                          
258 Laird (n 230) 53. 
259 See e.g. Fair and Equitable Treatment, Series on the Issues in International Investment Agreements 
UNCTAD /ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. III) (UNCTAD 1999) 37–42. 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd11v3.en.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
260 See Chapter 2, 2.1.o NAFTA 1992 51.   
261 See e.g. Article 5 of US model BIT 2012.  
<http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2014. 
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Article 5(2) of Canada Model BIT 2004 similarly states that the concepts of FET do not 
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens requires.262 
 
Although only the US Model BIT prescribes in detailed terms the customary rules that 
apply, both of these examples show the clear intention of the drafters to limit FET to 
the rules of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment.263 The 
elaboration of FET construction and NAFTA’s precedent provide further clarification. 
Some non-NAFTA investment agreements, which the NAFTA model influences, 
include US FTAs264 and other international investment agreements.  
 
3.2.A.d FET and Customary International Law: The NAFTA Saga  
 
The most intensive discussion in the existing scholarship on the relationship of FET to 
the minimum standard under customary international law has taken place in the context 
of NAFTA Article 1105.265 The centre of controversy has been the NAFTA parties’ 
attempt to re-write NAFTA Article 1105 through the mechanism of an all-party 
interpretation.266 NAFTA references FET under the rubric, ‘Minimum Standard of 
Treatment’. Schreur cites that the combination of these two features of the text as 
                                                          
262 See e.g. Article 5 of Canada Model BIT 2004 
 <http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> accessed 
30 September 2014.  
263 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 20. 
264 See e.g. Article 10.5 of the Central America-Dominican Republic–United States Free Trade 
Agreements (DR–CAFTA) (2004) <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text> accessed 22 August 2014.  
265 See e.g. Dumberry (n 47); Patrick G Foy and Robert JC Deane, ‘Foreign Investment under Investment 
Treaties: Recent Developments under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement’ (2001) 
16 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal  299; J Christopher  Thomas, ‘Reflections on Article 
1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and Influence of Commentators’ (2002) 17 ICSID Review – 
Foreign Investment Law Journal  21. 
266 See e.g. Fourth Opinion of Sir Robert Jennings, ‘The Meaning of Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA 
Agreement’, 6 September  2001  4–5 in Methanex Corporation vs. United States of America, Preliminary 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 7 August 2002, cited in Laird (n 230) 49–50. 
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‘conspicuous’.267 Certainly the heading is a manifest reference to customary international 
law. Schreur argues that the inclusion of the FET standard in the reference to 
international law makes FET part of international law, and particularly incorporates its 
rules on the minimum standard of treatment.268 
 
However, despite this clear articulation of NAFTA Article 1105 some of the arbitral 
tribunals have not restricted the FET standard to customary international law.269 The 
Partial Award in S.D. Myers vs. Canada270 stated that a breach of a rule of international 
law may not be decisive in determining whether a denial of FET had occurred.271 In Pope 
and Talbot vs. Canada272 the tribunal even more explicitly, and controversially, attempted a 
shift away from strictly attaching the FET clause to customary international law. The 
tribunal adopted an idiosyncratic concept of FET that could have far reaching impact.  
The Tribunal in its second award in Pope and Talbot concluded that both the ‘language 
and the evident intention’ of the BITs supported the ‘additive character’ interpretation 
under which the ‘fairness elements’ are distinct from customary international law 
standards.273 It followed that ‘compliance with fairness elements must be ascertained 
free of any threshold that might be applicable to the evaluation of measures under the 
minimum standard of international law.’274 Reflecting an analogy with the language of 
the BITs, the tribunal found that the fairness elements were ‘additive’ to the 
                                                          
267 Schreur, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (n 37) 362. 
268 Ibid.  
269 Laird however argues that all the NAFTA parties employed a strained and torturous strategy in the 
early NAFTA Chapter 11 cases to limit NAFTA Article 1105 and the FET standard to the minimum 
standard of treatment as construed in the Neer  Claim case. Not surprisingly, NAFTA parties have 
consistently opposed the plain meaning approach as an overly expansive interpretation of NAFTA Article 
1105. Laird further opines that the NAFTA parties have relied upon the Neer case as the ‘seminal’ case on 
the international minimum standard since it carried a low threshold standard of conduct easily reached by 
any government.  See e.g.  Laird (n 230) 57. 
270 SD Myers (n 122).   
271 Ibid Para 264. 
272 Pope & Talbot (n 117) Paras 105–118. 
273 Ibid Para 113. 
274 Ibid Para 111. 
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requirements of international law275 and therefore the investor was ‘entitled to the 
international law minimum plus the fairness elements’.276 
 
Based on the presumed intentions of the NAFTA parties, the tribunal stated that the 
NAFTA parties would not have provided investors of NAFTA states with a lower level 
of protection than it offered to third parties.277 Basing its conclusion on the strong 
relationship between the NAFTA parties in comparison to other third party states, it 
argued that any other construction would assign Article 1105 a lower level of protection 
than the BIT provisions and would therefore violate NAFTA’s national treatment and 
MFN obligations.278    
 
Laird suggests that this decision was controversial not only because it adopted a 
subjective plain meaning interpretative approach in complete denial of the submissions 
of NAFTA parties, but also that it attempted to reinterpret Article 1105 as providing 
obligations equivalent to an additive provision based on an application of the MFN 
principle.279 The NAFTA parties reacted forcefully to this outcome, arguing that the 
award rendered by the tribunal was poorly reasoned and unpersuasive.280  
 
This extensive interpretation evoked the fear among the NAFTA parties that FET 
would threaten economically related regulative measures in their national laws, even if 
they otherwise complied fully with NAFTA.281 Kläger argues this prompted the 
                                                          
275 Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 68. 
276 Pope & Talbot (n 117) Para 110. 
277 Ibid Para 115. 
278 Ibid Para 117. 
279 See e.g. Laird (n 230) 64–65. 
280 See e.g. J Christopher Thomas, ‘Reflections on Art.1105 of NAFTA’ (2002) 17 ICSID Review—
Foreign Investment Law Journal 21, 80; David A Gantz, ‘Pope & Talbot, Inc vs. Government of Canada 
– Case Report’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 937, 944; Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n) 69–70. 
281 Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 70. 
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NAFTA member states to seek a political move to put an embargo on future NAFTA 
arbitration proceedings so as to prevent them from becoming irrepressible.282 The 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC)283 therefore unexpectedly issued a Note of 
Interpretation,284 clearly stating that the concept of FET does not require treatment in 
‘addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment to aliens.’285 This note effectively ended the debate 
surrounding the relationship between FET and customary international law in the 
context of NAFTA, making it clear that the member states intended to adopt an FET 
standard that is as narrow as possible, by considering only the customary international 
law sources pertaining to the classical minimum standard of treatment of aliens.286 
Nonetheless, the formulation invented in the 1920s Neer case will likely fail to serve the 
purpose of a modern day complicated investor–state relationship.287  
 
The tribunal’s award, in dealing with the issue of damages in Pope & Talbot vs. Canada288 
reflected this tension, expressing considerable reservations concerning the FTC’s power 
to issue the Note of Interpretation289 as well as a critique of the soundness of the 
                                                          
282 Ibid.  
283 A body composed of representatives of the three state parties with the power to adopt binding 
interpretations under Article 1131(2).  
284 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued its Note of Interpretation dated 31 July 2001 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-
interpr.aspx?lang=en> accessed 30 August 2014. 
285 No public consultation preceded the announcement of the Note of Interpretation, and the public had 
no knowledge of the deliberations. Thus Laird opines that the irony of the FTC Note of Interpretation is 
that, in addition to the interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105, it sought to provide more transparency to 
the NAFTA Chapter 11 process.  He further argues that following frequent citation by Canada in its 
NAFTA arbitration submissions, this standard  ‘minimum standard of treatment’  has become known as 
the ‘egregious’ standard of treatment and that these arguments foreshadowed the FTC Note of 
Interpretation which subsequently clarified the meaning of NAFTA Article 1105. See Laird (n 230) 55–
57.  
286 Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 71.  
287 Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 71–72; Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment (n 232) 329–330.  
288 Pope & Talbot vs. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, 31 May 2002, (2002) 41 International Legal 
Materials 1347. 
289  The Tribunal providing obiter dicta in its decision that the FTC Note of Interpretation was in form and 
substance an amendment of Article 1105, rather than a proper interpretation. See Pope & Talbot (n 288) 
Paras 17–24.  
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interpretation itself,290 but reluctantly accepted the interpretation in its award.291 
Subsequent NAFTA Tribunals dealing with the issue have accepted the FTC’s 
interpretation without objection.292 Future NAFTA tribunals may not accept the 
Note,293 but at present the equivalence of FET articulated in the context of NAFTA 
Article 1105 to the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law is 
established fact. 294 
 
Schreur has opined that the FTC note does not mean that other investment treaties, 
particularly in BITs, should incur the same consequence, despite the fact that 
international standard of treatment clauses in other BITs use similar wording to Article 
1105’s.  He argues that the special features of NAFTA Article 1105—the heading’s 
reference to the ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’, the wording ‘international law 
including fair and equitable treatment’, and the use of a binding interpretation by an 
authorised treaty body, which other BITs do not establish—differentiate NAFTA.295 
                                                          
290 Pope & Talbot (n 288) Paras 25–47. 
291 Pope & Talbot (n 288) Paras 48–69. Laird opines that the tribunal in Pope and Talbot (Merits Award) 
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the legitimacy of the FTC Note of Interpretation. Since the announcement of the FTC Note of 
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195 Paras 175–178; Lowen Group Inc, and Raymond L. Lowen vs. United States of America, Award, 26 
June 2003, 7 ICSID Reports 442 Paras 124–128; Waste Management Inc. vs. United Mexican States 
(No.2) ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award April 30 2004, 43 International Legal Materials (2004) 
967 Paras 90–91.  
293 Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 72–74. 
294 Laird (n 230) 56. 
295 See e.g., Schreur ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (n 37) 364; Laird (n 230) 49–75. 
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Tribunals operating outside NAFTA have not adopted any fixed approach on the issue, 
but have employed individualized interpretations of the respective BITs.296   
 
An UNCTAD (2012) study concluded that the treaties which limit FET to customary 
international law indicate that FET cannot go beyond what customary international law 
declares to be the content of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens.297 Further, it 
argues that from the host country’s perspective, combining FET with customary 
international law may be a progressive step, given that the tribunals will likely interpret 
the standard as a higher threshold for finding a breach of the standard as compared to 
unqualified FET clauses.298 However, this view fails to reflect the drawback of such a 
construction, which is that no clear set of principles constitutes the minimum standard 
under customary international law. Given that customary international law is itself 
highly indeterminate299 and its evolutionary nature contentious,300 and that establishing 
the precise obligations to which it gives rise, tribunals will be unlikely to adhere to this 
view. The UNCTAD study’s argument is therefore unconvincing.  
 
3.2.A.e Minimum Standard under International Law/Customary International 
Law in Investment Law Context  
 
The international minimum standard does not encompass any particular focus on 
‘investor’; it only refers to aliens and their property. This restrictive approach is no 
longer sufficient to address the complexity of today’s foreign investment disputes. 
                                                          
296  See e.g. Tecmed (n 118) Paras 155 and 156; MTD Equity (n 119) Paras 110–112; Occidental (n 116) 
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Accordingly investment tribunals have not addressed the standard with respect to an 
investor’s investment. Considering the established components of the international 
minimum standard, which offers little in terms of substantive investor protection, most 
investor protections cannot constitute a violation of customary international law even in 
the absence of a treaty obligation.301  
 
Interpretation suffers from confusion as to whether the Neer claim and ensuing contexts 
have created the minimum standard or whether evolving customary law, which the 
extensive network of BITs has influenced, provides the standard.  In this context, 
developing countries (particularly Latin American countries) have questioned the 
existence of a minimum standard of treatment and its inclusion in customary 
international law.302 BITs have not provided a comprehensive definition of such a 
standard, an ironic result given nations enter into them to clarify vagueness on 
customary international law as it applies to investment protection.  
 
Thus no body of minimum standard of international law or customary international law 
that directly speaks to rapidly evolving standards like FET, and the present modern, 
highly intricate, and complicated investor–state relationship therefore exists without 
such a standard. Therefore combining the FET standard with the minimum standard 
does not create any secure guarantee for developing countries that the ambit of the FET 
obligation will be significantly restricted. As a result, it is clear that, in the vast majority 
of investment treaties, the host developing countries need to assume that a tribunal will 
interpret the FET standard as an independent and autonomous standard.  
 
                                                          
301 See e.g. Yalkin (n 245).   
302  Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and (n 47) 
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3.2.A.f Other FET Minus Provisions Which Limit The Scope of the Standard 
 
In this discussion it is pertinent to point out that, some investment agreements tend to 
narrow down the scope of the standard in an alternative way, apart from combining it 
with customary international law. They limit the scope of FET by specifically defining it 
in the text of the treaty. For instance some regional treaties have done so by expressly 
referring to denial of justice in the FET clause. For example, Article 11 of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009) states,  
 
“ 1. Each Member State shall accord to covered investments of investors of 
any other Member State, fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security.  
2.  For greater certainty:  
(a) fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny justice 
in any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle 
of due process; and…….”303 [emphasis added]  
 
The text of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009) here may 
suggest that the FET standard should be understood to be limited to denial of justice 
since it uses the term ‘requires’ rather than ‘includes.’304 Similarly Article 10.10 of the 
Malaysia-New Zealand FTA (2009) also used the word ‘requires’ and stated that,  
‘ 1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security.  
2. For greater certainty:  
                                                          
303 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009)  
<http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/tisiln-investagreement.pdf > accessed 23 September 2014.  
304 Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
Vol. II (n 42) 30.    
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(a) fair and equitable treatment requires each Party not to deny justice in any 
legal or administrative proceedings;  
(b) full protection and security requires each Party to take such measures as may 
be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of the covered 
investment; and  
 (c) the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is 
required under customary international law, and do not create additional 
substantive rights.’305 
 
 This appears to be a clear way of limiting the scope of the FET. The denial of justice in 
administrative or legal proceedings is clearly narrowing the obligation. The FET clause 
then only relates to judicial or quasi-judicial processes. Clauses like this therefore can 
potentially provide much clearer limits to the scope of the FET than invocation of 
international law or customary international law. But the vast majority of the investment 
treaties do not contain these kind of definitional limitations.   
 
3.2.B Simple FET  
 
The second category of treaties stipulate FET without any reference to international 
law, customary international law, or any other limitation, thereby implying that FET in 
these treaties is an unqualified, autonomous, and separate standard. These treaties rely 
on the simple construction, which does no more than to assert that the states have the 
obligation to accord the FET standard to the investors of the other contracting party. 
                                                          
305 Malaysia-New Zealand FTA (2009) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-
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78 
 
For example Article 3 of the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union–Tajikistan BIT, 
2009 states that, ‘All investments made by investors of one Contracting Party shall 
enjoy a fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.’306  
 
Now this potentially suggests that general notions of fairness and equity should guide 
interpretation of the clause on a case by case basis. Alternatively suggestions have been 
made that even if FET is stipulated as unqualified, the FET obligation should be 
equated with the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. 
For example the Draft OECD 1967 Convention on Protection of Foreign Property 
included an unqualified FET obligation equated to the minimum standard—‘the 
standard required conforms in effect to the “minimum standard” which forms part of 
customary international law,’307—a notion the OECD Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises reaffirmed in 1984 when it reported, 
‘according to all Member countries which have commented on this point, fair and 
equitable treatment introduced a substantive legal standard referring to general 
principles of international law even if this is not explicitly stated.’308 The Draft OECD 
Convention never came into force,309 nor does the OECD Report of 1984 have any 
binding effect. In spite of the Draft’s influence on later BITs, this effectively leaves the 
tribunals to interpret an unqualified FET standard and to adopt their own 
                                                          
306Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union–Tajikistan BIT, 2009.  
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Belgium_Tajikistan.PDF> accessed 22 August 2014.  
307 See e.g.  Notes and Comments to Article 1(a) of Draft OECD Convention, 1967 by the Drafting 
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interpretations for the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ rather than linking it to the minimum 
standard under customary international law.  
 
However an UNCTAD 2012 study on FET critiqued this in relation to unqualified FET 
clauses in BITs. The report states, 
‘such an interpretation leaves a wide margin of discretion to arbitrators and 
may lead to an overbroad and surprising extension of the FET standard 
toward the review of the wide categories of governmental action previously 
regarded as being outside the remit of international law review. The simple 
unqualified formulation may result in a low liability threshold and brings 
with it a risk for State regulatory action to be found in breach of it.’310 
 
Therefore the UNCTAD 2012 study expressed a caution that the unqualified 
FET would give the Tribunals a very wide discretionary power of interpretation 
and bring some unwanted results.  
 
It is important to note that UNCTAD also carried out a detailed study on the 
issue in 1999.311 The earlier report stated, ‘if States and investors believe that the 
fair and equitable standard is entirely interchangeable with the international 
minimum standard, they could indicate this clearly in their investment 
instruments.’312 After a detailed examination313 the 1999 study concludes,  
‘These considerations point ultimately towards fair and equitable treatment not 
being synonymous with the international minimum standard. Both standards may 
                                                          
310 Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
Vol. II (n 42) 22. 
311 Fair and Equitable Treatment, Series on the Issues in International Investment Agreements Vo. III (n 
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312 Ibid 13. 
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overlap significantly with respect to issues such as arbitrary treatment, 
discrimination and unreasonableness, but the presence of a provision assuring fair and 
equitable treatment in an investment instrument does not automatically incorporate the 
international minimum standard for foreign investors. Where the fair and equitable standard 
is invoked, the central issues remain simply whether the actions in question are in all 
circumstances fair and equitable or unfair or inequitable.’314 [Emphasis added] 
 
Therefore the UNCTAD 1999 study also points towards an independent and 
autonomous FET standard. The findings of the UNCTAD study of 1999 are plausible 
since it provides a clear picture in relation to the interpretation of an FET clause in an 
investment dispute, emphasising the fact that the standard needs to be interpreted 
independently.  Vasciannie also supports this view and opines that this standard is 
autonomous.315 He concludes,  
‘bearing in mind that the international minimum standard has itself been an 
issue of controversy between developed and developing countries for a 
considerable period, it is unlikely that a majority of States would have accepted 
the idea that this standard is fully reflected in fair and equitable standard without 
clear discussion’.316[Footnotes in the original text omitted] 
 
Presciently, Mann argued in 1981 for the autonomous standard of the FET clause. At 
the time judicial authorities and scholars alike continued to seek to tie the FET to the 
minimum standard. He wrote:  
‘It is submitted that nothing is gained by introducing the conception of a 
minimum standard and, more than this, it is positively misleading to 
                                                          
314 Ibid 40. Also see e.g.  Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (n 52) 637–638. 
315 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
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316 Ibid 144. 
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introduce it. The terms “fair and equitable treatment” envisage conduct 
which goes far beyond the minimum standard and afford protection to a 
greater extent and according to a much more objective standard than any 
previously employed form of words. A tribunal would not be concerned 
with a minimum, maximum or average standard. It will have to decide 
whether in all the circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and equitable or 
unfair and inequitable. No standard defined by other words is likely to be 
material. The terms are to be understood and applied independently and 
autonomously.’317 [Emphasis added] 
 
Fourteen years later Dolzer and Stevens expressed similar views, saying that stipulation 
of the standard as an express obligation rather than relying on the international law or 
minimum standard is probably ‘evidence of a self-contained standard.’318  
 
3.2.B.a The Role of the Minimum Standard in Interpreting Simple FET  
 
Controversy about the existence of an international minimum standard in customary 
international law predates its appearance in investment treaties. Thus Vasciannie argues, 
if the FET and the minimum standard are equivalent, acceptance of the FET standard 
would obviously have committed the Latin American states319 and some other 
                                                          
317 Francis A Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (n 47) 244. 
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developing countries to a level of treatment that they have been reluctant to offer on 
grounds of ‘principle and pragmatism’.320  
 
Interpreting the concept of a FET clause autonomously in accordance with its ‘ordinary 
meaning’ rather than as a reference to the international minimum standard has 
significant judicial support, as well.321 In Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA vs. United 
Mexican States 322 the tribunal interpreted the FET standard autonomously, according to 
its ordinary meaning, international law, and the ‘good faith’ principle. They cited the 
security and trust of foreign investors, and its role in maximising the use of economic 
resources, which the preamble of the relevant BIT emphasized, as rationale.323 The 
tribunal in MTD vs. Chile 324 adopted a similar approach,325 holding that the BIT framed 
FET as a ‘pro-active statement–“to promote”, “to create”, “to stimulate” rather than a 
prescription for passive behaviour of states or the avoidance of prejudicial conduct to 
the investors.’326 
 
The Tribunal in Enron vs. Argentina327 held that,  
‘it might well be that in some circumstances where the international 
minimum standard is sufficiently elaborate and clear, fair and equitable 
treatment might be equated with it. But in other more vague circumstances, 
the fair and equitable treatment standard may be more precise than its 
                                                          
320 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 162. 
321 See e.g. Azurix (n 116); Rumeli Telekom AS vs. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008.  
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customary international law forefathers. This is why the Tribunal concludes 
that the fair and equitable treatment standard, at least in the context of the 
Treaty applicable to this case, can also require a treatment additional to or 
beyond that of customary law. The very fact that recent FTC interpretations 
or investment treaties have purported to change the meaning or extent of 
the standard only confirms that those specific instruments aside, the 
standard is or might be a broader one.’328 
 
By stating that the FET standard may be ‘more precise’ than the international minimum 
standard, this passage suggests that the FET standard may contain specific obligations 
outside of the international minimum standard.329 More generally the tribunal in PSEG 
Global Inc. vs. Republic of Turkey330 stated that the FET standard ‘clearly does allow for 
justice to be done in the absence of more traditional breaches of international law 
standards.’331 
 
As Haeri rightly observed: 
‘Accordingly, in interpreting and applying the fair and equitable treatment 
standard autonomously, tribunals are not restricted by the methodology 
(and authoritative sources) for the identification of customary international 
law. It is not, therefore surprising that the fair and equitable treatment 
                                                          
328 Ibid Para 258. 
329 Haeri (n 47) 36.  
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standard has been interpreted autonomously as a broader standard than the 
international minimum standard, nor that it has been subjected to more 
varied applications.’332  
 
Haeri argues that the development of the FET standard as a broader standard than the 
international minimum standard may reflect different purposes and the methodologies 
for determining the FET standard and the international minimum standard.333 
 
Consequently the discussions made above suggests that in the absence of a clear 
indication to the contrary, when a treaty constructs FET in its simple formulation it has 
to be understood as an independent, autonomous, and standard.334 Any attempt to 
equate such a simply constructed FET standard with any other standards is rather a 
futile attempt to distort its meaning and the intentions of the parties to the treaty. 
  
3.2.C FET Plus   
 
FET Plus refers to treaties which combine the FET standard with an additional 
substantive obligation, such as full protection and security, prohibition of denial of 
justice, prohibition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures, obligations of MFN, or 
guarantee of protection and security. For example Article II (2) of the Cambodia–Cuba 
BIT, 2001 states, ‘Investments of investors of either contracting party shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy adequate protection and 
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333 Ibid 38. 
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security in the territory of the other contracting party.’335 Similarly Article 3 of the 
Netherlands–Philippines BIT, 1985 in Article 3(2) states that,  
‘Investments of nationals of either Contracting Party shall, in their entry, 
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party.’336 
 
Some BITs have combined FET with the MFN standard. For example Article 3(2) of 
the Switzerland Model BIT, 1986 states  
‘Each contracting party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment within its 
territory of the investments of the nationals or companies of the other 
contracting party. This treatment shall not be less favourable than that 
granted by each contracting party to investments made within its territory 
by its own nationals or companies of the most favoured nation, if this latter 
treatment is more favourable.’337 
 
Some treaties combine FET with an additional duty not to take any unreasonable or 
discriminatory measure. For example Article 2(2) of the Lebanon–Hungary BIT, 2001 
states 
‘Investments and returns of investors of either contracting party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full 
                                                          
335 Cambodia–Cuba BIT, 2001. 
< http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/cuba_cambodia.pdf> accessed 30 August 2014. 
336Netherlands–Philippines BIT, 
1985<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2073> accessed 22 August 2014. 
337 Switzerland Model BIT, 1986. Also see Article 4(2) of Switzerland–Chile BIT, 1999. A similar kind of 
reference with MFN has been made in Article 4 of the Bangladesh–Iran BIT, 2001 which states,  
‘Investments of natural and legal persons of either Contracting Party effected within the territory of the 
other Contracting Party, shall receive the host Contracting Party’s full legal protection and fair treatment 
not less favourable than that accorded to its own investors or investors of any third state, whichever is 
more favourable’. See e.g. Bangladesh–Iran BIT, 2001  
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/bangladesh_iran.pdf> accessed 22 August 2014.  
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protection and security in the territory of the other contracting party. Each 
contracting party shall refrain from impairing by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
extension, sale or liquidation of such investments.’338 
 
These treaties imply that the FET standard is separate from the other substantive 
obligations listed alongside it. The notions of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, and 
discrimination are understood as inherent to the FET standard. Therefore it appears 
that such clauses give further substance to the otherwise general wording of the 
standard.339 However, prohibiting arbitrary or unreasonable measures while also 
establishing the FET standard does not help to shape the scope of the FET standard. 
Rather it implies the prohibition of unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory measures 
are consonant with the FET standard, but the sphere of the standard itself goes beyond 
these prohibitions.340 For example the tribunal in LG&E vs. Argentina found a state 
measure to be not unreasonable or arbitrary or discriminatory but nevertheless found a 
violation of the FET standard.341 
 
                                                          
338 Lebanon–Hungary BIT, 2001  
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/hungary_lebanon.pdf> accessed 22 August 2014.  In 
the like manner Article 2(2) of The Netherlands–Oman BIT, 2009 states,  
‘Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the investments or nationals or 
persons of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unjustified or discriminatory measures, 
the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those nationals or 
persons’. See e.g. The Netherlands–Oman BIT, 2009   
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_oman.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. Also 
see Article II(2) of Romania–US BIT, 1994  
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43584.pdf> accessed 26 August 2014.   
339 Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
Vol. II (n 42) 31. 
340 Ibid 31. 
341 LG& E (n 121) Para 162; Also see e.g. Sempara Energy vs. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Award, 28 September 2007 Paras 281–283; PSEG (119) Para 262; Duke Energy (n 122) Paras 380–383. 
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The articulation of the FET standard in a particular BIT can guide its interpretation.  
For example in the 1994 US Model Draft Treaty,342 Article II(3) (a) stipulates,  
‘Each Party shall at all times accord to covered investments fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security, and shall in no case 
accord treatment less favourable than that required by international law.’ 
 
This provision reflects one of the United States’s basic policy positions, which says that 
BITs should combine the FET standard with full protection and security and the 
requirements of international law. This differs significantly from the approach other 
capital exporting countries have taken to the relationship between the FET standard 
and other treatment standards.343 The Federal Republic of Germany’s Model BIT offers 
344 investments, nationals, and companies of each contracting party both national 
treatment and MFN treatment, as well as full protection and security respectively under 
its Article 3. Unlike the US Model BIT, the German Model BIT separates the FET 
standard by stating that while each contracting party shall promote investments and 
admit those investments in accordance with its legislation, the host country shall ‘in any 
case accord such investments fair and equitable treatment.’345 However, a close 
examination reveals the effective similarities, since both model BITs afford investors a 
combination of national and MFN treatment, together with a general assurance of 
                                                          
342 Treaty between Government of United States of America and Government of ------ concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, reprinted in UNCTAD, International Investment 
Instruments, vol. III, 195–205. Also can be found at <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article137> 
343 In the US Draft Model BIT, 1994, Article II(1) and (2) calls for national and MFN treatment with 
respect to, ‘the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other 
disposition’ of investments, and provides certain exceptions.  Thus while Article II guarantees the 
provision for FET and full protection and security, Article III reiterates that the FET/full protection and 
security standard shall apply along with other rules, to matters concerning expropriation. Therefore the 
US Draft Model BIT, 1994 stipulates the FET standard is one of a number of general standards 
applicable to investments, and implies that the standards apply concurrently.    
344 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and ----- concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, reprinted in International Investment Instruments: A 
Compendium, Vol. III (n 202) 167–176. 
345 Article 2 of German Model BIT. 
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fairness and equity.  The Model BITs prepared by the United Kingdom,346 France,347 
conform to this model, and many other BITs signed by capital exporting countries do 
as well.  These Model BITs stipulate the FET standard from the outset as a general 
standard in a manner which permits tribunals to interpret whether the other standards 
included in each treaty are specific applications of the general standard.348 
 
Some treaties use the unqualified form of the FET standard and link it with the 
standard of full protection and security in the same clause. For example, the China–
Switzerland BIT, 2009, 349 in its Article 4  states, ‘Investments and returns of investors 
of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment 
and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party.’ However this language does not modify the interpretation of the standard; it 
merely incorporates both treatments in the same provision.350 
 
Kläger argues that combining FET with other investment protection standards might 
give the impression that the scope of different standards overlap at least to some 
extent.351 The UNCTAD study (2012) states that treaties use this combination to be 
more precise about the content of the FET standard and to be more predictable in its 
implementation and subsequent interpretation.352 But combining FET with additional 
                                                          
346 Agreement between Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of ------ for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2005 reprinted International 
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. III (n 202)185–194.   
347 Project d’Accord entre le Gouvernment de la Republique Francaise et le Gouvernment ---- sur l’ 
Encouragement et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements, 2006 reprinted International 
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. III  (n 202) 159–166. 
348 Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(n 47) 129. 
349China–Switzerland BIT, 2009   
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Switzerland_China_new.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014.   
350 Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
Vol. II (n 42) 21. 
351 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47)17.  
352 Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
Vol. II (n 42) 29. 
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substantive standards does not make any difference to the substance of the standard; it 
is still autonomous and self-standing.  As Kläger rightly states, the issue of these 
obligations combined in one clause or stipulated in distinct clauses is a stylistic question 
rather than one of substance.353 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has described the different variations of the FET standard as articulated in 
various investment treaties and shed light on the different issues and controversies 
surrounding the standard in the context of an individual treaty’s particular construction. 
It reveals that sufficient similarity of construction across different treaties exists to 
support the claim that an overarching and singular concept of FET can be the subject 
of detailed analysis. It also has argued that no body of a minimum standard of 
international law or customary international law can be clearly and predictably applied 
to a modern and rapidly evolving standard like FET. Apart from NAFTA Article 1105 
it is clear that even treaties that construct the FET standard in combination with 
international law or the minimum standard under customary international law, may not 
be clearly limiting the scope of the standard. This chapter has also explained how, in 
some treaties, the parties have attempted to more precisely limit the FET standard with 
a specific interpretation of the clause in the treaty. This creates a more precise form of 
FET minus. But these kind of clauses are not common.   
 
Therefore, it is clear that the host developing countries in the vast majority of 
investment treaties should assume that tribunals will interpret the FET standard as an 
independent and autonomous standard.  The remaining part of this thesis will argue that 
                                                          
353 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 17.  
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in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, FET has to be understood as an 
independent and autonomous standard and that this approach is appropriate to the vast 
majority of investment treaties signed by developing countries.   
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Chapter 4 
Country Classification and Developing Countries in International 
Investment Disputes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A key phrase that runs through this thesis is ‘developing countries’. Cognisant of a 
diverse understanding of the term, this chapter aims to contextualise the discussion by 
familiarising the reader with classifications of countries different international 
organisations have adopted. It will review the most common justifications for such 
classifications in the present literature, without offering a detailed discussion of the 
historical aspect of this issue, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, it will 
focus on the classifications different international organisations and academic 
scholarship have produced in relation to the concept of development. It will examine 
whether these conceptions can provide useful guidance to the international investment 
tribunals to consider the developmental issues and challenges of the host developing 
countries in their interpretation of the FET standard. On the basis of this analysis, this 
chapter argues for the need to identify a concept of development which is relevant in 
the investment law context.  It will be argued that this can be done by identifying the 
conditions and prevailing circumstances of developing countries, which form a relevant 
contextual background in the particular context of investment disputes.   
 
Part 4.2.A will provide a detailed discussion of the different classifications of countries 
that international organisations have adopted. Part 4.2.B will discuss the fact that, 
despite adopting the popular term ‘developing countries’ to describe a large number of 
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countries, there exist large differences between these countries. This part will also 
discuss, in brief, the concept of development. Finally, Part 4.2.C will explore whether 
the country classifications different international organisations have adopted and the 
concepts of development scholars have adopted can provide useful guidance to 
international investment tribunals. It will conclude by arguing that, for the purposes of 
international investment disputes, the tribunals need to adopt a concept of developing 
countries which takes into account the development factors that exist in these countries 
relevant to international investment law in their interpretation of the FET standard.  
 
4.2. A Classification of Countries by Different International Organisations 
 
The existing country classification systems by different organisations are termed as the 
‘development taxonomy’ and the associated criteria are called the ‘development 
threshold’.354 Classifying countries according to their level of development is 
controversial. No universally accepted criteria, either based on theory or an objective 
yardstick, exists to classify all countries according to their level of development.355 In the 
1960s, a significant number of new countries emerged following decolonisation after 
WWII.356 Academics and researchers became interested in understanding, not only the 
large income differences but also the diversity across these newly emerged countries in 
terms of issues such as social outcomes, culture, human development, and 
industrialisation.357 International organisations classify countries in order to describe 
their social and economic differences in relation to the organisation’s functions and 
                                                          
354 . See e.g.  Lynge Nielsen, Classification of Countries Based On Their Level of Development: How it is Done and 
How it Could Be Done (International Monetary Fund 2011) 4 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1131.pdf> accessed 7 July 2014. 
355 Others have argued that development is not a concept upon which countries can be classified and also 
that the inherent normative nature of the system does not allow for having a generally accepted 
classification system. See e.g. Ibid 3–5.  
356 When new states emerged after decolonisation around the globe the former empires started to invest 
and transfer resources to their former colonies. This paved the way for a new branch of economics 
known as development economics. 
357 Nielsen (n 354) 5. 
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goals. The terms developed and developing, have emerged as the preferred choice since 
the 1960s. These two words have been the focus of policy discussions on transferring 
resources from richer (developed) to poorer (developing) countries.358 Organizations 
also refer to countries across the globe as poor/rich, backward/advanced, 
North/South, First World/Third World, and developing/industrialized countries.359 
Developing countries are further divided into poor, under-developed and less 
developed.360  
 
Some international organisations classify countries based on economic criteria, while 
others classify them on social criteria. Different organisations use different terminology. 
Some use the term ‘indicators of development’, while others use ‘index’. This thesis uses 
‘criteria’ to refer to the classification of countries in lieu of technical terminology. 
Starting with the classification the World Bank (WB) employs, this part discusses the 
country classifications international organisations have favoured which are most 
dominant in the existing literature and most used in theory and practice in any 
discussion and commentary on country classification.  
 
4.2.A.a The World Bank   
 
The WB’s361 strategy to classify the countries uses the gross national income (GNI) of 
the countries using the WB Atlas Method.362 This classification answers both the 
                                                          
358 See e.g. Lester Pearson, Partners in Development: Report of Commission on International Development (Praeger 
Publishers 1969).  
359 See e.g. Nielsen (n 354) 4.   
360 Kathryn Morton and Peter Tulloch, Trade and Developing Countries (Routledge 2011) 14.  
361 The term ‘World Bank’ refers to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and the International Development Association (IDA). See e.g.  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:20147466~m
enuPK:344189~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95474,00.html> accessed 7 July 2014. 
362 See e.g. <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/world-bank-atlas-method> 
accessed 7 July 2014.  
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WB’s363 operational purposes and its analytical purposes.364 At present they have 
classified the countries into four groups.365 These include all the WB member states 
(currently 188 countries) and all other economies with populations of more than 30,000 
(in total 214 countries). It sets the GNI of each category every year on 1 July. As of 1 
July 2014, the WB income classifications by GNI per capita are: low income countries 
(GNI of US dollars 1,045 or less in 2013); lower middle income economies (GNI per 
capita of more than US dollars 1,045 but less than US dollars 4,125); upper middle 
income economies (GNI per capita of more than US dollars 4,125 but less than US 
dollars 12,746); and high income countries (GNI of US dollars 12,746 or higher). 366 
The WB began providing an analytical country classification in 1978. The World 
Development Indicators (WDI) appeared for the first time in the World Development 
Report,367 in an appendix, which provided the statistical basis for the analysis. This first 
country classification listed three categories: developing,368 industrialized, and capital 
surplus oil exporting countries. The report included summary data on eleven countries 
with centrally planned economies (CPEs).369 Significantly, developing and industrialised 
countries the Bank did not resort to income as a threshold. Rather the Bank used 
                                                          
363 The operation classification system of the WB preceded the analytical classification system. See e.g. 
Nielsen (n 354) 9.  
364 For information on the operational and analytical purpose of the WB see 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/lics-lmics-umics-and-hics-classifying-economies-analytical-
purposes> accessed 7 July 2014.  
365 See e.g. <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications> accessed 7 July 2014.  
366 <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups> accessed 7 July 2014.  
367 World Development Report, 1978 
 <http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/bookpdfdownload/3> accessed 20 July 2014. Also see 
e.g.  <http://wdronline.worldbank.org/> accessed 21 July 2014. For a discussion on the issue see e.g. 
Norman Hicks and Paul Streeten, ‘Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick’ 
(1979) 7 World Development 567. 
368 Developing countries were further categorised as low income and middle income countries.  
369 These countries were Albania, Bulgaria, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Democratic, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, and the USSR. 
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OECD membership for such classification.370 In 1989 the WB introduced major 
reforms to the country classification in the WDI.371 From 1997 onwards the WDI has 
been published separately with the Bank’s statistical survey of world development 
across countries.372  
 
Though the WB used a per capita income ceiling to designate developing countries, it 
made further sub-classifications of these countries ranging from low income to upper 
middle income countries. This sub-classification indicates the existence of complex grey 
areas. Though the WB classifies all low and middle income countries as ‘developing 
countries’, it further clarifies this classification by its note stating that, ‘The use of the 
term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in the group are 
experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached a preferred or 
final stage of development.’373 The WB acknowledges that it uses the per capita income 
method for country classification because it’s convenient, although it does not 
necessarily reflect development status. Accordingly the classification does not capture 
the full scenario of the differences that exist across countries.374 Despite this 
shortcoming, the WB classification is an important one given its widespread usage and 
acceptability.   
 
 
                                                          
370 It is also to be noted that four OECD member states, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, were in the 
developing country group. Whereas South Africa which was not an OECD member state was designated 
as an industrial country.  
371Nielsen (n 354) 13.  
372 See <http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi> accessed 30 May 2014.   
373 See e.g. <http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-classifications> accessed 30 May 2014.   
374 See e.g. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm> accessed 20 July 2014.  
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4.2.A.b International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
 
Like its sister Bretton Woods institution, the WB, the IMF uses a classification system 
for operational and analytical purposes,375 which it began publishing in its World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) in 1980.376 The IMF relies on a wider and more flexible 
classification of countries than the WB. It classifies countries into three groups, namely 
advanced economies, emerging markets, and developing economies.377 The IMF 
describes the scale as encompassing ‘(1) per capita income level, (2) export 
diversification…and (3) degree of integration into the global financial system.’378 It 
further clarifies diversification as follows: ‘oil exporters that have high per capita GDP 
would not make the advanced classification because around 70% of [their] exports are 
oil.’ 379 The IMF therefore resorts to a greater range of criteria of development to 
classify the countries based on per capital income, export diversification, and the degree 
of integration into the global financial system. 
 
However the IMF also employs other criteria in the classifications of countries.380 It 
employs geographical locations as well as economic considerations.381 Further, in 
response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1993 the WEO created a new country 
classification, ‘countries in transition’ to classify former Soviet states. It described these 
countries, as well as some eastern and central European states which had made a 
transition from communist CPEs to market-based economies, as in a process of 
                                                          
375 Nielsen (n 354) 14.  
376 For several years the WEO had been produced for internal use in the Fund.  
377 See e.g. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx> accessed 20 
July 2014.  
378 Ibid.   
379 Ibid.   
380 IMF, Statistical Appendix (2013) 177 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/statapp.pdf > accessed 20 July 2014.   
381 See e.g.<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx> accessed 20 
July 2014.  
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transition from one economic and political system to another.382 Nevertheless it is to be 
noted that these countries in transition are now widely regarded as developing countries, 
albeit they are in a process of transition in their political and economic systems. The 
2013 WEO’s Statistical Appendix states that ‘This classification is not based on strict 
criteria, economic or otherwise, and it has evolved over time. The objective is to 
facilitate analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful method of organizing data.’383 
This document classified 188 countries, with some countries appearing in more than 
one group.384  
 
The IMF essentially classifies any country not advanced as emerging and developing, 
which means that it labels 135 countries, despite their wide range of differences in terms 
of their economies, as ‘developing’. The group includes countries with stable and fast 
growing economies like Brazil, Qatar, and Malaysia; countries with promising 
economies like Vietnam, South Africa, and Sri Lanka; countries undergoing a transition 
like former Soviet states; countries with a high gross domestic product (GDP) like Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, or Brunei Darussalam; countries with strong economies 
in spite of political instability like Mexico or Chile; and countries like China, which has a 
very strong economy and a stable political environment and which most scholars and 
policymakers consider ‘super powers’; as well as countries like Congo or South Sudan 
                                                          
382 See e.g. Ron Hill, ‘The Collapse of Soviet Union’ (2005) 13 History Ireland 37; Attila Agh, ‘The 
Transition to Democracy in Central Europe: A Comparative View’ (1991) 11 Journal of Public Policy 
133; Victor Zaslavsky, ‘Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Post-communist Societies (1992) 
Daedalus 97; Martin Sokol, ‘Central and Eastern Europe a Decade After the Fall of State-Socialism: 
Regional Dimensions of Transition Processes’ (2001) 35 Regional Studies 645; Ronald Grigor Suny, The 
Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford University Press 1993).  
383 IMF, Statistical Appendix (n 380) 177.   
384 These groups are advanced economies (35 countries), Euro area (17 countries),  major advanced 
economies (G7), other advanced economies (Advanced economies excluding G7 and euro area),  
European Union (27 countries), emerging markets and developing economies (135 countries), Central 
and Eastern Europe (14 countries), the Commonwealth of Independent States (12 countries),  developing 
Asia (28 countries), ASEAN-5 (5 countries), Latin America and the Caribbean (32 countries), Middle 
East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan (22 countries), Middle East and North Africa (20 countries) 
and Sub-Sahara Africa (45 countries). See e.g.  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx> accessed 20 July 2014.  
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which are deeply troubled by poor economies and political instability. The disparities 
among these developing countries limits the utility of IMF classification for the 
purposes of the underlying questions this thesis seeks to address.   
 
4.2.A.c United Nations  
 
The UN General Assembly debated country classification over the years. In the 1970s 
the General Assembly identified a group of twenty-five countries as Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) indicating a lower level of socio-economic development.385 The 
General Assembly determined to focus on supporting the development of these 
countries in its implementation of the second UN Development Decade. Follow-up 
UN Conferences have monitored these listed countries and updated its list, which 
presently comprises forty-nine countries.386  
 
Unlike the WB or the IMF, which establish development taxonomies for their full 
membership387 the UN General Assembly has never done so.388 Like the WB, however 
the UN Statistics Division states, ‘The designations “developed” and “developing” are 
intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the 
stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process.’389   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
385 For details visit <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/ldc/home/Background> accessed 25 July 
2014.  
386 See <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/> accessed 20 July 2014. 
387 An economic taxonomy is the system by which economic activity is classified.  
388 Nielsen (n 354) 7. 
389 See e.g.< http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm> accessed 27 July 2014.   
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4.2.A.d UN Development Programme (UNDP)  
 
The UNDP is the UN’s global development network. The current UNDP position on 
country classification is based on the Human Development Index (HDI).390 Economists 
Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen developed the HDI in 1990,391 and the UNDP began 
using it in its annual Human Development Report in 1993.392 This index is a 
comparative measure comprising different criteria, including poverty, literacy, life 
expectancy, education, and quality of life.393 While Haq and Sen acknowledge the 
significance of political freedom and personal security as measures of development, the 
lack of sufficient data on these criteria discouraged their inclusion in the HDI.394 Instead 
it uses three variables – an index of per capita gross domestic income, life expectancy at 
birth, and level of education.395 Therefore a country’s ranking based on HDI can 
substantially differ from its ranking based on per capita income.396 These social criteria 
are a valuable addition to per capita national income data, though Szirmai argues that 
the per capita GNP has never been undermined as a summary criteria of 
                                                          
390 See e.g.< http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ >accessed 27 July 2014. 
391 See e.g. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/> accessed 27 July 2014. 
392 See e.g. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/> accessed 25 July 2014. Also see e.g. Mark McGillivray 
and Howard White, ‘Measuring Development? The UNDP’s Human Development Index’ (1993) 5 
Journal of International Development 183; Mark McGillivray, ‘The Human Development Index: Yet 
Another Redundant Composite Development Indicator?’ (1991) 19(10) World Development 1461; 
Michael Hopkins, ‘Human Development Revisited: A New UNDP Report’ (1991) 19(10) World 
Development 1469; Farhad Noorbakhsh, ‘A Modified Human Development Index’ (1998) 26(3) World 
Development 517; Farhad Noorbakshi, ‘The Human Development Index: Some Technical Issues and 
Alternative Indices’ (1998) 10 Journal of International Development 589.  
393 See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> accessed 27 July 2014. 
394 Nielsen (n 354) 8.  
395 The UNDP Human Development Report (1991) states in its explanation to technical notes that in 
order to represent the declining marginal utility of higher incomes in the income index it gives the income 
categories above the poverty threshold progressively lower weights. See e.g. UNDP Human 
Development Report 1991 (Oxford University Press 1991) 88–91. For a general discussion on UNDP, 
Human Development Report see e.g. Ambuj D Sagar and Adil Najam, ‘The Human Development Index: 
a Critical Review’ (1998) 25 Ecological Economies 249; Mark McGillivray, ‘The Human Development 
Index: Yet Another Redundant Composite Development Indicator?’ (1991) 19(10) World Development 
1461; Meghnad Desai, ‘Human Development: Concepts and Measurement’ (1991) 35 European 
Economic Review 350; Harald Trabold-Nübler, ‘The Human Development Index – A New 
Development Indicator?’ (1991) 26 Intereconomics 236.  
396 According to the UNDP Human Development Report, 2001, in 1991, 30 countries had an HDI 
ranking that differed more than 20 points from their ranking according to their per capita income. See e.g. 
UNDP Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 41.  
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development.397 The UNDP HDI classifies countries across the globe into four 
different groups—very high HDI, high HDI, medium HDI, and low HDI.398 The 2013 
list of very high HDI countries includes all the countries IMF classifies as advanced and 
some countries it classifies as emerging markets and developing countries.399 The 
UNDP classifies some countries with a very high GDP like Saudi Arabia and others 
with a relatively low GDP like Sri Lanka as high HDI countries. As in the IMF 
classification, countries with a strong economy like India and South Africa (which the 
scholars and policy makers describes as the emerging ‘super powers’) qualify only as 
medium HDI countries. This visible difference from the HDI classification reflects its 
humanistic approach to describing a country’s level of development.   
 
4.2.A.e World Trade Organisation (WTO)  
 
The WTO system has no classification of ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries. In 
effect, unlike other organisations, it uses no established normative standard to designate 
a developing country.400 The member states themselves announce whether they are 
‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries.401 If any member states have any objection to any 
such announcement, they can challenge the decision of that particular member state 
                                                          
397 Adam Szirmai, The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 15. 
398 See e.g. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries > accessed 21 July 2014.  
399 Ibid.    
400 Alex Ansong, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO-GATT – Past, Present, 
Future (Law Research Association 2012) 22. Also see e.g. Cui Fan, ‘Who Are the Developing Countries in 
the WTO?’ (2008) 1 The Law and Development Review 124.  
401 See e.g. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm> accessed 21 July 2014. Also 
see e.g. R Abbot, ‘Are Developing Countries Deterred from Using the WTO Dispute Settlement System? 
Participation of Developing Countries in the DSM in the Years 1995–2005’. ECIPE Working Paper No. 
01/2007, <www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/are-developing-countries-deterred-from -
using-the-wto-settlement-system/PDF > accessed 23 August 2014; and H Horn and P Mavroidis, The 
WTO Dispute Settlement 1995–2004: Some Descriptive Statistics (World Bank 2006); also see e.g. Leah 
Granger, ‘Explaining the Board-Based Support For WTO Adjudication’ (2006) 24 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 521.  
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claiming to be a ‘developing country’.402 Given that the WTO system gives ‘developing 
countries’ some benefits,403 including ‘special and differentiated’ treatment from the 
organisation,404 including longer transition periods to implement some WTO 
agreements, and eligibility for certain technical assistance,405 such labelling can be 
controversial. ‘Developing countries’ in the WTO also benefit from the unilateral 
preference schemes of some of the developed member states such as the Generalized 
System of Preference (GSP).406 However, the GSP is not part of the WTO system and 
announcing itself as a developing country does not per se guarantee that the country will 
benefit from the GSP. In practice the developed country implementing the GSP decides 
which countries will receive preference as ‘developing countries.’407 This mitigates the 
value a country realizes by designating itself ‘developing.’ However, the countries which 
have claimed to be developing countries within the WTO system generally have been 
labelled as developing countries by the WB, or emerging markets and developing 
economies by the IMF.408 The list of self-declared ‘developing countries’ within the 
WTO system does not provide any useful additional guidance to define a developing 
country, or provide any information on the level of development of these countries, 
given the nature of the system.   
                                                          
402 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm> accessed 25 July 2014. 
403 See e.g. Bernard Hoekman, Constantine Michalopoulos and L Alan Winter, ‘Special and Differential 
Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward After Cancun’ (2004) 27 The World 
Economy 481; J Michael Finger and L Alan Winters, ‘What Can the WTO Do For Developing 
Countries?’ in Anne O Krueger and Chonira Aturupane (eds), The WTO as an International Organization 
(The University of Chicago Press 1998); Spencer Henson and Rupert Loader, ‘Barriers to Agricultural 
Exports From Developing Countries: The Role of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements’ (2001) 29 
World Development 85.  
404 See e.g. <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/devel_e.htm> accessed 23 August 2014.   
405<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm#legal_pr
ovisions> accessed 20 July 2014.  
406 For a general understanding of the GSP see e.g. George D Holliday, Generalized System of Preferences 
(Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 1996); William H Cooper, Generalized System of 
Preferences (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 1999); Bernard M Hoekman and Michael 
M Kostecki,  The Political Economy of World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond (Oxford University Press 
2009). 
407 For more information on GSP see e.g. <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/Generalized-
System-of-Preferences.aspx> accessed 23 August 2014.  
408 See e.g. Constantine Michalopoulos, Developing Countries in the WTO (Palgrave New York 2011); 
Chantal Thomas and Joel P Trachtman, Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (Oxford University 
Press 2009).  
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4.2.A.f OECD    
 
In the absence of a generally accepted classification of the countries based on their level 
of development, some international organisations have used OECD membership as the 
main criteria for developed country status. For example, the WB used OECD 
membership for country classification rather than an economic threshold in 1978. 
However, the OECD does not have any criteria like the WB or IMF for country 
classification. The preamble to the OECD Convention, 1960 identifies the contracting 
parties with a belief that ‘the economically more advanced nations should co-operate in 
assisting to the best of their ability the countries in process of economic 
development.’409 Essentially, like the WTO system, which is a voluntary system of 
classification, OECD members declare themselves ‘developed’.  
 
Only a small of number of countries clearly qualify as ‘economically advanced nations’ 
according to this system. At present the OECD has thirty-four member states, up from 
the original twenty in 1961.410 OECD member states clearly exist as ‘developed’; the 
remaining countries in the world, according to this system, are ‘developing countries’. 
While the thirty-four member countries of the OECD includes most countries the IMF 
lists as advanced economies, it also includes Chile, Mexico, Hungary, Turkey, and 
Poland which the IMF classified as emerging markets and developing economies. This 
suggests OECD membership may be an imperfect standard. However OECD 
membership provides a general picture of the more economically advanced nations, 
subject to some exceptions stated above. Thus a simple understanding of OECD 
                                                          
409 OECD Convention, signed in Paris, 1960. See e.g.  
<http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-
operationanddevelopment.htm> accessed 25 July 2014.   
410 For a more information on current members of OECD visit 
<http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/> accessed 25 July 2014.  
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membership gives the impression that outside the OECD member states the rest of the 
world can be termed as developing countries.  
 
As part 4.2.A has described, country classifications adopted by different international 
organisations are significant not only for the organisations’ policy goals, but also for the 
countries since such classification based on the level of development affords them 
certain benefits and exemptions.411 Scholars therefore hotly debate country 
classifications as there is an economic interest when resources are transferred to or 
invested in developing countries.412 Various complex taxonomies of classification and 
sub-classifications of countries, like LDCs, ‘countries in transition’, and classifications 
based on more technical and complex HDI complicate these debates.  None of the 
classifications forwarded by the WB, IMF, or UNDP provide a complete picture of 
developing countries. Organisations which use a self-declaration mechanism provide no 
assurance of accuracy. The same country can fall within different groups based on all of 
these classification systems.   
 
 
                                                          
411 See e.g. Cartel Exemptions in Developing Countries: Recent Work from the World Bank Group, 
Competition Policy International (2013) <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/cartel-
exemptions-in-developing-countries-recent-work-from-the-world-bank-group/ > accessed 23 July 2014; 
Ricardo Bitrán and Ursula Giedion, Waivers and Exemptions for Health Services in Developing 
Countries Social Protection Unit Human Development Network The World Bank (March 2003) < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Safety-
Nets-DP/0308.pdf > accessed 23 July 2014; Jean-Christophe Bureau, Sebastien Jean and Alan Matthews, 
‘Concessions and Exemptions For Developing Countries in the Agricultural Negotiations: The Role of 
the Special and Differential Treatment’ No. 18858  (2005) Working Papers from TRADEAG – 
Agricultural Trade Agreements <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/18858/1/wp050006.pdf> 
accessed 10 September 2014.  
412 Hans-Peter Lankes and Anthony J Venables, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Transition: The 
Changing Pattern of Investments’ (1996) 4 Economics of Transition 331; Luiz R De Mello Jr, ‘Foreign 
Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth: A Selective Survey’ (1997) 34 The Journal of 
Development Studies 1; Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F Campos,  Why Does FDI Go Where it Goes? New 
Evidence from the Transition Economies (IMF 2003).  
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4.2.B Disparities and Differences Across Developing Countries and the Concept 
of Development  
 
From part 4.2.A, it is clear that it is a difficult task to fit all countries appropriately into 
the constricting dichotomous classification framework forwarded by these different 
international organisations. Worsley opines that after WWII existing scholarship 
designated any country not clearly economically advanced as ‘developing countries.’413 
However, even between developing countries there remain a wide range of disparities 
and differences in terms of their economic and social levels of development. Further, 
neither of these two criteria can describe a particular country’s level of development 
exactly.  
Szirmai identified the disparities and differences across this large group of countries as 
including their per capita income, their demographic characteristics, natural resources, 
economic structure and dynamism, and even the difference in their colonial experience 
and their pre-colonial history and regional characteristics.414 Similarly the Report of the 
South Commission lists developing countries’ size, natural resources, economies, level 
of economic and technological development, social and cultural differences, and 
political ideology and systems as significant differences.415 It describes widening 
disparities in the last decade due to economic and technological differences.416 The 
WB’s classification acknowledges that developing countries range from low income to 
lower middle income, upper middle income and high income; the IMF classification 
encompasses special characteristics such as oil exporting, newly industrialised countries, 
countries in transition, emerging economies.  
                                                          
413 See e.g. Peter Worsley, The Third World (University of Chicago Press 1970). All these developing 
countries however had significant differences with developed industrialised countries. Other terms such 
as ‘North’ and ‘South’ were also used to describe these two broad group of countries. 
414 Szirmai (n 397) 26.  
415 Julius Kambarage Nyerere (ed.),  The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission,  
Independent Commission of South on Development Issues (Oxford University Press 1990) 1.    
416 Ibid.   
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Many Middle East countries are developing countries but they are rich, even richer than 
some developed countries, in their per capita income.417 Brazil and India have 
experienced rapid economic growth and have developed a sophisticated industrial 
sector comparable to the developed world, while countries like South Korea earn most 
of their foreign exchange through export of manufactured goods.418 Countries like 
Nepal or Kenya, readily qualify as developing countries while Japan and Norway are 
developed countries. But classifying countries like Russia, Malaysia, or Brazil, or UAE 
with its high GDP and high HDI classification, and Sri Lanka with its low GDP and 
high HDI, is difficult. India has a much stronger economy than Sri Lanka, but only 
qualifies for medium HDI. A large number of countries are difficult to classify, which 
suggest the developed/developing country dichotomy is too restrictive to capture the 
differences in the level of development of all the countries across the globe.419 
Therefore the classification of developed and developing countries is subject to relative 
and subjective judgment. It also depends on how one defines the concept of 
‘development’ itself. In the absence of a normative regime as to what a developing 
country is, it becomes relevant to provide a brief overview of different views in the 
relevant scholarship surrounding the debate on the concept of development itself.     
 
It is difficult to define the term ‘development’ in what Szirmai calls an ‘objective, 
abstract and ahistorical manner’.420 In simple terms, development means progress. At 
the societal level it is a positive ‘progressive social change’.421 As Aristotle stated, the 
                                                          
417 Morton and Tulloch (n 360) 15; Also see e.g. Szirmai (n 397) 6.   
418 Szirmai (n 397) 15.   
419 Nielsen (n 354) 3    
420 Szirmai (n 397) 11.  
421 John Henry Merryman, ‘Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & 
Revival of the Law and Development Movement’ (1977) 25 The American Journal of Comparative law 
457, 463.  
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purpose of the state, ‘is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good’.422 
In modern times social contract theory encapsulates this, saying that a state has a 
developmental duty towards its citizenry.  Therefore development now has become the 
raison d’etre of states. However, scholars are often in conflict as to what constitutes the 
concept of development.423 Scholars like Escobar think that development is a 
historically produced discourse through which the idea of ‘third world’ was invented 
and made an object of scholarship meant to serve hegemonic purposes.424 Baxi views 
development as a global ritual of the ‘periodic reinvention of impoverishment’ and that 
it ‘constitutes a mode of legitimate power’.425 Scholars like Szirmai linked development 
with westernisation. He argues that the international political and economic balance of 
power influences and determines the concept and powerful countries set up the model 
of development.426 In the last 400 years of human history the ‘West’ has become the 
dominant power both in economic and political terms in the globe, and accordingly 
western societies have become the models of modern and developed societies.427 
Likewise Myrdal argues that the present day idea of development links to westernisation 
and that scholars have derived it from the historical development experiences of the 
present Western countries.428 Szirmai opines that the powers which dominate the world 
                                                          
422 Aristotle, The Politics (Trevor J Saunders, Trevor J Sinclair and Thomas Alan trs, Penguin Books 1992) 
196.  
423 See e.g. David Colman and Frederick Nixson, Economics of Change in Less Developed Countries (3rd edn, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994)1–5. The views on development are so divergent that some scholars view 
modern day capitalism as producing a distorted form of development around the globe. For a detailed 
discussion on capitalism and development in a global perspective see e.g. Leslie Sklair, ‘Capitalism and 
Development in Global Perspective’ in Leslie Sklair (ed), Capitalism and Development (Routledge 1994) 165.  
424 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton 
University Press 1995) 5 and 44–45.  
425 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, (Oxford University Press 2012) 455. 
426 Szirmai (n 397) 11. 
427 See e.g. Eric Lionel Jones, Growth Recurring: Economic Change in World History (University of Michigan 
Press 1988); David S Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Countries Are So Rich and Some So 
Poor (WW Norton 1998).   
428 See e.g. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (Penguin Books 1968); 
Gunner Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline (Pantheon Books 
1970).  Sen argues that in ancient Asian traditions the so-called modern day Western notions such as 
tolerance or human rights were very much prominent.  But today the spread of these ideas in modern 
form in this part of the globe is inextricably linked to Western expansion. See e.g. Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press 1999).  
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in fact explicitly or implicitly determine the ideas and objectives of development.429 
Esteva has expressed a similar view, calling development a promotional symbol for 
pursuing and internalising the hegemony of the United States, a tool for transmogrifying 
‘into an inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them 
off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a 
heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply in terms of homogenizing and narrow 
minority.’430  
Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen described development in terms shifted from 
strictly economic criteria, suggesting a humanistic approach to the concept. He 
proposed that the value of economic growth, technological advances, and political 
change all lies in their contribution to human freedoms.431 Sen even went further to 
challenge the too narrow focus on economic dimensions of development only, citing 
many examples of countries, in which growth in  social factors such as literacy or life 
expectancy do not accompany rapid economic growth.432 Therefore in his view, 
development reflects the ‘acceptable minimum living condition’433 of the people in a 
country, rather than the per capita income which may not in all cases reflect the real 
                                                          
429 Szirmai (n 397) 12.  Szirmai also refers to Frank. See e.g. Andre Gunder Franck, Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (Monthly Review Press 1969).   
430 Gustavo Esteva, ‘Development’ in Wolfgang Sachs (ed), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge 
as Power (Zed Books 1992) 2.   
431 Sen identifies a short list that among these freedoms the most significant are freedom from poverty, 
malnutrition, premature mortality, and access to health care. In support of his argument Sen shows the 
empirical evidence of urban African Americans who have lower life expectancies than that of the Chinese 
person despite the fact that in the United States the per capita income is much higher. For a brief 
discussion on Sen’s ideas of freedom see e.g. Sen (n 428). 
432 Szirmai (n 354) 7.  
433 An acceptable living condition implies that a person is able to consume sufficient nutrients to avoid 
being malnourished and that his or her dwelling place has certain basics for life such as water, light, size, 
sanitation, etc. Therefore the minimum income has to afford workers these basic standards of living 
conditions; the poverty line defines this minimum. The individuals or households who fall below that line 
are designated as poor. However, as the costs and politically acceptable minimum living standards vary 
greatly from country to country, the poverty lines are country specific, which has a direct impact on the 
comparisons of poverty outcomes across the countries. See e.g. Sen (n 428).   
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living conditions of the citizenry.  Scholars like Korten and Seers express similar 
views.434 
These different classifications of development can provide useful information on 
various economic and social indices of the country. But these indices have limited 
explanatory power in terms of the status and ability of a host developing country in the 
international investment dispute context. A developing country’s particular capability in 
an investment regime cannot be defined by its GDP, GNI or its HDI. The social and 
economic criteria different international organisations have advanced can explain a 
country’s level of economic or social development but they cannot explain the 
particular host country’s capability and the challenges of their particular developmental 
level with regard to investment protection.  Understanding this picture requires a 
different perspective, one that recognises the socio-political and economic conditions 
prevailing in that country and the challenges they create in an investment law context.   
 
4.2.C Perspectives of Host Developing Countries in Investment Disputes    
 
The discussion in part 4.2.B established that each developing country is unique in terms 
of its economic and social level of development, and that different international 
organisations classify them according to different economic and social criteria of 
development. The country classifications different international organisations have 
created can help us to understand the wide range of developing countries according to a 
broader set of perspectives. However such perspectives provide little help when it 
comes to the particular developmental issues of the host developing countries in the 
investment dispute context.  
                                                          
434 See e.g. Dudley Seers, ‘What Are We Trying to Measure? (1972) 8 The Journal of Development 
Studies 21; David C Korten, When Corporations Rule the World (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2001) 165.  
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As Morton and Tulloch have rightly observed, the phrases used to describe a 
developing country do not accurately or uniquely describe all the countries in the group; 
they are merely epithets.435 However, they have identified a number of features that 
often developing countries share, including poverty, unemployment, infrastructural 
capacity, lack of self-sustained economic growth, uneven economic development, 
significant disparity among citizens in terms of income and wealth, lack of high 
standards of living, illiteracy, different degrees of corruption, lack of technological 
support, and political instability.436 For example, Nepal and Brazil differ widely in terms 
of economic and technical capability but both countries face challenges like poverty, 
corruption in public life, and some degree of political instability.437 The issues identified 
by Morton and Tulloch represent an important and more inclusive basket of 
developmental issues that the host developing countries might face to varying degrees. 
What is important for this thesis is to identify those that are particularly relevant for the 
investment dispute context. This part of the thesis and the chapters which follow will 
identify some of those issues which will assist the tribunals in their interpretation of the 
alleged breach of FET standard by host developing countries. These issues will enable 
the tribunals to deal with this large group of host countries more appropriately.  
                                                          
435 Morton and Tulloch (n 360) 14. Also see e.g. UN Statistics Division Note 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm> accessed 30 May 2014. 
436 Morton and Tulloch (n 360) 15. Similarly, Szirmai identifies certain common problems in developing 
countries, such as a problem of widespread poverty, a dominance of agriculture in national income and 
employment patterns, widespread corruption, political instability, environmental degradation, and lack of 
proper technological capacities, see e.g. Szirmai (n 397) 29.  
437 From the historical point of view, most developing countries lack the process of widespread capitalist 
industrialisation of their developed counterparts. However that does not mean that they were totally 
untouched by the development of Western capitalism or industrialisation. The majority of developing 
countries were once colonies of developed industrial states, and Morton and Tulloch argue that 
exceptions tend to have similar patterns in economic, political, and cultural links with industrial countries. 
They believe the links with their former colonial powers have an influential role in the economic, political, 
and social activities of the developing countries, since these influences have dominated their trade and 
exports with developed countries, in particular their ex-colonial powers and also their reliance on Western 
capital and technology. See e.g. Morton and Tulloch (n 360) 14. 
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Thus, this thesis is not concerned with a universally applicable concept of 
‘development’. Rather it suggests that there is a need to identify a concept of 
development that is relevant to the investment law context. It focuses on the 
international investment tribunals’ role in considering the developmental issues and 
challenges host developing countries face when they interpret the FET standard. This 
investigation requires an understanding of the functions of those tribunals in a dispute. 
As discussed in brief in Chapter 1, the purpose of international investment tribunals is 
to adjudicate investment disputes between host countries and foreign investors. Chapter 
1 also emphasised the importance of the arbitrators’ discretionary powers to interpret 
the FET standard. From this view point of the arbitrators’ discretionary power to 
interpret the standard, this thesis proposes that international investment tribunals, in 
their interpretation of the standard, need to accommodate the developmental issues and 
challenges of the host developing countries which have direct and indirect relevance to 
the dispute in question instead of those identified by the different classifications by 
different international organisations in terms of their economic and social level of 
development. As will be shown in the chapters which follow, elements such as the level 
of poverty, HDI ranking, or GDP of the host developing countries are not the most 
relevant factors that the investment tribunals need to be particularly aware of in the 
investment dispute context. Rather investment tribunals should weigh other issues and 
factors identified in this thesis in adjudicating disputes against developing countries.  
The case studies which Chapters 5-7 will present will identify those issues which, in the 
investment dispute context, the tribunals need to take into account most in relation to 
host developing countries. These issues and challenges include many which are 
identified by those Morton and Tulloch; in particular  lack of administrative capacity 
and sophistication of the governmental bodies, lack of experience in international 
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investment law, lack of technological support and infrastructure, limited resources, 
post-conflict vulnerability, social and political transition, political instability, social 
unrest, and economic crisis. Even the socio-political dimensions of a particular sector or 
socio-political sensitivity in relation to foreign investment in sectors like public utilities 
or natural resources bear on investment disputes. The status of being a developing 
country makes policy changes that might not occur in a developed country both natural 
and necessary. As Kriebaum argues,   
 ‘[A] raising of domestic law requirements during the lifespan of the investment 
in fields such as labour law, environmental law etc. within reasonable bounds 
should not be seen as a violation of legitimate expectations.  Investment 
protection must not stand in the way of States graduating to higher levels of 
social development.’438  
Developing countries, intrinsically, are at a level of development different from their 
developed counter parts. Therefore investment treaties should not obstruct their right 
to change policies on certain issues to meet their obligations to foreign investors. Given 
the relationship of legitimate expectations to the FET standard, Kriebaum’s argument 
suggests developing countries should have latitude to change policies that might affect 
the investment.  This thesis will extend this logic to the FET standard; the 
developmental issues and challenges of host developing countries that should bear on 
their adherence to the standard would include this right to change policy related to the 
investment.  
Serious situations like civil war and the vulnerability that follows, social unrest, and 
economic crisis in the context of political instability make host developing countries 
                                                          
438 Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Condition for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113) 404. 
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more vulnerable in their relationships with the foreign investors. Investing in 
developing countries bears inherent risks for foreign investors.  
The three chapters that follow this one will describe how these issues and conditions 
have played a key role in the challenges that the host developing countries face in 
seeking to meet their investment treaty obligations and particularly their obligation in 
relation to the FET standard. The case studies will illustrate, investment tribunals have 
frequently disregarded these factors, when foreign investors claim host developing 
countries have breached the FET standard. The challenges host developing countries 
face under current interpretations of their treaty obligations reflect the catalyst role of a 
lack of resources, experience, sophisticated administrative capacity, and other 
vulnerabilities in the investment dispute context. This thesis focuses on three types of 
situations and crises which make these factors more significant; (i) political crises as 
discussed in Chapter 5 (ii) political and economic transition as discussed in Chapter 6 
and (iii) economic crises as discussed in Chapter 7. Each of these chapters describes the 
influence of these factors in particular circumstances which are common for developing 
countries, and reveals their impact in host countries’ ability to meet their treaty 
obligations towards foreign investors.   
 
This impact particularly emerges in difficult cases. Kläger has identified the absence of 
any clear guidance in relation to the difficult cases from the current tribunals.439 He 
describes the current tribunals as engaged in categorisation of lines of argument by 
specification of fact situations to simplify the FET standard,440 which does not help 
when it comes to the most difficult situations host developing countries face.   
 
                                                          
439 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law’ (n 47) 121. 
440 Ibid.  
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This thesis argues that if the investment tribunals acknowledge the developmental issues 
that host countries face in complicated situations, the awards will reflect a sound 
interpretation of the FET standard. Therefore this thesis argues that the issues, 
including the need to change policies, which become relevant for host developing 
countries in complicated situations should be introduced as obligatory factors in 
investment dispute proceedings and acknowledged as relevant. These factors fuel the 
challenges that host developing countries face as they seek to ensure investor protection 
standards under treaty obligations, and particularly in compliance with the FET 
standard. The flexible and ‘catch-all’ nature of the FET standard makes this particularly 
significant. Investment tribunals have interpreted it as license to interpret actions 
governments undertake to address crises or serve public need as a breach of their FET 
obligations, imposing high costs on developing countries of accepting foreign 
investment. If tribunals begin to identify and utilise developmental issues in the context 
of investment disputes, taking into account the challenges countries face relevant to the 
investment dispute, they will make possible a concept of development that supports 
both the continued development of host developing countries and their continued 
ability to support foreign investment.  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the country classifications different international 
organisations have adopted depending on either economic or social criteria.  It has also 
discussed the wide disparity among developing countries and highlighted that no 
definitive list of developing countries exists. It also points out the fact that these 
different classifications, and the concept of development as discussed here, have limited 
explanatory power in relation to the particular capabilities and challenges of the host 
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developing countries in an investment dispute context. There is a need to identify a 
specific concept of development which is particularly applicable to the challenges faced 
by developing countries in investment law disputes as identified above. This will allow 
the tribunals to take the contextual background of the disputes into consideration in a 
way that will provide more appropriate decisions.  
 
The subsequent three chapters will focus on how the tribunals have addressed the issues 
and challenges of host developing countries in relation to (1) political crises and socio-
political conditions, (2) transition from communist centrally planned economies (CPEs) 
to market based economies, and (3) economic crises in their interpretation of alleged 
breaches of the FET obligation by host developing countries.   
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Chapter 5 
Current Arbitral Practice Relating to Social and Political 
Circumstances in Host Developing Countries: FET Standard in 
Context 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will discuss a selection of arbitral awards against host 
developing countries in which their particular socio-political circumstances 
led to alleged breaches of the FET standard. Tribunals in these cases have 
discussed the different aspects of those socio-political circumstances, the 
host countries’ related ability to provide protection to foreign investors, 
and the issue of foreign investors’ legitimate expectation from these host 
countries under the FET obligation in a particular case. The a rbitral awards 
discussed in this chapter represent the full range of approaches current 
tribunals have adopted where these socio-political circumstances were 
clearly a relevant contextual background to the dispute. Part 5.2.A of the 
chapter will analyse the awards where political instability wa s an issue and 
part 5.2.B will analyse the awards where a broader range of socio -political 
circumstances were a vital contextual background to the investment 
disputes.  
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5.2.A Political instability  
 
Developing countries have unstable political conditions to varying 
degrees,441 due to undemocratic military interventions, conflict situations 
after changes of power, rigged general elections, domination by 
undemocratic political parties, and conflicts due to mass political 
intolerance.442 Political instability often affects foreign investment 
protection standards; 443 changes of power in government can even lead to 
changes in policy in relation to foreign investments or benefits particular 
foreign investors may receive.444 Thus political instability imposes certain 
inherent risks on foreign investors in developing countries.445  
 
This part will examine arbitral awards against host countries experiencing 
political turmoil or in a post-war situation, focusing on the impact of these 
circumstances upon foreign investors and the tribunals’ interpretation of 
whether the host country breached the FET standard. It begins with the 
                                                          
441 See e.g. Taketsugu Tsurutani, ‘Stability and Instability: A Note in Comparative Political Analysis’ 
(1968) 30 The Journal of Politics 910. 
442 For wide range of such issues see e.g. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub 
and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990 
(Cambridge University Press 2000); Steven Barracca, ‘Military Coups in the Post-cold War Era’ (2007) 28 
Third World Quarterly 137. 
443 See e.g. Mario Levis, ‘Does Political Instability in Developing Countries Affect Foreign Investment 
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Political Instability and Flow of Foreign Direct Investment’ (1989) 29 Management International Review 
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awards most sympathetic to the problems political situations impose on 
host developing countries and progresses to the least sympathetic.  
 
5.2.A.a Bayindir Insaat Turizm  
 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S, a Turkish company, entered into a 
contract with the National Highway Authority (NHA) of Pakistan to build a six-lane 
motorway in Pakistan in 1993.446  Various disagreements over delays in the schedule 
disrupted the project for eight years. When the NHA terminated the contract and the 
Pakistani army took control of the company’s work site in 2001, Bayinder initiated 
proceedings in ICSID that Pakistan had breached a number of obligations including 
FET, MFN, and National Treatment.447 Bayinder also complained that there was 
adverse impact of change in government during those years over the project and when 
in 1999 General Musharaf took over power, this new regime conspired to remove 
them.448 Bayinder claimed that it had wider expectations of stability and predictability 
under the FET standard.449 
 
In its award in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S vs. Pakistan on the question of 
legitimate expectation of the investor under the circumstances the tribunal cited three 
pre-existing decisions which relied on: 
‘all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but 
also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in 
the host State.’450[Footnotes in the original text omitted] 
                                                          
446 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi AS vs. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29 Award, 27 
August 2009.  
447 Ibid Paras 96–100. 
448 Ibid Paras 194–195. 
449 Ibid Para 194. 
450 Ibid Para 192. The Tribunal cited Saluka (n 104) and Duke Energy (122).   
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The tribunal concluded that investors cannot expect stable and predictable decision 
making on the part of the government when it changes rapidly and successive regimes 
may have different views on investment projects.451 It also emphasised the 
reasonableness of the investor’s expectation under such political circumstances and 
stated that,  
‘… the Tribunal is of the view that the Claimant could not reasonably have 
ignored the volatility of the political conditions prevailing in Pakistan at the time 
it agreed to the revival of the Contract. Indeed, the Claimant expressly 
acknowledges that it suffered severely from political changes in Pakistan during 
the preceding years.’452 
 
The tribunal ruled that Bayinder had no legitimate expectation of stability, and therefore 
the facts were not sufficient to prove that the host country had breached the investor’s 
legitimate expectation as part of its FET obligation.453 Referring to a decision discussed 
later in this chapter, Tecmed 454 the tribunal observed that the decision, 
‘…could not rule out prima facie that Pakistan’s fair and equitable treatment 
obligation comprised an obligation to maintain a stable framework for 
investments and that “a State can breach the ‘stability limb’ of its [FET] 
obligation through acts which do not concern the regulatory framework but 
more generally the State’s policy towards investments.”’455 [Footnotes in the 
original text omitted] 
On the basis of the facts of the dispute, the tribunal stated that “…in the light of 
political changes of the preceding years, the Claimant could not reasonably expect that 
                                                          
451 Kriebaum, ‘Are Investment Treaty Standards Flexible Enough to Meet the Needs of Developing 
Countries’ (n 85) 337. 
452 Bayinder (n 446) Para 193. 
453Ibid Paras 177-–179. 
454 Tecmed (n 118) see 5.2.B.c Tecmed 137.  
455 Bayinder (n 446) Para 177. 
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no further political changes would occur.”456 Accordingly the tribunal held that 
Bayinder’s claim for frustration of legitimate expectation is unsustainable457 and also that 
there was no breach of the applicable FET standard.458 
 
The tribunal’s willingness to take the particular political situation and instability in 
Pakistan that existed during General Musharaff’s regime into account459 reflected 
Pakistan’s long history of political turmoil and considerable evidence  that a lack of 
democracy, transparency and accountability is endemic to Pakistan’s political and social 
culture and that foreign investors should understand these risks before investing in that 
country.460 Others have criticized this reasoning,461 and, as the balance of this chapter 
will show, a number of other tribunals have taken a different approach towards such 
unstable political situations in host states. 
 
 
 
                                                          
456 Ibid Para 197. 
457 Ibid Para 199. 
458 See e.g., Ibid Paras 458 and 482. 
459 For an account of Pakistan’s political situation during General Mushraff’s regime see e.g. Vali Nasr, 
‘Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan’ (2004) 58(2)The Middle East Journal 195; Matthew J 
Nelson, ‘Pakistan in 2008: Moving Beyond Musharraf’ (2009) 49 Asian Survey 16; C Christine Fair, ‘Why 
the Pakistan Army is here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance’ (2011) 87 International Affairs 571; 
Iftikhar H Malik, ‘Pakistan in 2000: Starting  A New Stalemate?’ (2001) 41 Asian Survey 104; Shoaib A 
Ghias, ‘Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf’ 
(2010) 35 Law & Social Inquiry 985. 
460 For a detailed account of Pakistan’s political instability see e.g. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History 
(Hurst 2009); Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan’(1959) 13(4) The 
Middle East Journal 389; S Akbar Zaidi, ‘State Military and Social Transition: Improbable Future of 
Democracy of Pakistan’ (2005) 40 (49) Economic and Political Weekly 5173; Samina Yasmeen, 
‘Democracy in Pakistan: The Third Dismissal’ (1994) 34(6) Asian Survey 572; Aqil Shah, ‘Pakistan’s 
“Armored” Democracy’ (2003) 14(4) Journal of Democracy 26; Veena Kukreja, ‘Pakistan Since the 1999 
Coup: Prospects of Democracy’ in Veena Kukreja and MP Sing (eds), Pakistan: Democracy, Development and 
Security Issues  (Sage Publications 2005); Iftikhar H Malik, ‘Pakistan in 2001: The Afghanistan Crisis and 
the Rediscovery of the Frontline State’ (2002) 42(2) Asian Survey 204;  Ameen Jan, ‘Pakistan on a 
Precipice’ (1999) 39(5) Asian Survey 699; John Bray, ‘Pakistan at 50: a State in Decline?’ (1997) 73(2) 
International Affairs 315. 
461 For a criticism of the Award see e.g., Akin Alcitepe and Ronan J McHugh, ‘Bayinder v. Pakistan and 
the Decline and Fall of Investment Treaty Claims on Construction Projects’ (2009) 6(2) Ankara Review 
83. 
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5.2.A.b Toto  
Toto Construzioni Generali S.p.A., an Italian construction company, contracted with 
the state of Lebanon to build a highway in 1997.462 The Syrian troops occupied at least 
part of the work site,463 and a change in the customs and tax regulation affected the 
project. In Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. vs. The Republic of Lebanon,464 Toto alleged that 
Lebanon had breached various provisions of the Italy–Lebanon BIT,465 including FET. 
Lebanon contended that Toto had visited the site before it entered into the contract and 
was aware of the presence of the Syrian army, and also that the Syrian Army’s presence 
could not have substantially hindered the project work because it occupied only a small 
area of the site.466  
 
The tribunal found that Lebanon did not breach the FET obligation under the BIT with 
regard to evacuation of the Syrian troops from the site.467 Referring to Parkerings-
Compagniet AS vs. Lithunia468 the tribunal stressed that investors must consider the 
business risk as well as the possible legal and economic instability imposes when 
investing in a country in political transition.469 Further, it stated, ‘the post-civil war 
situation in Lebanon, with substantial economic challenges and colossal reconstruction 
efforts, did not justify legal expectations that custom duties would remain unchanged.’470 
The tribunal held on merit that in such a situation a foreign investor in a developing 
country cannot expect the degree of protection a developed country offers, and thereby 
                                                          
462 See e.g., Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A vs. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 
Award, 7 June 2012.  
463 For an account of the political crisis in Lebanon see e.g. Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: the 
Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue  (Routledge 2013); Naomi Joy Weinberger,  Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 
1975-76 Civil War (Oxford University Press 1986); Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the 
Lebanese Civil War  (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1993). 
464 Toto (n 462).   
465 Italy–Lebanon BIT, 7 November, 1997. 
466 See e.g. Toto (n 462) Paras 100–102. 
467 Ibid Paras 206, 200. 
468 Parkerings-Compagniet AS vs. Lithunia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007. 
469 Toto (n 462) Para 245. 
470 Toto (n 462) Para 245. For a summary of the war, see e.g. Edgar O’balance, Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-
92 (Macmillan Press 1998). 
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took political instability into consideration. Lebanon was a clearer case of a post-war 
situation than other cases have involved; in other situations tribunals have been less 
confident that investors should recognise political instability as an underlying condition 
of their investment.   
 
5.2.A.c AMT 
 
In American Manufacturing & Trading (AMT) vs. Republic of Zaire471 riots and acts of 
violence by the armed forces in the Republic of Zaire led to looting and destruction of 
the property of US investors. The claimant company alleged that this failure to protect 
its property represented a failure by Zaire in its obligation to protect the investor’s 
property under the Zaire-US BIT,472 particularly Article II paragraph 4 of the BIT which 
referred to FET.473 In its rejoinder, Zaire cited political crisis as a ground of its defence: 
‘No one on earth could ignore the fact that for the past four years, the Republic 
of Zaire has been going through a most painful and unfortunate period in its 
history.… This requires a benevolent and compassionate attention on the part 
of all our partners, even those who have encountered unfortunate and 
disastrous consequences, for there was a time when these same persons were 
enjoying the benefit of the good situation of the State of Zaire.’474  
 
                                                          
471 American Manufacturing & Trading vs. Republic of Zaire (AMT), ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, 
Award, 21 February 1997. 
472 Ibid Para 1.05. Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
United States–Zaire, 3 August 1984 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43544.pdf> 
accessed 4 September 2014. 
473 See AMT (n 471) Paras 6.04 and 6.05. 
474 Ibid Para 7.17. 
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The tribunal did not consider local conditions in finding that Zaire failed to provide the 
standard of FET prescribed in the BIT, but did not specifically respond to Zaire’s 
contention that it should.475 It stated,  
‘The Tribunal does not consider it necessary to insist on this question beyond 
measure. In effect, [the] relevance [of Zaire’s political instability] is not here 
discussed as a foundation of the responsibility of Zaire. That is why the 
Tribunal prefers at this stage to concern itself with the method of calculation of 
the amount of compensation to which AMT is entitled because of injury 
sustained.’476 
 
In other words, the tribunal rejected Zaire’s political situation as relevant to liability, but 
considered it relevant to determine compensation.477 The tribunal stated that it would, 
‘take into account the existing conditions of the country.’478 It further stated that, 
‘AMT would have liked to adopt a method of calculating 
compensation...practicable in the normal circumstances prevailing in an ideal 
country where the climate of investment is very stable, such as Switzerland or 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The Tribunal does not find it possible to 
accede to this way of evaluating the damages with interests in the circumstances 
under consideration, in which it is apparent that the situation remains 
precarious...the Tribunal will opt for a method that is most plausible and 
realistic in the circumstances of the case, while rejecting all other methods of 
assessment which would serve unjustly to enrich an investor who, rightly or 
wrongly, has chosen to invest in a country such as Zaire, believing that by so 
doing the investor is constructing a castle in Spain or a Swiss Chalet in Germany 
                                                          
475 Ibid Paras 6.06–6.08. 
476 Ibid Para 7.12. 
477 Ibid Paras 7.14–7.15. 
478 Ibid Para 7.13. 
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without any risk, political or even economic or financial or any risk 
whatsoever.’479 
 
The tribunal acknowledged Zaire’s distinction from a developed country but did not 
question the basic obligation in this light, only the compensation for the failure. AMT 
made a request for compensation in the amount of 14.3 million US dollars plus interests 
and costs;480 the final award was 9 million US dollars. The tribunal found that AMT had 
severely diminished the market value of the property damaged in the events cited in the 
complaint by sending it to a country in Zaire’s precarious situation481 and that therefore 
AMT’s complaint amounted to an application for an unjust enrichment of the 
investors.482 
 
Arbitrator Mr Kéba Mbaye in a separate individual declaration argued for a smaller 
award, stating,  
‘Although concurring in the reasoning of the Tribunal, I am still convinced that 
the sum of US Dollars 9,000,000 (nine million) awarded to the Claimant exceeds 
by far the injuries actually sustained by the Claimant and the profits including 
the interests it could have reasonably expected. In my opinion, the total amount 
of compensation, inclusive of the principal, interests and all other claims, should 
not exceed US Dollars 4,000,000 (four million).’483 
                                                          
479 See e.g., Ibid Paras 7.14–7.15. 
480 Ibid Para 3.06 
481 Ibid Para 7.13, 7.15. 
482 See e.g., Ibid Paras 7.14–7.15. 
483 See Separate Individual Declaration by Arbitrator Mr Kéba Mbaye in AMT (n 471).  
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This assertion by Mr Mbaye for reducing the amount of compensation against Zaire is 
also supported by Gallus who also examines the relevance of host country’s level of 
development on investment protection standards.484 
 
Distinct from the tribunal in Toto and Bayindir, the Tribunal rejected Zaire’s politically 
unstable condition as relevant to a finding of liability. Reducing the amount of damages 
on the basis of these conditions suggests unsound reasoning; the tribunal does not 
explain why Zaire’s political context related to compensation but not liability.  This 
dubious logic limits the AMT award’s appropriateness for future tribunals in relation to 
unstable political situations of host developing countries.  
 
Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, faced a momentous political crisis that 
continues to the present day.485 Its long history of political turmoil going back to 
independence in 1960 from Belgium includes ethnic conflict and invasion by Katangan 
rebels based in Angola in 1977 and 1978486 and by neighbouring Rwanda in 1996, which 
led to war.487 Ethnic violence, regional ethnic conflict, rebellions, and political violence 
under the dictatorship of Mobutu have severely affected the country for more than four 
decades;488 the country faced at least eight wars between 1960 and the 1990s and during 
the 1990s; scholarship considered it a failed state.489  
                                                          
484 Also see e.g. Gallus (n124) 729.  
485 See e.g. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Nordic Africa Institute 
2004). 
486 See e.g. Crawford Young, ‘Zaire: The Unending Crisis?’ (1978) 57 Foreign Affairs 169. 
487 See e.g. Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe (Oxford University Press 2008). 
488 For a detail account of Congo’s political crisis see e.g., Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet, The 
Economics of Civil War: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo in Nicholas Sambanis (ed) Understanding 
Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. (The World Bank 2005); Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, 
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North Kivu (DR Congo)’ (2003) 102 African Affairs 429; Filip De Beock, ‘The Apocalyptic Interlude: 
Revealing Death in Kinshasa’ (2005) 48 African Studies Review 11; Paul S Orogun, ‘Crisis of 
Government, Ethnic Schisms, Civil War and Regional Destabilization of the Democratic Republic of 
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The tribunal’s failure, in 1997, to place a higher burden of expectation on AMT remains 
puzzling, and Mr Mbaye’s separate opinion reflects this. The separate opinion could 
have been a good example for other tribunals as host developing countries become new 
destinations for foreign investors from the West, and which also suffer from political 
instability, turmoil, and crisis.490 
 
5.2.A.d Pantechniki  
 
The Greek company Pantechniki S.A. Contractors and Engineers entered a contract 
with Albania’s General Road Directorate to carry out a project of construction of 
bridges and roads in Albania in 1994.491 Political unrest in the country in 1997 violent 
riots ensued in many parts of the country (also known as the Pyramid crisis or Albanian 
Anarchy),492 affecting the project. At one point Pantechniki was forced to abandon its 
work site and repatriate its officials and workers. The equipment and facilities of the 
company were looted and destroyed.  In Pantechniki SA Contractors and Engineers vs. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Congo’ (2002) World Affairs 25; Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality (Zed Books 
2007). 
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1999);  Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identify  (New York 
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Albania493 the claimants alleged that the state had violated various protections provided 
under the Greece–Albania BIT,494 including breach of the FET standard.495 
 
In favour of considering a country’s circumstances, the sole arbitrator of the tribunal 
acknowledged that,  
‘The Claimant cannot say today that it felt entitled to rely on a high standard of 
police protection. (Indeed an absence of such expectations may well explain the 
logic and value to the contractor of Clause 11 of the Contracts by which the 
Employer accepted the risk of loss caused by civil disturbance). My view may 
have been different if police were present and turned their back.…[E]vidence 
was to the contrary. [Claimants] testified that the police said they were unable to 
intervene. That is crucially different from a refusal to intervene given the scale of 
the looting. I conclude that the Albanian authorities were powerless in the face of social 
unrest of this magnitude.’496 [Emphasis original]  
 
By distinguishing between outright negligence or refusal on the part of law enforcing 
agencies to protect the foreign investor and its property the state from inability to take 
appropriate action, without any mala fide, as in the present case, this dictum exempts the 
host country from liability. By stressing the fact that in the present case the claimant 
cannot claim that it was entitled to rely on a ‘high standard of police protection’, the 
tribunal is clearly emphasising that the foreign investors should not expect that level of 
protection from  a country like Albania.  
 
                                                          
493 Pantechniki (n 491). 
494 Greece–Albania BIT, 1 August 1991 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/greece_albania.pdf> accessed 29 April 2014.  
495 Pantechniki (n 491) Paras 28 and 85. 
496 Ibid Para 82. 
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The tribunal rejected all claims on merit. However the Tribunal did not give enough 
weight to the political unrest issue in this particular dispute, which was a vital factor for 
alleged breach of investment protection standards. Nonetheless the tribunal emphasised 
that such a lack of resources and incapacity in the situation is not a factor in 
determining state liability under international law.497 It stated that an assessment of ‘the 
human factor of obedience to the rule of law’ would guide the award,498 asking,  
‘Should a state’s international responsibility bear some proportion on its 
resources? Should a poor country be held accountable to a minimum standard 
which it could attain only at great sacrifice while a rich country would have little 
difficulty in doing so? No such proportionality factor has been generally 
accepted with respect to denial of justice. Two reasons appear salient. The first 
is that international responsibility does not relate to physical infrastructure; 
states are not liable for denial of justice because they cannot afford to put at the 
public’s disposal spacious buildings or computerized information banks. What 
matters is rather the human factor of obedience to the rule of law. Foreigners 
who enter a poor country are not entitled to assume that they will be given 
things like verbatim transcripts of all judicial proceedings – but they are entitled 
to decision-making which is neither xenophobic nor arbitrary. The second is 
that a relativistic standard would be none at all. International courts or tribunals 
would have to make ad hoc assessments based on their evaluation of the capacity of each state 
at a given moment of its development. International law would thus provide no 
incentive for a state to improve. It would in fact operate to the opposite effect: a 
state which devoted more resources to its judiciary would run the risk of 
graduating into a more exacting category.’499 [Emphasis added] 
                                                          
497 Ibid Para 76. 
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Here the tribunal suggests that a host country’s resources should not be a factor in 
determining its liability under international law, suggesting that proportionality of 
resources of the host country is not empirically measurable. Thereby it denies any 
obligation to assess a host country’s resources and struggles in satisfying the 
expectations and demands of the foreign investors, or the reasonable expectation of 
investors based on observable facts at the time of investment. This confined approach 
differs from those that prevailed in Bayindir and Toto and even AMT, although Bayindir 
occurred roughly concurrently with Pantechniki.  
 
Developing countries often have a lack of resources,500 which invariably affects their 
ability to protect the resources of foreign investors.501 Decisions like Pantechniki render 
developing countries in an uncertain and weak position before investment tribunals on 
the issue of their political situation and lack of resources. 
 
The crisis that prevailed in Albania at that time was so severe that the state had no 
control.502 The tribunal acknowledged that there was no mala fide on the part of the 
police authority but it did not make any attempt to discuss the scale of the political crisis 
and how such unrest impacted upon the foreign investor.  This outcome puts a chill on 
                                                          
500 See e.g., Lack of resources threatens water and sanitation supplies in developing countries – UN 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41763#.U33Q7b5wYdU> accessed 29 April 2014; 
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UNEO, Institute for International and European Environmental Policy 
<http://www.ecologic.eu/download/projekte/200-249/221-01/221-01-report.pdf> accessed 29 April 
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the position of developing countries, which often face political instability like that of the 
Albanian crisis in 1997, in the future.   
 
5.2.A.e Synopsis of the Awards on Political Instability  
 
These four decisions reveal an inconsistent approach by tribunals in dealing with the 
political instability in the host countries. Thus the AMT tribunal, even though it had to 
deal with a more serious and complicated political crisis and instability and had to 
address a similar situation to Toto of post-war events, did not consider the importance 
of the situation to the same degree as the Toto tribunal. On the other hand, dealing with 
similar kinds of political instability and turmoil, the Bayinder and Pantechniki tribunals had 
very different approaches. The Bayinder tribunal gave the prevailing political instability 
greater weight in determining the responsibility of the host country and considered that, 
based upon particular country characteristics, the foreign investors should not have had 
a high expectation of investor protection. The Pantechniki tribunal did not directly 
consider the particular political turmoil and crisis that existed in Albania, and made no 
direct reference to it. It narrowly interpreted the relevance of the host country’s 
resources to investment protection standards. The Pantechniki and AMT Tribunals were 
inadequate in addressing the political instability of the host country and have not had 
any serious discussion on the issue. This may make developing countries in post-
conflict situations in future reluctant to encourage foreign investment; as they are more 
vulnerable to investment disputes and large amounts of compensation due to political 
instability (discussed in chapter 8).   
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5.2.B Socio-Political Circumstances Of The  Country  Relevant To The 
Investment Dispute 
 
Part 5.2.A has discussed the arbitral awards where the tribunals had to deal with more 
serious situations of political crisis or unrest in the host country like that of civil war, 
military intervention or violence which arose out of ethnic or political conflict. Part 
5.2.B will discuss awards in which the dispute arose out of a host country’s particular 
socio-political context. Unlike those in Part 5.2.A, these situations do not involve 
violence or actual physical destruction of the investor’s property.  As in part 5.2.A, this 
part will present the arbitral awards in order of decreasing sympathy to the situations of 
the host developing countries.  
 
5.2.B.a EDF 
 
EDF, a British investor, entered into a contract for a joint venture with two state owned 
companies in Romania in 1991. EDF was to provide duty free and other retail services 
at Romanian airports as well as on board a Romanian airline. The Romanian joint 
venture partners undertook a series of actions and the government issued an 
Emergency Ordinance in 2002 to cease all duty free activities in the airport. As a 
consequence the duty free licenses were revoked which had a serious impact upon 
EDF’s business. One of the joint venture companies ultimately declared bankruptcy and 
the partnership terminated. In 1998 the Romanian customs authorities also suspended 
EDF’ authorisation to operate in the country for bookkeeping irregularities.  
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In EDF (Services) Limited vs. Romania,503 EDF claimed that Romania had violated the 
UK–Romania BIT,504 and thereby indirectly expropriated and breached the FET 
obligation. In finding that Romania did not violate the FET obligation under the BIT,505 
the tribunal described legitimate expectation of stability of the legal and business 
framework as a major component of the FET standard.506 
 
The tribunal qualified the concept of legitimate expectation when it emphasised that an 
‘overly-broad and unqualified formulation’,507 provides a poor foundation for such an 
expectation. It acknowledged that such a formulation would allow FET to virtually 
freeze the legal regulation of economic activities and impacts upon the normal 
regulatory powers of the state on its economic life.508 The tribunal further observed that 
a BIT cannot provide an insurance policy against the risk of regulatory change in the 
host country and therefore such expectations would be ‘neither legitimate nor 
reasonable’.509 It also stated that FET cannot serve the same purpose as stabilisation 
clauses, which are specifically granted to foreign investors.510 With respect to the 
expectations it could ascribe to an investor after the fact, it stated:   
 ‘Legitimate expectations cannot be solely the subjective expectations of the 
investor. They must be examined as the expectations at the time the investment 
is made, as they may be deduced from all the circumstances of the case, due 
regard being paid to the host State’s power to regulate its economic life in the 
public interest.’511 
                                                          
503 EDF (Services) Limited vs. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, 8 October 2009.  
504 UK–Romania BIT, 13 July 1995. 
505 EDF (n 503) Para 301. 
506 Ibid Para 216. 
507 Ibid Para 217. 
508 Ibid Para 217. 
509 Ibid Para 217. 
510 Ibid Para 218. 
511 Ibid Para 219. 
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These dicta reflect a reasonable and flexible approach to legitimate expectation as part of 
the FET obligation. The tribunal emphasised on the fact that the legitimate expectation 
of the investor cannot be based on the investor’s judgment, but rather on the 
circumstances of the host country and especially its power to change the laws and 
regulations that affect foreign investment for a public purpose. The tribunal also 
emphasised that if legitimate expectation entails the total stability of the business 
framework then it may ultimately lead to freezing of the regulatory powers of the host 
state in determining its economic activities. Considering the socio-political context and 
experiences of instability, the host developing countries may need to adopt new laws in 
order to respond to new situations.  The positive approach to the issue of the need for 
host states to change laws and regulations in response to public interest and to adapt to 
new circumstances the award provides a positive influence on developing countries. 
The tribunal recognised the role of legitimate expectation in FET as well as the 
potential that not considering the socio-political circumstances of the host country 
could lead to a standstill situation for the host country; emphasising that FET cannot 
serve the same purpose as the stabilisation clause.   
 
5.2.B.b GAMI 
 
During the early 1990s the sugar industry in Mexico faced difficulties.512 In response to 
this crisis, the Mexican government implemented a number of laws and also 
expropriated several mills, including five mills of a Mexican company, GAM, in which a 
                                                          
512 For further information on Mexico’s sugar industry and its particular socio-political dynamics see e.g. 
Antonio Lara and Paul Rich, ‘Commodity Policy in an Era of Globalization: The Mexican Sugar Industry 
and its Problems under NAFTA’ (2003) 31 Policy Studies Journal 101; Jonathan A Fox, ‘The Politics of 
Mexico’s new Peasant Economy’ in Kevin J Middlebrook, Juan Molinar and Maria Lorena Cook (eds),  
The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico  (La Jolla Centre for 
US-Mexican Studies 1994).   
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US company, GAMI Investments, owned shares. GAMI Investments claimed513 that 
Mexico had breached a number of obligations under the NAFTA Treaty, including 
breach of the FET standard.514 It accused Mexico of maladministration of the sugar 
industry in Mexico, which resulted in denial of national treatment as well as in breach of 
international minimum standards.515  
 
In GAMI Investments Inc. vs. The United Mexican States,516 the tribunal rejected 
consideration of the socio-political context of Mexico’s sugar industry. It did recognise 
that ‘Agricultural economics tend to be complex’ and acknowledged, ‘the Mexican sugar 
industry is characterised by special complicating factors’517 and also that ‘the industry 
has a considerable political dimension.’518 Further, it stated that, ‘against this 
background it is not surprising that this Mexican industry has a long tradition of state 
intervention. Mexico is however far from unique in this regard.’519 The Tribunal then 
quoted a description from Mr Antonius which states as follows: 
‘The world sugar industry is also one of most economically distorted, almost 
notoriously so. In both developed and developing economies one finds 
evidence of widespread government intervention in the sector.… These 
practices of protection have also resulted in the sugar industry being one of the 
most politicised in most economies, as the various interests groups linked to the 
industry constantly pressure their governments in an attempt to maximize their 
benefits.’520 
                                                          
513 See e.g., GAMI Investments Inc., vs. The United Mexican States (GAMI), NAFTA Arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 15 November 2004, (2005) 44 International Legal 
Materials 545.  
514 Ibid Para 24. 
515 See e.g. Ibid Paras 44–115. 
516 Ibid.   
517 Ibid Para 45. 
518 Ibid Para 46. 
519 Ibid Para 47. 
520 See e.g., Ibid Para 47. 
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This passage acknowledges how common it is for states to intervene in such 
industries.521 The facts of the case support the interpretation that Mexico followed a 
path other states have taken and that rescuing the industry required some legislative 
actions.522  
 
While the tribunal eventually rejected GAMI’s claims, it also rejected the Mexican 
defence based on its administrative capacities. It asserted that it had ‘no mandate to 
evaluate laws and regulations that predate the decision of a foreigner to invest523 and 
that: 
‘The duty of NAFTA tribunals is rather to appraise whether and how pre-
existing laws and regulations are applied to the foreign investor. It is no excuse 
that regulation is costly. Nor does a dearth of able administrators or a deficient 
culture of compliance provide a defence. Such is the challenge of governance 
that confronts every country.... Breaches of NAFTA are assuredly not to be 
excused on the grounds that a government’s compliance with its own law may 
be difficult. Each NAFTA Party must to the contrary accept liability if its 
officials fail to implement or implement regulations in a discriminatory or 
arbitrary fashion.’524 
 
Here the tribunal adopts a narrow interpretation of the host country’s administrative 
capacity and incapability. It renders such conditions irrelevant in determining the 
liability of the host state under its NAFTA obligation. It also did not consider that a 
particular host country may face different kinds of challenges to comply with the 
                                                          
521 See e.g., Ernest J Wilson III, ‘Strategies of State Control of the Economy: Nationalization and 
Indigenization in Africa’ (1990) 22 Comparative Politics 401; Thomas Andersson, Multinational Investment 
in Developing Countries: A Study of Taxation and Nationalization (Routledge 2002) 91-168.  
522See e.g., Gritsenko (n 85) 346.  
523 GAMI (n 513) Para 93. 
524 Ibid Para 94.  
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investment treaty obligation. It made no distinction even between Mexico and its 
American and Canadian NAFTA counterparts in terms of administrative capacity and 
resources.  
 
Significantly, the tribunal referred to SD Myers Inc. vs. Government of Canada,525 adopting a 
passage which stated that the ‘tribunal does not have an open-ended mandate to 
second-guess government decision making. Governments have to make many 
potentially controversial choices.’526 The tribunal rejected any evaluation of the 
circumstances surrounding a government decision. It stated that a foreign investor 
might bring claims of maladministration before the Mexican courts and before a 
NAFTA Tribunal without exhausting local remedies, observing:   
‘…The problem is therefore to identify the type of maladministration that could rise to the level 
of breach of international obligations. A claim of maladministration would likely 
violate Article 1105 if it amounted to an “outright and unjustified repudiation” 
of relevant regulations. There may be situations even where lesser failures would 
suffice to trigger Article 1105. It is the record as a whole – not dramatic incidents in 
isolation – which determines whether a breach of international law has occurred.’527 
[Emphasis added] 
 
The GAMI award exemplifies the current attitudes of the majority of tribunals. They 
have been reluctant to consider the administrative capabilities of the host countries in 
relation to investment disputes. However it preserved the possibility that a host country 
that violates its own law does not always violate the FET standard:  
                                                          
525 See e.g., SD Myers (n 122).  
526 See e.g. Ibid Para 261 cited in GAMI (n 513) Para 93. 
527 GAMI (n 513) Para 103. 
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‘...a government’s failure to implement or abide by its own law in a manner 
adversely affecting a foreign investor may but will not necessarily lead to a 
violation of Article 1105. Much depends on context.’528 [Emphasis added] 
 
Emphasizing this point, the GAMI Tribunal also referred to the Waste Management No. 2 
Award which states, ‘Evidently the standard is to some extent a flexible one which must 
be adapted to the circumstances of each case’529:  
‘Four implications of Waste Management II are salient even at the level of 
generality reflected in the passages quoted above. (1) The failure to fulfil the 
objectives of administrative regulations without more does not necessarily rise 
to a breach of international law. (2) A failure to satisfy requirements of national 
law does not necessarily violate international law. (3) Proof of good faith effort 
by the Government to achieve the objectives of its laws and regulations may 
counter-balance instances of disregard of legal or regulatory requirements. (4) 
The record as a whole – not isolated events – determines whether there has 
been a breach of international law. It is in this light that GAMI’s allegations with 
respect to Article 1105 fall to be examined.’530 
 
A separate paragraph emphasised the importance of whether a breach of international 
law had occurred would not depend on dramatic incidents in isolation but on the record 
as a whole.531 However, in this particular case, the record as a whole provides no 
evidence that Mexico had not attempted to implement its own regulations; the 
necessary cooperation of the private sector and unions had been lacking.532 The 
                                                          
528 See e.g., Ibid Paras 91, 94 and 97. 
529 Waste Management (n 292) Para 109, cited in GAMI (n 513) Para 96. 
530 GAMI (n 513) Para 97. 
531 Ibid Para 103. 
532 Ibid Paras 104, 108 and 110. 
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tribunal’s attribution of failures to the government suggest that the cause, its lack of 
infrastructural and administrative incapacities, constitute a violation of the FET 
standard.  The GAMI Tribunal adopted a very narrow approach to the administrative 
capacity and the socio-political circumstances of the host country in the sugar industry 
of Mexico; it stated that such drawbacks in the host country cannot be an excuse for 
any breaches of its NAFTA obligation.533 This broad interpretation of the treaty 
obligation surely ignores the socio-political context of the host country.  
 
Significantly, Mexico expropriated the mills because of turmoil and crisis in the sector, 
which the socio-political circumstances of developing countries can make common. As 
Gritsenko observes, many developing countries implement similar actions in response 
to similar circumstances, and socio-political conditions may support such actions.534 The 
GAMI Tribunal’s decision to disregard the crisis situation in the industry therefore 
represents an inadequate approach to addressing the socio-political circumstances of the 
host country and its duty to intervene in the public interest. Ignoring the difficulties 
host developing countries face under such circumstances would raise concern for the 
host developing countries in future in investment disputes.   
 
5.2.B.c Tecmed  
 
In Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA vs. United Mexican States535 the tribunal refused to 
consider a host country’s particular socio-political context and experience in regulation 
of investors as a part of its FET analysis. Tecmed a company incorporated in Spain, had 
invested in Mexico through its two Mexican subsidiaries, Tecmed and Cytrar. The 
project concerned the operation of a landfill containing hazardous industrial waste. 
                                                          
533 Ibid Para 94.  
534 Gritsenko (n 85) 346.  
535 Tecmed (118).  
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Mexico’s National Ecology Institute (INE)536 granted Tecmed a licence for the work in 
1996, which it extended until November 1998, at which time it refused a renewal. Local 
citizens had protested the landfill, which was proximate to the municipality of 
Hermosillo. Tecmed claimed Mexico had violated the Spain—Mexico BIT537 by 
breaching the obligation of FET; along with the claim of breach of protection against 
expropriation and of full protection and security.  
 
Mexico denied that its refusal to renew the licence was arbitrary, saying that INE had 
used its discretionary powers in a highly regulated sector which is very closely linked to 
the public interest.538 Mexico stressed the community’s concerns about the landfill’s 
threat to the environment and public health.539 
 
In its award, the tribunal highlighted Mexico’s socio-political circumstance—the locals’ 
protest against the project and the resulting public pressure against it, rather than legal 
considerations. However it found that Mexico had failed to present evidence of 
community opposition to the landfill, which Mexico had claimed was ‘intense, 
aggressive and sustained’.540 In the absence of any evidence that the project was a ‘real 
or potential threat to the environment or to the public health,’ or that ‘massive 
opposition’ existed, the tribunal found that ‘although they amount to significant 
pressure on the Mexican authorities’ community pressure did not ‘constitute a real crisis 
or disaster of great proportions, triggered by acts or omissions committed by the 
foreign investor or its affiliates.’541 It took into account the lack of transparency in 
                                                          
536 Hazardous Materials, Waste and Activities Division of the National Ecology Institute of Mexico, and 
agency of the Mexican Federal Government within the Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources 
and Fisheries.  
537 Spain-Mexico BIT, 18 December 1996. 
538 See e.g. Tecmed (n 118) Para 46. 
539 Ibid Para 49. 
540 Ibid Para 144. 
541 Ibid Para 144. 
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relations with the investor and found that this had violated investors’ basic expectations, 
which the tribunal considered a violation of the FET standard. It construed the 
investor’s legitimate expectation as follows: 
‘The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from 
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so 
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern 
its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to 
the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but also 
to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also expects the host 
State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing 
decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to 
assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and 
business activities. The investor also expects the State to use the legal 
instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the investment in 
conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments, and not to 
deprive the investor of its investment without the required compensation. In 
fact, failure by the host State to comply with such pattern of conduct with 
respect to the foreign investor or its investments affects the investor’s ability to 
measure the treatment and protection awarded by the host State and to 
determine whether the actions of the host State conform to the fair and 
equitable treatment principle.’542 [Emphasis added] 
 
                                                          
542 Ibid Para 154. 
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Subsequent tribunals have frequently cited this passage, informally known as the 
TECMED test, in relation to foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.543 However, this 
represents fairly broad criteria for legitimate expectations. Social and political turmoil 
makes it difficult for developing countries to guarantee that the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives will be static. Crises may require 
change in policies and directives upon which the foreign investor relied before making 
the investment, without any mala fide. The TECMED test may prevent many developing 
countries from passing such a restricted filter. The TECMED test is investor oriented; 
its insensitivity to host countries’ socio-political circumstances relevant to a given 
investment dispute threatens their ability to benefit from foreign investment.   
 
The TECMED test leaves open the question as to whether a stronger public protest 
would constitute a crisis and therefore a justification for an action like Mexico’s. 
Foreign investment in developing countries often meets with public protest, where the 
projects are directly related to public interests.544 As Thomas M Franck notes, citizens of 
developing countries often consider foreign investment a ‘disguised emissary of an 
exploitative colonialist regime.’545 Governments that make concessions to such protests 
risk making a decision that a tribunal may deem prejudicial to the foreign investors. The 
Tecmed tribunal, as well as subsequent tribunals that have cited it, have not commented 
on this issue. From the observations made by the tribunal it appears that it decided on 
the consideration that Mexico had failed to present the evidence of the urgency to take 
                                                          
543 See e.g. CMS (n 119) Para 279; Occidental (n 116) Para 185; LG& E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) 
Paras 102 and 127, 128; National Grid PLC vs. Argentina Republic, Award, 3 November 2008 Para 173; 
MTD Equity (n 119) Para 114; Saluka (n 104) Para 302. 
544 See e.g. David Wheeler, ‘Racing to the Bottom? Foreign Investment and Air Pollution in Developing 
Countries’ (2001) 10 The Journal of Environment and Development 225; Friedrich Schneider and Bruno 
S Frey, ‘Economic and Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment’ (1985) 13 World 
Development 161; Jennifer Clapp, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Hazardous Industries in Developing 
Countries: Rethinking the Debate’ (1998) 7 Environmental Politics 92; John M Rothgeb, Foreign Investment 
and Political Conflict in Developing Countries (Greenwood Publishing Group 1996).  
545  Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 106) 438.  
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those actions. Tribunals generally have little expertise to evaluate the strength or gravity 
of the public protest in a host country; the socio-political context of the host country 
makes the issue complex. Therefore it is almost impossible for an investment tribunal to 
evaluate such evidence. Only the host country government can make such assessment.  
 
The government of the host country alone will address the results of public protest; 
public interest may require decisions that jeopardise the interests of foreign investors. 
Sovereign power bestows decisions such as Mexico made in the Tecmed case on central 
governments; genuine public interest may require them to exercise this power.  From 
that view point, Tecmed award is inadequate in response to the public interest in 
developing countries.  
 
5.2.B.d Duke Energy  
 
The US Company Duke Energy Electroquil Partners acquired an ownership interest in 
INECEL, a state owned power Company in Ecuador, through its Ecuadorian subsidiary 
Electroquil S.A.546  In 1995 and 1998, INECEL entered into power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) with Duke Energy. It required Electroquil to receive a guaranteed 
price for the supply of electricity and to return certain amounts of electric power. Under 
the agreement, INECEL was entitled to fine the company in the event of its failure to 
supply the required amount of electricity. Within a year of the agreement, INECEL had 
fined Electroquil and by 2002 these fines amounted to over 8 million US dollars. In 
Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A vs. Republic of Ecuador,547 the investors 
                                                          
546 See e.g., Duke Energy (n 122). 
547 Ibid.  
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claimed that INECEL had improperly levied these fines and violated Ecuador’s FET 
obligation under the US–Ecuador BIT.548 
 
The tribunal made some important observations regarding the legitimate expectations 
of an investor in a country like Ecuador considering its socio-political circumstances. It 
stated: 
‘To be protected, the investor’s legitimate expectations must be legitimate and 
reasonable at the time when the investor makes the investment. The assessment 
of reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all circumstances, 
including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, 
socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host 
State.’549[Footnotes in the original text omitted]  
 
Here the tribunal described legitimate expectation in two ways, firstly in relation to its 
existence at the time of investment, and secondly in relation to the investor’s actual 
reliance upon such expectations when making the investment.550 The tribunal observed 
that legitimate expectations in relation to the stability of the legal and business 
environment are an important element of the FET standard and emphasised the 
existence of limitations to such expectations.551  
 
While the tribunal found a violation of the FET obligation under the BIT because 
Ecuador had failed to make payments the 1998 PPA had guaranteed, which 
                                                          
548 US–Ecuador BIT, 27 August 1993. 
549 Duke Energy (n 122) Para 340. 
550 Ibid Para 340. 
551 Ibid. Also see e.g. Jane Hofbauer and Cristina Knalir, ‘International Centre for Settlement of Disputes: 
Legal Maxims-Summaries and Extracts from Selected Case Law’ in Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo (ed), The 
Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2010) 901.   
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contravened the investor’s legitimate expectation,552 the Duke Energy award provides 
criteria and explanation of the investor’s legitimate expectation as part of the FET 
standard more sympathetic to host countries than the Tecmed award. It calls on tribunals 
to consider the socio-political context of the host state in relation to investor 
complaints, emphasising that ‘political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions 
prevailing’ in the host state form an essential part of investors’ legitimate expectation. 
The above dictum from Duke Energy did not have the persuasive authority over the 
subsequent tribunals; rather many opted to quote the restrictive dictum from Tecmed in 
order to describe the legitimate expectation of the foreign investor in investment 
disputes.553 Current tribunals’ general preference for the Tecmed test suggests a reluctance 
to adopt a more flexible approach to considering the socio-political circumstances of 
host countries in determining the legitimate expectations of the investors from the host 
country under the rubric of the FET obligation.  
 
5.2.B.e Azurix  
 
Azurix Corporation, a US Company, entered into a 30-year concession for the 
distribution of potable water services and the treatment of sewerage in the Argentinean 
Province of Buenos Aires through its local subsidiary Azurix Buenos Aires SA (ABA).554 
Under the concession agreement the province agreed to complete certain infrastructural 
repairs, which it never did. As a result during April 2000, the health authorities had to 
issue a warning to customers that they had to boil tap water due to an algae outbreak. 
Azurix alleged the government had incited public panic and encouraged them to refuse 
to pay their water bills following the incident. In July 2001 the company requested that 
                                                          
552 Duke Energy (n 122) Para 491. 
553 See e.g. CMS (n 119) Para 279; Occidental (n 116) Para 185; LG& E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) 
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the government rectify the breaches of the concession, but the government refused. 
ABA terminated the concession in October 2001. The province rejected the termination 
and asked ABA to continue the work. In March 2002 the province terminated the 
concession agreement based on the allegation that the company failed to provide due 
services. In Azurix Corporation vs. The Argentine Republic,555 Azurix initiated proceedings 
against Argentina under the US–Argentina BIT 1994 and claimed that such actions 
amounted to expropriation and violation of full protection and security and the FET 
obligation under the treaty.  
 
Public utility services represent crucial public health and safety issues; any government 
should act when a threat exists, and the health authority’s warning was responsible. 
Ignoring the algae in the water might have instigated a serious crisis. However, the 
tribunal in its finding that Argentina had breached its FET obligation, claimed that ‘it is 
also clear that the tariff regime was politicized because of concerns with forthcoming 
elections and because the Concession was awarded by the previous government.’556 The 
award provides no direct support for this assumption that the government acted on 
political, rather than public health concerns. It does not address the potential 
consequences of silence in light of an algae outbreak.  
 
An algae outbreak not disclosed to water customers would create public health threat in 
any country. Given Argentina’s social and political turmoil in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, an algae outbreak could have led to social unrest. A 2000 incident in 
Argentina’s neighbour Bolivia, the ‘Conchabamba Water Wars,’ present a sobering 
example; Bolivia ultimately imposed martial law in the wake of an investment treaty 
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conflict in which privatisation of water and sewer services led to protest and social 
unrest resulting in civilian deaths.557  
 
The commentary of Muchlinksi on Methanex Corporation vs. USA558 bears on Azurix. 
Muchlinski in his article stated that the Canadian investors in that case should have 
known about the risk of foreseeable future regulatory change in the absence of a 
stabilisation commitment in the NAFTA treaty. This logic precludes tribunals from 
deeming ordinary regulatory change a breach of the FET standard, regardless of the 
change’s effect on the investor’s interest.559 This example raises the question as to how 
the tribunal can consider ordinary regulatory change by developing countries a breach 
of obligation while excluding such changes by developed countries like the US.  
 
5.2.B.f Synopsis of the Awards on Socio-Political Circumstances of the Host 
Country  
 
Like part 5.2.A, part 5.2.B has shown the reluctance of the majority of investment 
tribunals to emphasise the socio-political circumstances of host developing countries. 
This particular contextual background is also an important factor in evaluating the facts 
of the dispute. The GAMI Tribunal was unwilling to discuss the socio-political 
background of the sugar industry in Mexico and refused to consider the particular 
capabilities of the host country in this context. Though the GAMI Tribunal did refer to 
                                                          
557Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 20) 444. 
558 Methanex Corporation vs. USA (UNCITRAL) (NAFTA), Award, 3 August 2005. In this case the 
dispute arose between the Canadian based company Methanex Corporation, which is the world’s largest 
producer of methanol, and the United States under NAFTA when the State of California issued a ban on 
the use of MTBE (methy teriary butyl ether; methanol is a key component that increases oxygen content 
and boosts octane in gasoline). The ban reflected increasing human health and safety concerns and its 
impact upon the environment due to the use of MTBE, because of its large presence in the drinking 
water system in California. Methanex argued that ineffective regulation and non-enforcement of domestic 
environmental laws, including the US Clean Water Act, 1972 had led to MTBE’s level in the drinking 
water system. The company argued that the ban was tantamount to an expropriation under NAFTA as 
well as breach of national treatment and the FET obligation.   
559 Muchlinski ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 551–552. 
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a dictum from Waste Management No. 2 that ‘much depends on context’ it nonetheless ignored 
the dispute’s vital socio-political contextual background. The Tecmed tribunal also 
rejected consideration of the socio-political context of the dispute, adopting a very strict 
approach to legitimate expectation. In Tecmed the tribunal conceptualised legitimate 
expectation as extending to situations that might lead to a host country’s freezing of its 
legal environment. The socio-political context prevailing in the majority of these host 
developing countries renders such a restrictive approach unrealistic, but the Tecmed 
formulation nonetheless represents a very strict objective criteria and persistent use of 
it, and the decision that ‘community pressure’ ‘does not constitute a real crisis or 
disaster of great proportions’,560 by subsequent tribunals without addressing the 
possibility of a ‘real crisis or disaster’ represents a sobering example for host developing 
countries. Similarly, the award in Azurix exhibited a complete disregard of government’s 
legitimate interest in protecting public health and safety issues, effectively exempting the 
investor from risk.  
 
In Duke Energy and EDF, the tribunals constructed legitimate expectation differently, 
acknowledging the need for host countries to be able to change law and regulations due 
to prevailing socio-political and economic conditions. Overall the current tribunals are 
reluctant to consider the socio-political context of the host developing state; they prefer 
to adopt the restrictive approach of the Tecmed tribunal.   
 
5.2 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed a number of arbitral awards in light of their approach to the 
political instability and socio-political circumstances of host developing countries in 
                                                          
560 Tecmed (n 118) Para 144.  
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interpreting the FET standard. The tribunals have been generally inconsistent and 
inadequate in addressing substantive issues. Overall, they give minimal importance to 
host developing countries’ circumstances. Only the Bayinder, Toto, and the EDF 
Tribunals directly address them; the rest discuss them generally and apart from the 
question of liability. However, this thesis argues that Bayinder and EDF correctly 
identifies the role of socio-political conditions in relation to foreign investors’ legitimate 
expectations.   
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Chapter 6 
Current Arbitral Practice Relating to Countries in Transition: The 
FET Standard in Context 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will discuss selected selection of awards against countries in transition, a 
category created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Chapter 4 discussed in brief. 
These countries include the ex-Soviet states and some Eastern and Central European 
states which made a transition from communist centrally planned economies (CPEs) to 
market based economies after 1989.561 After the collapse of communism these countries 
became the new destination for many foreign investors and FDI due to the 
liberalisation of the embargo on foreign and private investments.562 However the 
difficulties of these countries in transition led to a number of investment disputes; 
transition affected all aspects of the state, including its social, political, and economic 
life.563 As this chapter will show, transition and the resulting economic and socio-
political conditions had both direct and indirect effects that led to the disputes in 
question, and the tribunals at times addressed this difficulty of the host country in the 
process of transition in their awards, and in relation to investors’ legitimate expectations 
as part of the FET obligation. The awards discussed below demonstrate the full range 
of approaches of the current investment tribunals’ responses to these countries’ 
particular transitory status in relation to the alleged breach of the FET standard. Some 
are not specifically related to breach of FET but are nevertheless significant in this 
                                                          
561 See e.g., Hill (382); Agh (n 382); Zaslavsky (n 382); Sokol (n 382); Suny (n 382).   
562 See e.g. Lankes and Venables (n 412); Kinoshita and Campos (n 412).  
563 See e.g., Josef C Brada, Ali M Kutan and Taner M Yigit, ‘The Effects of Transition and Political 
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discussion in terms of the current tribunal’s approach towards the transitionary status of 
the host countries.  
  
6.2.a. Parkerings-Compagniet  
 
In Parkerings-Compagniet AS vs. Lithuania564 the tribunal rejected the violation of FET 
claim of the investor made under the Lithuania–Norway BIT.565 The Norwegian 
company Parkerings-Compagniet AS established a Lithuanian subsidiary to carry out a 
parking system project in Vilnius. The Municipality of Vilnius was to receive a portion 
of fees and charges and also a fixed monthly fee. In 2000 the government amended 
certain laws which affected the project, indicating that the parking plan had not been 
completed in a timely manner and the company had failed to pay the fees under the 
Project Agreement. Parkerings-Compagniet claimed municipal actions and omissions 
and the legislative changes had caused the delay, and that these represented a breach of 
the legitimate expectation of the investor. The company also claimed that Lithuania had 
violated the obligation to provide ‘equitable and reasonable treatment’ under Article III 
of the BIT.566 They argued that, under the aforesaid treaty, the obligation to grant 
‘equitable and reasonable treatment’ requires host countries to adhere to stricter 
standards of conduct than the FET standard that appears in other BITs.567 The 
claimants further argued that, ‘A showing of breach of Article III of the Treaty 
                                                          
564 Parkerings (n 468).  
565 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Norway on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments (Lithuania–Norway BIT) 
16 August 1992 <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/norway_lithuania.pdf> accessed 20 
August 2014.  
566 Parkerings (n 468) Para 197. Article III of the Lithuania–Norway BIT (n 565) states, ‘Each contracting 
party shall promote and encourage in its territory investments of investors of the other contracting party 
and accept such investments in accordance with its laws and regulations and accord them equitable and 
reasonable treatment and protection. Such investments shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the 
contracting party in the territory of which the investments are made.’ 
567 Parkerings (n 468) Paras 198 and 272. 
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therefore requires less than a showing of breach of the standard of “fair and equitable 
treatment.”’568 
 
The tribunal rejected this argument,569 observing, ‘The Claimant did not show any 
evidence which could demonstrate that, when signing the BIT, the Republic of 
Lithuania and the Kingdom of Norway intended to give a different protection to their 
investors than the protection granted by the “fair and equitable” standard.’570 Accordingly 
the Tribunal held that it ‘intends to identically interpret the notion “equitable and 
reasonable” and the standard “fair and equitable.”’571 
 
In relation to the question as to whether Lithuania violated Parkerings-Compagniet’s 
legitimate expectation when it changed its laws, the tribunal stated,  
‘In fact it would have been foolish for a foreign investor in Lithuania to believe 
at the time, that it would be proceeding on stable legal ground as considerable 
changes in the Lithuanian political regime and economy were undergoing.’572 
 
Further, it observed the transitory status of the host country:  
‘at the time of the Agreement, the political environment in Lithuania was 
characteristic of a country in transition from its past being part of the Soviet 
Union to candidate for the European Union membership. Thus, legislative 
changes, far from being unpredictable, were in fact to be regarded as likely. As 
any businessman would, the Claimant was aware of the risk that changes of laws 
would probably occur after the conclusion of the Agreement. The 
                                                          
568 Ibid Para 198. 
569 Ibid Paras 271–279. 
570 Ibid Para 277. 
571 Ibid Para 278. 
572 Ibid Para 306. 
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circumstances surrounding the decision to invest in Lithuania were certainly not 
an indication of stability of the legal environment. Therefore, in such a situation, 
no expectation that the laws would remain unchanged was legitimate.’573 
 
Here the tribunal considered Lithuania’s particular transitory status in making its award, 
acknowledging that this status required the adoption of new laws in changing social and 
political circumstances, and imposing the understanding of this risk on investors. The 
Tribunal observed in relation to the host country’s regulatory power that, 
‘It is each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign 
legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its 
own discretion. Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a 
stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the 
amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an 
investor made its investment.’574 
 
Here the tribunal asserts that any sovereign state has the right to change it laws, in 
addition to the fact that a country in transition will need to do so frequently, and 
required investors to recognise the risks associated with investing in those countries. It 
rejected Parkerings-Compagniet’s claim to have had a legitimate expectation that the 
government of Lithuania would not pass any law which could harm its investment,575 
and rejected the claim of a breach of the ‘equitable and reasonable treatment’ 
requirement under the treaty, holding it to be equivalent to the FET obligation.576   
 
 
                                                          
573 Ibid Para 335. 
574 Ibid Para 332. 
575 Ibid Para 338. 
576 Ibid Para 465 (b). 
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6.2.b Nagel  
 
William Nagel, a British citizen entered into a contract with the state enterprise Sprava 
Radiokomunikaci Praha to obtain a telecommunication licence in the Czech Republic. 
In William Nagel vs. Czech Republic,577 Nagel claimed that the Czech Republic had 
breached its obligation under the UK–Czech Republic BIT,578 which included the FET 
standard, when it refused to give him a telecommunication licence, awarding it to the 
state enterprise and another foreign investor. The tribunal found that Mr Nagel did not 
have an investment and therefore did not address the treaty provision.579 However, its 
statement that it ‘takes into account the rather special factual background to the dispute’ 
in determining the merits of Nagel’s claim, are significant in relation to the transitory 
status of the host country.580 Referring to the investor’s own evaluation of the 
investment, the tribunal observed that,  
‘The Arbitral Tribunal considers that Mr Nagel may, in good faith, have been 
over-optimistic in interpreting the informal signals he received from his 
influential personal friends and contacts within the Czech Government. He may 
also not have taken sufficient account that the country was still in a state of transition, in 
which the Government and public authorities were labouring to develop the newly born 
democratic system and to create a well-functioning market economy. This involved a 
lengthy process of planning the route the country was to follow in the 
privatisation process of various important sectors of the state-controlled 
economy, including telecommunications.’581 [Emphasis added]  
 
                                                          
577 William Nagel vs. Czech, 2003, 13 ICSID Reports 33, Award, 9 September. 
578 UK–Czech and Slovak Federal Republic BIT, 10 July 1990. 
579 See e.g. Nagel (n 577) Paras 297–329. 
580 Ibid Para 286. 
581 Ibid Para 293. 
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This statement recognised the Czech Republic’s status as a state in transition, although 
the award primarily reflected the technical points of the parties’ contract, stating,  
‘Legal terms in an international treaty do not necessarily have the same meaning 
as similar terms in the domestic laws of the Contracting Parties. In a treaty such 
terms should often be considered to have an autonomous meaning appropriate 
to the contents of the specific treaty and to the issues it intends to regulate.’582  
 
The tribunal concluded that,  
‘Mr Nagel’s rights under the Cooperation Agreement – alone or in conjunction 
with surrounding factors, such as the conduct of persons acting on behalf of the 
Czech Government – did not constitute an asset and an investment protected 
under Article 1 of the Investment Treaty.’583 
 
In dismissing Mr Nagel’s claims entirely,584 the tribunal did not directly address the FET 
standard as it concluded that such a claim was not admissible under the present 
arbitration.585  
 
Nonetheless it is important to recognise the tribunal’s emphasis on the importance of 
foreign investors’ responsibility to investigate when the bureaucratic process involved 
investing in countries in the process of social and political transition, and its dictum  
showing sympathetic approach for countries in transition, even though its dismissal of 
the claim meant it did not engage in any discussion of the violation of the investment 
protection standards against the background of those socio-political factors of the 
country in transition.  
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6.2.c Generation Ukraine  
 
In Generation Ukraine Inc. vs. Ukraine586 the dispute arose out of an allegation of 
expropriation. Generation Ukraine, a US company, claimed that Ukraine had breached 
the US–Ukraine BIT587 when the local authorities interfered with the realisation of the 
commercial project in Kiev. This interference, the company claimed, amounted to 
expropriation. The tribunal accepted that the claimant company had ‘experienced 
frustration and delay caused by bureaucratic incompetence and recalcitrance’588 but 
concluded that Ukraine’s treatment of the investor did not fail the obligations 
guaranteed under the BIT. It incorporated the host country’s economic condition and 
its transitory status in the award in plain words. The Tribunal stated that,  
‘….it is relevant to consider the vicissitudes of the economy of the state that is host to the 
investment in determining the investor’s legitimate expectations, the protection of which is 
a major concern of the minimum standards of treatment contained in bilateral 
investment treaties. The Claimant was attracted to the Ukraine because of the possibility 
of earning a rate of return on its capital in significant excess to the other investment 
opportunities in more developed economies. The Claimant thus invested in the Ukraine 
on notice of both the prospects and the potential pitfalls. Its investment was 
speculative.’589 [Emphasis added]  
 
Here the tribunal examined the legitimate expectation of the investor in light of the 
economic conditions in the host country. The tribunal observed that the investor 
selected Ukraine for investment because it sought the higher return that a risky 
                                                          
586 Generation Ukraine, Inc.  vs. Ukraine (Generation Ukraine), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 
September 2003. 
587 US–Ukraine BIT, 4 March 1994 <http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/html/US-UKR_BIT_1996_.html> 
accessed 20 August 2014.  
588 Generation Ukraine (n 586) Para 20.37. 
589 Ibid Para 20.37. 
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investment can offer, which signified its understanding that Ukraine lacks a stable and 
sound economy.  Here the tribunal emphasized the necessity of investor due diligence 
in assessing legitimate expectations.590 The host country’s transitory status played a part 
in the tribunal’s decision to reject the claim.591 While this award related to expropriation, 
it seems reasonable that similar logic would apply to the FET standard. If knowledge of 
commercial risk can contribute to rejection of an allegation of expropriation, then 
similarly any claim of a breach of the FET standard should also be rejected. 
 
6.2.d Tokios Tokelés 
 
The Lithuanian company Tokios Tokelés was running its business of advertising, 
printing and publishing through two Ukrainian subsidiaries; Ukrainian nationals holding 
99 percent of its shares.592 In Tokios Tokelés vs. Ukraine593 it alleged that Ukraine had 
violated the investors’ protections guaranteed under the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT,594 
which included the FET standard. Tokios Tokelés alleged that the Kiev Tax 
administration had targeted and oppressed its subsidiaries for political gain. While the 
tribunal ultimately rejected595 all claims on the grounds that the nationality of Tokios 
Tokelés’s shareholders disqualified the company from seeking protection under the 
BIT, it also provided an elaborate description of Ukraine’s political and economic 
situation.596 It stated that ‘The long history of suffering and oppression endured by the 
Ukraine and its peoples forms an inescapable background to the dispute,’597 and that, 
‘the events of 2001–2003 which form the substance of the present dispute were played 
                                                          
590 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law International 
2009) 288–289. 
591 Generation Ukraine (n 586) Para 20.38. 
592 Tokios Tokelés vs. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, 26 July 2007. 
593 Ibid.  
594 Ukraine–Lithuania BIT, 8 February 1994.  
595 Tokios Tokelés (n 592) Para 147. 
596 See e.g. Ibid Paras 7–11. 
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out against a backdrop of volatility and fragmentation in the Ukrainian political life.’598 
Few tribunal awards provide this level of detail on a country’s history. However, the 
tribunal did not discuss these contextual factors in relation to the alleged violation of 
the investment treaty clauses, which limits its applicability to future disputes.    
 
6.2.e Genin 
 
 In Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc and AS Baltoil vs. The Republic of Estonia599 the 
tribunal also recognised the host country’s economic conditions and developmental 
stage without relating them to the award’s final outcome. The dispute concerned the 
revocation of a banking licence of Mr Genin’s company, Estonian Innovation Bank 
(EIB), which purchased the Koidu Branch of Estonia Social Bank. The Bank of Estonia 
revoked the EIB’s licence on the grounds that the share registry and the list of 
shareholders it provided had discrepancies. EIB charged this revocation violated 
Estonia’s obligation under the US–Estonia BIT,600 which stipulated the FET standard 
and the ‘non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary treatment’ standard.  
 
The tribunal found that considering the Bank of Estonia’s actions required ‘proper 
context’ and that actions such as revoking a licence were ‘extremely technical’.601 It also 
found that the Bank of Estonia’s stated reasons for revoking the licence were 
‘exceptionally formalistic’ and ‘superficial,’ failed to ‘justif[y]…the revocation of EIB’s 
license’.602 It called the revocation process ‘somewhat irregular’603 and ‘contrary to 
                                                          
598 Ibid Para 8. 
599 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc and AS Baltoil vs. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/2, Award, 25 June 2001. 
600 US–Estonia BIT, 19 April 1994 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43560.pdf> 
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602 Ibid Para 352. 
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generally accepted banking and regulatory practice’604 which ‘invites criticism’.605 
Nevertheless, the tribunal found that its actions were not unsound. It rejected the claim 
that Estonia had breached the FET obligation under the BIT.606 It stated,  
‘It is quite obvious that the Banking Supervision Department had good reason 
to be critical of various aspects of EIB’s business and operations. It was 
perfectly justified to request the information which it sought. The question the 
Tribunal must answer, however, is whether the central bank afforded Claimants 
due process in the procedure in leading to the revocation of EIB’s license. Not 
without some hesitation, we conclude that the actions of the Bank of Estonia 
did not amount to a denial of justice.’607  
 
In describing how it overcame this ‘hesitation,’ the tribunal stated that it,  
‘considers it imperative to recall the particular context in which the dispute arose, 
namely, that of a renascent independent state, coming rapidly to grips with the 
reality of modern financial, commercial and banking practices and the 
emergence of the state institutions responsible for overseeing and regulating 
areas of activity perhaps previously unknown. This is the context in which Claimants 
knowingly chose to invest in an Estonian financial institute, EIB.’608 [Emphasis added].  
 
The tribunal took the fact that Estonia was going through a transition from 
communism to a market based economy into account in excusing the host country’s 
rather bureaucratic behaviour,609 stating that investors must take the local authorities’ 
                                                          
604 Ibid Para 364. 
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606 Ibid Paras 345–347. 
607 Ibid Para 357. 
608 Ibid Para 348. 
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degree of sophistication into consideration when investing in a country like Estonia and 
having its particular economic conditions. The tribunal noted that investors cannot 
expect the level of investor protection from a country, or supervision and regulation 
from the central bank, from host country which is struggling to cope with modern 
financial and banking practices that a country with a market based developed economy 
provides. Muchlinski, commenting on the award, opines that, ‘Where that country is like 
Estonia, in a process of change and transition, this may require a higher degree of 
candour and transparency than might be expected when dealing with a more developed 
market economy State.’610 He emphasises the investors’ duty to enter into investments 
with full knowledge of the risk involved in the host country.611 
 
The tribunal found an enormous number of shortcomings in the treatment of investors 
by the Bank of Estonia,612 and recognized Estonia’s capabilities and the weak 
administrative and technical capacity due to its transitory economic condition. However 
it did not base its conclusion that Estonia had not violated the FET standard on these 
conditions. Rather it cited Mr Genin’s poor conduct and his failure to disclose the 
shareholding interest of the company:  
‘It is the opinion of this Tribunal that the decision taken by the Bank of Estonia 
must be considered in its proper context – a context comprised of serious and 
entirely reasonable misgivings regarding EIB’s management, its operations, its 
investments and, ultimately, its soundness as a financial institution.’613 
This was the very reason the Bank of Estonia cited for its treatment of the EIB.614  
                                                                                                                                                                    
47. For criticism of this view see e.g. Kaj Hobér, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: In Search of a 
Definition of Expropriation (Juris Publishing Inc. 2007) 255.   
610 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 541. 
611 Ibid. 
612 See e.g.  Genin (n 599) Paras 352, 355, 361, 364 and 365. 
613 Ibid Para 361. 
614 Ibid Para 362. 
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In fact, the shortcomings of Estonia’s process which the tribunal identified in its award 
generally reflected its status as a developing country and country in transition, but the 
tribunal did not directly make this connection, in spite of recognising this status in light 
of Genin’s legitimate expectations. Rendering the award in Estonia’s favour only on 
technical grounds and in light of the EIB’s failures of management limits the positive 
implications of this decision for future decisions.615  
 
6.2.f Lemire (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability)  
 
Mr Joseph Charles Lemire, a US citizen, invested in the Ukraine radio broadcasting 
industry, Gala Radio, after the government opened the sector for privatisation. In Joseph 
Charles Lemire vs. Ukraine 616  Mr Lemire alleged that Ukraine breached FET and other 
stipulations of the US–Ukraine BIT617 by failing to provide additional frequencies to his 
radio station and subjecting it to arbitrary and discriminatory measures in the process of 
awarding broadcasting frequencies. The claimant alleged that Ukraine had granted 
broadcasting licences to other radio stations but had improperly and repeatedly denied 
his claims for additional frequencies. This had significantly frustrated his radio station’s 
plans for expansion. The tribunal decided Ukraine had violated FET but rejected 
Lemire’s other claims, including breach of the settlement agreement.618  
 
The tribunal noted Ukraine admitted in responding to the allegations that ‘in the initial 
years of independence, constant battles and economic battles and economic instability 
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caused lack of coordination in the activities of the state bodies and hampered their 
ability to create an effective system of government,’619 but did not cite Ukraine’s 
developing and transitory status in relation to the alleged breach of the FET standard. 
Rather, the Tribunal held, ‘On a general level, Claimant could expect a regulatory 
system for the broadcasting industry which was to be consistent, transparent, fair, 
reasonable, and enforced without arbitrary or discriminatory decisions.’620 Further, it 
stated, ‘The FET standard defined in the BIT is an autonomous treaty standard, whose 
precise meaning must be established on a case-by-case basis,’ going on to describe 
certain thresholds and factors the tribunal would need to examine in order to define the 
standard.621 It described the precise scope of the standard against certain other factors 
of the host state, stating,  
‘The evaluation of the State’s action cannot be performed in the abstract and 
only with a view of protecting the investor’s rights. The Tribunal must also 
balance other legally relevant interests, and take into consideration a number of 
countervailing factors, before it can establish that a violation of the FET 
standard, which merits compensation, has actually occurred: 
- the State’s sovereign right to pass legislation and to adopt decisions for the 
protection of its public interests, especially if they do not provoke a 
disproportionate impact on foreign investors; 
- the legitimate expectations of the investor, at the time he made his 
investments; 
- the investor’s duty to perform an investigation before effecting the 
investment;  
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- the investor’s conduct in the host country.’622 
 
The tribunal recognized Ukraine’s situation affecting its ‘smooth and effective system of 
government,’623 but did not consider these factors in determining liability and therefore 
found the state liable for violating the FET standard.  
 
Dr Jürgen Voss dissented,624 criticising the majority’s application of the FET standard, 
which he considered overly broad. He argued that this interpretation would have 
harmful consequences for host countries, particularly as applied to review the tender 
process.625 He referenced Para 3 of the Annex to the BIT, which included a provision 
reserving their right to deviate from the national treatment obligation in circumstances 
relating to certain activities, which included radio broadcasting.626 Dr Voss felt this 
provision should have defeated the claimant’s allegation of breach of FET.627 
 
6.2.g Lemire (Award)  
 
While the tribunal did not consider Ukraine’s transitional status in determining its 
liability628, Joseph Charles Lemire vs. Ukraine (Award)629 does address the developmental 
stage and economic characteristics of the host country in relation to damages. The 
claimant had proposed a methodology which the US National Association of Certified 
Valuation Analysts (NACVA) had developed to determine the discount rate to be 
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629 Joesph Charles Lemire vs. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award, 28 March 2011. 
162 
 
applied in the case, under the discounted cash flow (DCF) model.630 In financial terms, 
DCF values a project/investment based on the concept of the time value of money. To 
implement, the user estimates all cash flow projections and discounts them to ascertain 
the present value of the project/investment. The discount rate typically reflects the 
project/investment’s risk.  
 
The tribunal deemed DCF model only appropriate to ‘domestic’ situations, observing,  
‘is appropriate to value companies in the US and possibly in other developed 
nations. It does not however, reflect country risk, i.e. the fact that the same 
company, situated in the US or Ukraine, is subject to different political and 
regulatory risks; to reflect this difference, ceteris paribus  the discount rate in 
Ukraine must be higher (and the valuations lower) than the US. The NACVA 
approach does not acknowledge this difference, while the Damondaran 
methodology includes a specific item to reflect country risk and thus is to be 
preferred.’631 
 
This reference to ‘country risk’ implicitly incorporated Ukraine’s particular position. The 
tribunal elected instead to rely on assumptions632 that, it acknowledged, ‘must be 
checked, applying tests of reasonableness’.633 The assumptions included the ‘risk 
environment’ in which the investor Mr Lemire invested and the tribunal observed that,  
‘Mr Lemire was not a passive investor in a mature market. He had the courage 
to venture into a transitional State and to create from scratch a completely new 
business. Transitional economies need such investors, who take considerable risks and 
commit themselves with great energy, notwithstanding the absence of clear recovery horizons. 
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Such investors come and go, many of them risking and losing everything 
because their idea was not sound, or they were too quickly discouraged, or the 
venture turned out to require greater resources than what they were able to 
mobilise. When they lose, they have no right to compensation. Legal liability by 
the host state arises only if the duties of legal investment protection have been 
breached, and is transformed into monetary recovery only when there has, in 
consequence, been an appreciable loss.’634 [Emphasis added]  
 
In light of this, the tribunal set out to determine an amount of compensation that would 
be ‘a fair reflection of the actual loss, reasonably proportional to the investment.’635 It 
observed that the investor in this case is ‘not to be equated with a US investor’636 and 
that there was ‘indeed an adequate proportionality’637 in that Lemire had invested ‘not in 
cash alone but in a combination of cash, risk-taking, personal commitment, and the 
essential contribution of a path breaker.’638 This case differs from Genin and Generation 
Ukraine not only in that it did not involve a dismissal of claims, but also in that  the 
tribunal emphasised investors’ duty to know the responsibilities attached to investing in 
that country. As a ‘path breaker,’ rather than a mere investor, the tribunal deemed 
Lemire should have been aware of the host country’s particular circumstances.639 The 
distinction between the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Liability and the Tribunal on 
Award’s approach to the same dispute against Ukraine was that they had different 
approaches to the issue of the host country as a country in transition suggests that the 
tribunal considered that these issues only relevant when calculating the damages. This is 
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surely an inadequate approach of the tribunal in response to the host country’s 
transitory status.  
 
6.2.h Alpha 
 
In 2001, the Austrian real estate investor company Alpha Projectholding GmbH 
entered into an agreement with the Ukrainian state-owned enterprise in Kiev to 
renovate and reconstruct a hotel named Hotel Dnipro. In Alpha Projectholding GmbH vs. 
Ukraine,640 Alpha brought an action against Ukraine for breach of various clauses under 
the Austria–Ukraine BIT,641 including the FET obligation in relation to the failure of the 
project. Alpha claimed that the agreement entitled it to participate in the operation of 
the business of the hotel as well as to receive monthly income distributions. It alleged 
that during the period of 2001–2007, Ukraine’s actions had resulted in loss to the 
investor company and their rights attached to it.  
 
The tribunal found that the interference by the government into the contractual 
relationship between the claimant and the hotel had violated the investors’ legitimate 
expectation and the FET obligation under the treaty. It observed that,  
‘As stated by the Vivendi tribunal, the fair and equitable treatment standard is an 
“an objective standard.” As stated in an UNCTAD report, “where the fair and 
equitable standard is invoked, the central issue remains simply whether the 
actions in question are in all the circumstances fair and equitable or unfair and 
inequitable.” This means, in part, that governments must avoid arbitrarily 
changing the rules of the game in a manner that undermines the legitimate 
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expectations of, or the representations made to, an investor.’642 [Footnotes in 
the original text omitted]  
 
The tribunal did not discuss Ukraine’s particular capabilities and conditions or its socio-
political context as a country transitioning from communism to a market based 
economy; it only observed that ‘the Claimant was investing in Ukraine at a time of great 
political, legal and commercial uncertainty.’643  
 
While the tribunal did not engage in any further discussion of the impact and influence 
of these uncertainties, it appears these factors influenced its determination of the rate of 
interest. Rather than acceding to the claimant’s request to base the interest rate on the 
twelve-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)644 rate and compound 
annually, the tribunal sought a ‘more appropriate rate.’ It stated, the ‘risk-free rate plus 
market risk premium…better reflects the opportunity cost associated with Claimant’s 
losses, adjusted for the risks of investing in Ukraine.’645  
 
The tribunal provided no further explanation, which makes it a more worrying case in 
terms of the socio-political context of the host developing country. While it implicitly 
acknowledged the risks involved in investing in a country like Ukraine, it did not 
describe how it assessed those risks, even though it had not acknowledged these risks in 
relation to liability. In the absence of direct discussion of the socio-political contextual 
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background of the dispute, the award provides little guidance, and a troubling 
precedent, for future tribunals dealing with countries in transition.  
 
6.2.i Kardassopoulos 
 
The tribunal in Kardassopoulos and Fuchs vs. Georgia646 discussed its interpretation of the 
FET standard at length. In this case the claimants, Ionnis Kardassopoulos and Ron 
Fuchs, Greek and Israeli investors respectively, were the co-owners of Tramex 
International Oil Company. In 1992, they invested in Georgia in a thirty-year joint 
venture project GTI with the state owned Georgian Oil Company for a concession over 
Georgia’s main oil pipeline.  In 1996 Georgia terminated the concession contract and 
formed a governmental commission to compensate the investors. However, by 2004 the 
state had made no compensation and a new governmental commission concluded that 
the investors were not entitled to any compensation. Mr Kardassopoulos proceeded 
against Georgia for breaching the expropriation and FET standards under the Georgia–
Greece BIT,647 and under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT); Mr Fuchs proceeded only 
under the Georgia–Israel BIT.648 The same tribunal adjudicated the proceedings jointly. 
Georgia asked for an exemption from its FET obligation on the grounds of the 
economic and political situation that prevailed during the period, heavily relying on 
Parkerings.649  
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The tribunal discussed the FET standard comprehensively;650 however, it did not 
address Georgia’s claim that investors could not reasonably expect a stable political 
environment during its transition from the Soviet era,651 although this condition had a 
direct relation to the stability of its political environment.  The tribunal found that 
Georgia had breached the FET obligation, a finding that considering the host country’s 
transitory status might have been affected.  
 
6.3 Conclusion  
 
Tribunals dealing with countries in transition generally acknowledge the struggles and 
difficulties these host countries face in the process of transition from communism to 
market based economies to some degree. The Parkerings award emphasised investors 
duty to adjust their legitimate expectations in light of the inherent risks associated with 
these countries,652 but the remaining representative awards discussed in this chapter are 
inadequate in their approach to countries in transition. The tribunal in Lemire (Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability) did not consider the developing and transitory status of the host 
country. Though the Lemire (Award) adopted certain methodologies to calculate 
compensation which better reflected the country risk. The Alpha tribunal was implicitly 
influenced by these factors but failed to address the gravity of the issue. In this 
connection it is pertinent to refer to Kriebaum who thinks that,  
‘Confronted with a need to take into account the special situation prevailing in a 
developing country, a tribunal should first investigate whether it can do so in the 
decision on liability by using the existing flexibility in the substantive standards. 
                                                          
650See e.g. Ibid Paras 428–452. 
651 Ibid Paras 419–420. 
652 In this connection a particular dictum from Maffezini is worth mentioning. Maffezini involved the actions 
of developed host country Spain, but the tribunal emphasised that ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties are not 
insurance policies against bad judgments.’ See e.g. Maffezeni (n 120) Para 64. Similar expression given in 
MTD Equity citing Maffezini, see e.g. MTD Equity (n 119) Para 178.  
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If this is not possible, it can still address this need at the level of 
compensation’.653 
 
However from the awards discussed in this chapter it does not appear that the majority 
of the tribunals have considered the special situation of the host developing country in a 
systematic manner to draw any conclusion as to why they have not considered this 
pivotal fact in the liability phase or in other awards, only in the compensation phase 
without giving sufficient reasons.  
 
 The tribunal in Nagel did make some useful observations on investor responsibility in 
investing in a country in transition. It acknowledged the ‘factual background’ of the 
dispute. Namely the state’s transition and its struggle to cope with the new system, but 
its dismissal of the claimant’s invocation of the BIT blocked further engagement with 
these issues. The tribunal in Tokios Tokelés, similarly, engaged with the transitory 
background of the host state and rejected all the claims investors had forwarded, but 
unfortunately did not engage in any discussion as to whether the socio-political context 
had any impact upon the alleged breach of investment protection standards. The 
tribunal in Kardassopoulos adopted an approach inconsistent with the other tribunals in 
relation to countries in transition; it did not make any observation as to the plea Georgia 
raised that its social and political transition exempted it from its FET obligation.   
 
The awards discussed in this chapter do not provide consistent guidance for future 
tribunals as to the relevance of the particular conditions of the countries in transition to 
determine the legitimate expectation of investors in those countries as part of the FET 
standard. While they represent a spectrum of approaches towards countries in 
                                                          
653 Kriebaum, ‘Are Investment Treaty Standards Flexible Enough to Meet the Needs of Developing 
Countries’ (n 85) 339.  
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transition, as a group the current tribunals have not assigned this important contextual 
background of disputes in those countries due weight.   
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Chapter 7 
Current Arbitral Practice Relating to Economic Crises in Host 
Developing Countries: The FET Standard in Context 
  
7.1 Introduction   
 
This chapter will discuss arbitral awards in which the investment disputes arose as a 
result of a host developing country’s actions to address an economic crisis. Foreign 
investors alleged that the actions and measures taken in response to the economic crisis 
had violated FET and other investment protection standards. It will discuss how the 
tribunals addressed the issue and whether they took this particular economic context 
into account. Most of the cases concern Argentina; due to the numerous disputes 
accusing the country of breaching the FET standard which came before investment 
tribunals following the country’s 2000–2001 economic crisis,654 the worst in its 
history.655 Therefore the discussion in this chapter is largely dominated by the disputes 
against Argentina. The Economist described Argentina’s collapse as ‘a decline without 
parallel’ and ‘an economic collapse to match the Great Depression of the 1930s’.656 
                                                          
654 See, e.g.,  Paolo Di Rosa, ‘The Recent Wave of Arbitrations against Argentina under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues’ (2004) 36 The Universtiy of Miami Inter-
American Law Review  41; William W Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under 
BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System’ in Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung 
and Claire Balchin (eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2010) 407; 
James Harrison, ‘Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?’ in 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann Pierre-Marie Dupuy, and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 396, 398; José Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, 
‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: a Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime’ in Karl 
P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2009) 397.  
655 See, e.g., J F Hornbeck, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: A Chronology of Events’ 
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8040.pdf> accessed 1 May 2014; Martin Feldstein, 
‘Argentina’s Fall’ (2002) 81(2) Foreign Affairs  8. Also see Chapter 1 in 1.2.2 Developing Countries in 
Investment Dispute Arbitration 5. 
656 ‘A decline without parallel-Argentina’s collapse’ The Economist (2 March 2002); ‘Liberty’s Great 
Advance’ The Economist (28 June 2003).  
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Argentina has faced more disputes than any other host developing country in the world, 
not least because foreign investors considered it very investor-friendly prior to the crisis, 
due to a number of initiatives its government had taken. By November 2002 more than 
half the population of the country was living in poverty.657 Against this contextual 
background by 2006 more than thirty investment arbitration claims were pending 
against Argentina.658 The total value of the claims, approximately 17 billion US dollars, 
is almost the entire budget of the national government.659 According to the ranges of 
development index at that particular moment Argentina fell within the category of a 
developing country.660 As this chapter will describe, the tribunals did not generally view 
these issues as reasons to exempt the country from liability or moderate the amount of 
compensation awarded to foreign investors.  
 
Part 7.2.A will discuss the impact of economic crises upon developing countries and 
hence their significance in investment disputes. Part 7.2.B will discuss disputes that 
arose out of economic turmoil in Argentina as well as in Mexico, Indonesia, and 
Paraguay. 
 
7.2.A Economic Crisis and its Impact upon Developing Countries  
 
This thesis argues that tribunals should take economic crises in developing host 
countries into account because of the limited resources available and capability of the 
                                                          
657 Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (n 1) 2.  
658 Ibid 2.  
659 Ibid. 
660 See e.g.  Dev Kar and Devon Cartwright-Smith, ‘Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 
2002–2006’ <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=dev_kar&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.co.uk%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3Dlist%2Bof
%2Bdeveloping%2Bcountries%2B2002%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C5%26as_sdtp%3D#searc
h=%22list%20developing%20countries%202002%22> accessed 4 May 2014; UNCTAD, ‘The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2002: Escaping the Poverty Tap’ 
<http://unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2002_en.pdf>  accesssed 23 July 2014.   
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host developing countries to manage such crises. These countries’ efforts to manage 
economic crises largely depend upon their resources and level of development. In 
particular, developing (and transitioning) countries tend to experience more severe 
impact as a result of economic crises than developed countries as their governments 
with limited resources struggle to alleviate the devastation caused by the crisis.  
 
Several studies of the global economic crisis over the last decade show that the global 
recession affected the world’s poor countries more severely than richer countries,661 
which has impacted upon them in a number of ways. As a study by ActionAid states, 
‘Although developing countries didn’t make this crisis, it has become all too clear that 
they are in the firing line when it comes to suffering its effects.’662 The effects of 
economic crisis are particularly severe in such countries.663 The global economic crisis of 
2007–2008 has led to a real drop in financial flows and export earnings in some 
developing countries,664 and the economic turmoil had an impact upon the equities 
market.665 The ActionAid study describes the severity of the crisis in the following 
terms: ‘what is clear [is] that developing country losses from a crisis that started in the 
developed world are real and significant, and will be compounded as time goes on by 
the impact on the domestic economy within developing countries’.666 Economic crises 
also cause a reduction in government revenues, taxes and borrowings.667 
 
                                                          
661 See, e.g., ‘Feeling the pinch: impacts of the financial crisis on developing countries’ 
<http://panos.org.uk/resources/feeling-the-pinch-impacts-of-the-financial-crisis-on-developing-
countries/> accessed 1 May 2014. 
662 ActionAid, ‘Where does it hurt’ The impact of the financial crisis on developing countries’ 1 
<http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/where_does_it_hurt_final.pdf> accessed 1 
May 2014.   
663 Ibid 6 and 8. 
664 See e.g. Peter Thal Larsen, ‘Capital flows to developing world at risk of collapse’ 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6fab9488-ecbf-11dd-a534-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz31bddS6jO> 
accessed 5 May 2014. Also see, e.g., ActionAid ‘Where does it hurt’ (n 662) 4–6. 
665 Action Aid (n 662) 5. 
666 Ibid 6. 
667 Ibid. 
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In relation to international investment, the ActionAid study finds that ‘preliminary 
results imply that in many developing countries the exposure to international trade – 
their dependence on export revenues, level of concentration of exports, trade balance 
and reserves – is the biggest factor in their vulnerability to the crisis.’668 An IMF survey 
of the 2007–2008 global recession argues that the global impact of the resulting 
economic crisis upon developing countries is likely to be more serious and more long-
term than the impact of recession itself.669 The study notes that, in increasing their 
vulnerability to economic crisis, developing countries are also likely to have increased 
their risk of exposure to more serious recessions.670 Indeed, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 
show that the recession, which began in the developed world, had multiple negative 
impacts in developing countries, including sharp falls of FDI in those countries,671 and 
that emerging markets, which are more integrated into the international private capital 
markets than established ones, experience the impact of the global economic crisis more 
severely.672 They argue that history suggests that past experiences of economic crises are 
in fact inevitable in developing countries’ deregulated financial systems.673 Therefore, 
the systematic risk inherent in the financial system poses a greater risk.674 In other 
words, as the IMF survey indicated, developing countries are more vulnerable to 
economic crisis.  
The ActionAid study demonstrated that different countries experience economic crises 
differently,675 but that ‘the crisis will be severe in every [developing] country, both for 
                                                          
668 Ibid 7. 
669 See, e.g., World Economic Outlook, October 2008, ‘Financial Stress and Economic Downturns’ 
Chapter 4 (IMF 2008) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf> accessed 
23 July 2014.   
670 Ibid.   
671 Stephany Griffith-Jones and José Antonio Ocampo, The Financial Crisis and its Impact on Developing 
Countries,  Working Paper No 53 (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 2009) 1–2. 
672 Ibid 6. 
673 Ibid 12. 
674 Ibid.  
675 The study particularly described the range of experiences of South Africa, India, Brazil, and China. 
Action Aid (n 662) 9. 
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people immediately affected, and for long-term development prospects’676, and will 
include such phenomena as unemployment, reduced state spending, increasing poverty 
and, eventually, increasing mortality.677 It noted, ‘the comparisons here are all about 
degrees of disaster, and capacity to bounce back from disaster, and don’t imply that any 
country can escape the shocks all together’.678 While this study was conducted in the 
aftermath of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, its apprehensions reflect the 
conditions developing countries continue to face.  
 
Another study by Oxfam conducted to assess the human impacts of the economic crisis 
in eleven countries679 shows that the global economic crisis hit the poor countries 
through a number of transmission channels but each at ‘different speeds and 
intensities’.680 The extent of the impact depended on their integration into global 
financial markets, their dependence on FDI or their dependence on developed 
countries for aid, trade, and remittance.681 The study also found that though the impacts 
in different regions will be of different kinds, nevertheless all regions are definitely 
going to be impacted by the global economic crisis.682 
 
Another study conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) shows that 
many developing countries and especially small and African countries are ill-equipped to 
face another crisis.683 It describes the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 as having 
                                                          
676 Ibid 11. 
677 Ibid 10. 
678 Duncan Green, Richard King and May Miller-Dawkins, ‘The Global Economic Crisis and Developing 
Countries’ Oxfam Research Report,  (Oxfam Inernational  2010) 7–8. 
679 Ibid.  
680 Ibid 54. 
681 See e.g., ‘Feeling the pinch: impacts of the financial crisis on developing countries’ (n 661).  
682 Green, King and Miller-Dawkins The Global Economic Crisis and Developing Countries’ (n 678) 4. 
683 Dirk Willem Te Velde and others, The Global Fnancial Crisis and Developing Countries: ODI Background 
Note (Overseas Development Institute 2008) 2. 
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financial implications in developing countries684 with effects that included declines in 
remittances, pressure on FDI and equity investment, pressure on commercial lending, 
the risk of defaulting on debt, declines in aid budget and also pressure on capital 
adequacy ratios of development finance institutes.685 The study concludes that, while 
these effects varied from country to country, the economic impact of crisis in the future 
could also include ‘weak export revenues, further pressure on current accounts and 
balance of payment, lower investment and growth rates, lost employment’ and also 
social impacts like ‘lower growth translating into higher poverty, more crime, weaker 
health systems and even more difficulties meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals.’686  
 
A study conducted by Naomi Hossain describes the social impact of the economic 
crisis.687 After the 2007–2008 crisis the World Bank’s chief economist for Africa 
predicted that the economic crisis would imperil the lives of many children.688 The 
Oxfam study describes wage freezes and reductions in working hours in developing 
countries.689   
 
                                                          
684 Ibid 3.  
685 Ibid 4. 
686 Ibid. 
687 In her study Hossain analyses how the economic crisis has affected communities in five developing 
countries—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, and Zambia. These affects, which including rising 
crime rates, are matters of serious social concern which can lead to widespread insecurity in the 
community and also can give rise to issues of national concern. For example she cites the food riots in 
Haiti due to the economic crisis. See e.g.  Naomi Hossain, ‘Crime and Social Cohesion in the Time of 
Crisis: Early Evidence of Wider Impacts of Food, Fuel and Financial Shocks’ (2009) 40(5) Institute of 
Ddevelopment Studies Bulletin 59. 
688 See e.g.<http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/a-sub-prime-crisis-in-the-us-and-infant-deaths-in-
africa> accessed 27 July 2014. Also see e.g. Jed Friedman and Norbert Schady, How Many More Infants Are 
Likely To Die In Africa As A Result Of The Global Financial Crisis? World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No.5023  (August 2009)  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/AfricaIMR_FriedmanSchady_060209.pd
f > accessed 10 September 2014.  
689 Green, King and Miller-Dawkins The Global Economic Crisis and Developing Countries’ (n 678) 4. 
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Economic crises have direct and indirect linkage to a host country’s poor administrative 
and infrastructural capabilities,690 and many of the claims against Argentina as a result of 
its severe economic crisis addressed administrative capacity. Investor protection by a 
state requires administrative and legal capacity; economic crises tend to weaken these 
mechanisms,691 and raise the risk that an administrative and legal system will treat 
foreign investors in a way that they perceive to be unfair. Here again the legal question 
is whether foreign investors can legitimately expect that a developing host country will 
provide the same protection as a developed one. So far, investment tribunals have 
largely concluded that they can.  
 
7.2.B Arbitral Awards involving Economic Crises  
 
This part discusses selected awards to demonstrate the full range of approaches 
investment tribunals have taken when an economic crisis was clearly a relevant 
contextual background to the dispute. Most reflect a refusal to consider economic crises 
in host developing countries; as well as the inconsistent approaches adopted by 
different tribunals on some substantive issues which all raise concerns for developing 
countries in the future. This part will first discuss the Argentine economic crisis cases in 
chronological order with a view to demonstrate the flow of analysis of the tribunals 
which were dealing with the disputes that arose out of the similar legal and factual 
context and also to see to what extent earlier findings of the tribunals have influenced 
the later tribunals dealing with the same issues. It will then discuss three other cases in 
other countries involving similar economic crises situations which occurred prior to the 
Argentine crisis. Due to the recent numerous awards against Argentina, which raised 
                                                          
690 Gallus (n 124) 719.  
691 Ibid.   
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concern for the host developing countries (discussed in chapter 1), this part prioritises 
the Argentine cases.   
 
7.2.B.a CMS  
 
CMS vs. Argentina,692 is the most discussed Award which demonstrates various 
inconsistencies in the Tribunal’s approach to dealing with the severe economic crisis in 
Argentina. The tribunal found a breach of the FET standard, which Argentina 
challenged before the ad hoc Committee.693 The ad hoc Committee found fault in various 
aspects of the Tribunal’s Award such as ‘manifest errors of law’ and that it ‘suffered 
from lacunae and elisions,’694 and therefore annulled the decision but not the award.695 
Therefore the Award and findings rendered by the tribunal prevail in effect. 
 
In this case the US company CMS held a 30 per cent share in Transpotadora de Gas del 
Norte (TGN), a private Argentinean gas company. The Argentine government 
encouraged privatisation in the energy sector through various initiatives, including the 
convertibility law allowing TGN to calculate tariffs in US dollars and convert them into 
pesos at the prevailing exchange rate at the beginning of 1989. This superseded the 
previously existing system which introduced gas tariffs to be calculated in US dollars 
and adjusted twice a year based on the United States Producer Price Index (US PPI). 
When Argentina encountered economic difficulties in the late 1990s, the government 
met with the gas companies, and they agreed that the adjustment of the tariffs would be 
temporarily suspended. As the economic crisis worsened, Argentina extended the 
                                                          
692 CMS (n 119).   
693CMS Gas Transmission Company vs. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 
(Annulment Proceeding) Decision of the Ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, September 25 2007. 
694 See e.g., Ibid Para 158. 
695 Ibid.  
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arrangement indefinitely. In response to the most severe economic crisis in its history, 
the government of Argentina further enacted the Emergency Law No. 25.561 on 6 
January 2002,696 which eliminated the practice of pegging the value of the peso to the 
US dollar, resulting in the devaluation of the peso. The legislation also provided for 
different industries to have different exchange rates, but provided no special treatment 
for gas export or transportation tariffs. It also created a new process for negotiating 
licence agreements for industries outside of the gas sector.  
 
CMS claimed that the Emergency Law and the continuation of the tariff freeze 
decreased TGN’s tariff revenue by 75 percent, and that CMS’s investment in TGN 
therefore lost 92 percent of its value. With decreased revenue, TGN was unable to 
honour its loans, which totalled USD 590 million.697 CMS further claimed that the 
government laws and regulations had artificially depressed gas prices, thereby providing 
an ‘effective subsidy benefiting the rest of the Argentine economy’.698 Finally CMS 
claimed that Argentina had violated the FET and other investment protection standards 
under the US Argentina BIT.699 CMS claimed compensation of USD 261.1 million.700 
 
In its response Argentina argued that the licence agreements with TGN did not 
constitute a guarantee against financial losses, but only provided for the right of the 
licensee to a fair and reasonable tariff encompassing costs of operation, taxes, 
                                                          
696 In the event of its most severe financial crisis in its history Argentina had to issue the Emergency Law 
No. 25,561 of 6 January 2002 which provided ‘(i) abolish the currency broad that had linked Argentine 
peso to the U.S. dollars, resulting in a significant depreciation of the Argentine peso; (ii) abolished the 
adjustment of the public service contracts according to agreed upon indexations; and (iii) authorize the 
Executive branch of government to renegotiate all public service contracts.’ 
697 CMS (n 119) Para 171. 
698 Ibid Para 72. 
699 Ibid Para 88. US–Argentina BIT, 14 November 1991. 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf> accessed 16 July 2014.   
700 CMS (n 119) Para 89. 
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amortizations, and a reasonable return on investments.701 It further argued that the 
Argentine government implemented the measures to which CMS objected in order to 
regulate a matter of national importance.702 It claimed discretion to regulate gas tariffs, 
and that ‘public considerations’ had prompted its actions.703 Argentina further argued 
CMS had undertaken a risk that domestic policies would change in response to a serious 
economic crisis and that Argentina could not be liable for CMS’s financial losses.704 
Argentina raised the defence of necessity and stated that claims by individuals or 
corporations could not supersede its right to invest in the country.705 It invoked the 
actions of countries such as the United States, who took such emergency measures 
during economic crises to devaluate their currencies, for example, during the economic 
crisis in the 1930s, in accordance with national and international law.706 
 
In relation to the economic crisis, which also gave rise to a political and social crisis, the 
tribunal observed,  
‘There is a broad agreement on the fact that Argentina was affected by a deep 
crisis of an economic, social and political nature. The downturn in the economy 
commencing in 1999, the rising levels of poverty, and the rapid turnover of politicians occupying 
the highest offices in the nation, coupled with social upheaval and civil disobedience, was 
dramatic reality.…These developments have been deplored by the Claimant. 
Needless to say, also the Tribunal has the greatest sympathy for the plight of the Argentine 
                                                          
701 Ibid Para 91. 
702 Argentina argued that regulation of the distribution and transportation of gas constituted regulation of 
a ‘national public service which must take into account particular needs of social importance.’ See e.g. 
Ibid Para 93. 
703 See e.g. Ibid Para 93. 
704 Ibid Paras 94–97. 
705 Ibid Para 94. 
706 See e.g. Ibid Para 272. 
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people under the circumstances and respects its efforts to overcome the situation.’707 [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Accordingly Argentina claimed the defence of necessity for an exemption of its liability 
under international law and the treaty law due to the severe economic and social crisis 
that it was facing.708 The Tribunal acknowledged the economic circumstances that 
prevailed in Argentina during that period but considered them irrelevant to the award 
itself.  
 
The tribunal accepted that the collapse of Argentina’s economy influenced the standard 
of conduct it could be expected to provide in its treatment of foreign investors. It 
stated, ‘the Claimant cannot ask to be entirely beyond the reach of the abnormal 
conditions prompted by the crisis, as this would be unrealistic.’709 It reaffirmed the point 
predecessor tribunals had made710 that the investment treaties did not provide an 
insurance policy against business risk. It stated, 
‘The crisis had in itself a severe impact on the Claimant’s business, but this aspect 
must to some extent be attributed to the business risk the Claimant took on when investing in 
Argentina, this being particularly the case as it related to decrease in demand. 
Such effects cannot be ignored as if business had continued as usual. Otherwise, 
both parties would not be sharing some of the costs of the crisis in a reasonable 
manner and the decision could eventually amount to an insurance policy against 
business risk, an outcome that, as the Respondent has rightly argued, would not 
be justified.’711 [Emphasis added] 
                                                          
707  Ibid Para 211.  
708 Ibid Para 99. 
709 Ibid Para 244.  
710See e.g.  Maffezeni (n 120) Para 178. 
711 CMS (n 119) Para 248.  
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Here the tribunal stated that, the economic crisis appears to be relevant to damages; the 
effects of the crisis minimise the damages and Argentina cannot be expect to pay for 
damages that directly stem from the economic crisis and that CMS should have realised 
could happen. The tribunal will not provide any insurance for taking such business risk 
for investing in the country.  
 
Despite these observations, the tribunal found that Argentina’s conditions were not 
severe enough to exclude liability or to preclude the wrongfulness of Argentina’s 
measure.712 It further stated that,  
‘There is of course the question of the reality of the crisis that has been 
described. The Tribunal explained above that this reality cannot be ignored and 
it will not do so. The crisis, however, can only be taken into account as a matter 
of fact. And facts of course do not eliminate compliance with the law but do have a 
perceptible influence on the matter in which the law can be applied.’713 [Emphasis added]  
 
Therefore, while the tribunal placed the obligation to recognise the possibility of an 
economic decline on the investor, it made no move to grant a host country latitude to 
respond to the crisis unless it could do so without hurting the investors.  The tribunal 
granted that the crisis had occurred, but refused to grant that the crisis might change the 
state’s legal obligations.  
 
In awarding compensation, however, it stated that it should consider the crisis in setting 
compensation. It diminished the status of the crisis, stating, ‘….the crisis in and of itself 
                                                          
712 Ibid Para 165. 
713 Ibid Para 240. 
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might not be characterized as catastrophic.’714  This admission suggests the tribunal was 
trying to find a middle way to address the issue.  It acknowledged that the country was 
suffering from issues of rising levels of poverty, political instability, social unrest, and 
civil disorder.715 It expressed sympathy for the crisis situation716 but did not take into 
account Argentina’s situation in deciding liability. The economic crisis functioned only 
as a factual issue in this regard.  
 
While the tribunal signalled that it would consider the economic crisis and the difficulty 
the Argentine government faced in tackling the crisis, it appears it did not. In its 
calculation of damages owed to CMS, the tribunal applied the principle of restitution.717 
It used the discounted cash flow method to calculate the lost value of CMS’s shares, 
which amounted to compensating CMS, not only for the lost value of its initial 
investment, but the value of its investment plus its profits until the date at which 
damages were calculated (17 August 2000).718 It neither calculated the effect of the size 
of the award on the Argentine government nor calculated the diminished expectations 
CMS should have in light of the economic crisis. In effect it decided that the FET 
standard guarantees a stable economic and regulatory environment, essentially providing 
the substantive value of the profits from an investment.719  
 
The CMS Tribunal heavily relied on the factual circumstances in CME vs. Czech 
Republic720 and Tecmed721  in its interpretation of FET, in spite of decidedly different facts 
in the cases. Neither of the disputes in CME or Tecmed arose out of a severe economic 
                                                          
714 Ibid Para 356. 
715 Ibid Para 211. 
716 Ibid Para 211. 
717 Ibid Paras 399–405. 
718 Ibid Para 466–467. 
719 Mayeda (n 47) 279.  
720 CME vs. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, SCC (Under UNCITRAL Rules) 9 ICSID 
Reports 264. 
721 Tecmed (n 118).  
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crisis. Therefore the interpretation of FET based on CME and Tecmed should have been 
substantially different in CMS.  In utilizing them, it effectively dismissed Argentina’s 
argument that its obligation to provide investment stability could not trump the 
government’s obligation to prevent severe poverty and social damage. It interpreted the 
FET standard as being able to limit the implementation of a legitimate government 
policy.722  
 
As this chapter will describe, a number of tribunals have used CMS as a precedent in 
relation to disputes that arose out of the same Argentine economic crisis. Kreibaum has 
pointed out the ambiguity of the award, which does not make it clear whether the 
economic conditions that prevailed in Argentina, the host country, should have any 
influence on the threshold for the FET standard or whether the tribunal considered the 
breach was so egregious that it had to act.723 
 
7.2.B.b CMS ad hoc Committee for Annulment Proceedings  
 
As noted above, an ad hoc committee annulled CMS, but left its effects intact. Waibel et 
al argue that the observation that the Tribunal applied the law ‘cryptically and 
defectively’724 and that the central part of the award’s legal reasoning was erroneous725 
was in fact directed at the general investment arbitration community.726 They observe,  
                                                          
722 Trebilcock and Howse pointed this out when they commented on Mondev.  In their words, ‘the 
approach that tribunals have so far articulated with respect to “minimum standard of treatment” creates 
little risk that ordinary legitimate government action, including judicial and administrative decision 
making, can be impugned. To violate the minimum standard of treatment, the government’s conduct 
must be improper to the extent that it would shock or surprise an impartial international tribunal’. See e.g. 
Michel J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn, Routledge 2005) 466. 
723 Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113) 402. 
724 See e.g. CMS (Annulment Proceedings) (n 693) Para 136. 
725 Ibid Para 158. 
726 Michael Waibel and others, ‘The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality in 
Michael Waibel and others (ed), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 
Law International 2010) xlii. 
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‘The Committee’s expansive commentary on that point, despite its limited 
mandate, seems to be directed at the general investment arbitration community. 
Such criticism from within fulfils a dual function. First, it shores up the system’s 
legitimacy by bringing bad practices to light and opening the way of catharsis in 
future cases. Second, it serves as a warning shot: change course or risk putting 
the long-term health of the entire regime at risk.’727 
 
It is unfortunate that the ad hoc Committee did not affirm Argentina’s defence of 
necessity728 or annul the damages although it729 found fault with various aspects of the 
Tribunal’s Award of 2005, such as ‘manifest errors of law’ and that it ‘suffered from 
lacunae and elisions.’730  As a result, the ad hoc Committee in the Annulment Decision 
ultimately fails to provide a workable approach to disputes arising from severe 
economic difficulty in host developing countries.  
 
7.2.B.c LG&E (Decision on Liability) 
 
LG&E vs. Argentina (Decision on Liability)731 took a slightly different approach in 
addressing Argentina’s economic crisis and plea of state of necessity. Three US 
companies, LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, and LG&E International Inc 
(collectively LG&E), had invested in three Argentinian gas companies that distribute 
natural gas having been encouraged by the privatisation initiatives of the Argentine 
government in the early 1990s. LG& E was granted a licence until 2027. However the 
                                                          
727 Ibid xlii. 
728 August Reinisch, ‘The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of 
Fragmentation vs. The Promise of a More Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of 
Investment Arbitration’  in Isabelle Buffard and others (eds), International Law between Universalism and 
Fragmentation: Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Baetens) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 118.  
729 CMS (Annulment Proceeding) (n 693).  
730 See e.g., Ibid Para 158. 
731 LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 121).  
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convertibility law abrogated the guarantees provided at the time of privatisation in 2002, 
and the profitability of the company’s gas distribution business declined sharply. LG&E 
alleged Argentina had violated the FET standard, umbrella clause, protection against 
expropriation, and also discrimination under the US–Argentina BIT.732 The tribunal did 
not fully allow Argentina’s claim of defence of necessity for such measures, but 
acknowledged that plea partially. Although the tribunal found in favour of the plaintiffs, 
it found that Argentina was in a state of necessity between 1 December 2001 (the date 
of the Decree repealing the convertibility law) and 26 April 2003733 (the date on which 
the new President of Argentina took office734) and therefore the state should be released 
from international responsibility for losses that LG&E faced during this period.735 It 
subtracted the losses incurred by LG&E during the period of the state of necessity from 
the general damages,736 stating,  
‘This exception is appropriate only in emergency situations; and once the 
situation has been overcome, i.e. certain degree of stability has been recovered; 
the State is no longer exempted from responsibility for any violation of its 
obligations under the international law and shall reassume them immediately.’737 
 
The Tribunal recognised the economic crisis and particular political and social 
circumstances when it decided on the amount of compensation,738 which, however, was 
fixed at 57.4 million US dollars.739 It accepted Argentina’s plea to invoke Article XI of 
the US–Argentina BIT, which grants an exception for measures to maintain public 
                                                          
732 US-Argentian BIT (n 699).  
733 LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) Para 226. 
734 See e.g. Ibid Paras 226–258.  
735 Ibid Para 229 and 257. 
736 Ibid Para 267 (d). 
737 Ibid Para 261. 
738 See e.g. Ibid Para 139. 
739 LG&E Energy Corporation vs. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/01, Award, 25 July 
2007 Para 109.  
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order or security,740 and excluded Argentina from liability for breaches of the treaty 
during the period of the state of necessity.741 It observed:  
‘Having found that the requirements for invoking the state of necessity were 
satisfied, the Tribunal considers, that it is the factor excluding the State from its 
liability vis-à-vis the damage caused as a result of the measures adopted by 
Argentina in response to the severe crisis suffered by the country.’742 
 
Nevertheless, the tribunal held that the measures Argentina took had breached its FET 
obligation under the treaty, saying it ‘went too far by completely dismantling the very 
legal framework constructed to attract investors.’743 It found that the measures taken by 
Argentina were unfair and inequitable744 and that Argentina had violated its FET 
obligation to honour the guarantees provided to the foreign investors by failing to 
ensure the ‘stability and predictability’ requirement.745 Thus it argued providing stability 
of the legal and business framework is an essential element of FET.746 It concluded that 
specific tariff guarantees for the gas distribution sector were aimed at achieving such 
stability.747 However it outlined a caveat, that allowing that a threat to the state’s 
existence limits the guarantee in relation to the regulatory framework: ‘the stability of 
the legal and business framework is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment 
in this case, provided that they do not pose any danger for the existence of the host 
State itself.’748 It observed:   
                                                          
740 Article XI of the US–Argentina BIT (n 699) states, ‘This Treaty shall not preclude the application by 
either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its 
own essential security interests.’ 
741 LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) Para 229. 
742 Ibid Para 259. 
743 Ibid Para 139. 
744 Ibid Paras 133–138. 
745 Ibid Paras (n) 127, 131 and 132. 
746 Ibid Para (n) 124. 
747 Ibid Para (n) 119.  
748 Ibid Para (n) 124. 
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‘The essential interests of the Argentinean State were threatened in December 
2001. It faced an extremely serious threat to its existence, its political and 
economic survival to the possibility of maintaining its essential services in 
operation, and to the preservation of its internal peace.’749 
 
Here the tribunal admits that necessity affects the FET obligation. It noted the difficulty 
if defining the FET standard due to its generic nature and its changing interpretation in 
the course of time and depending on the circumstances of the dispute.750 
 
On the question of compensation of investors for losses during the state of necessity, 
the tribunal resorted to Article 27 of the Draft United Nation’s Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts 2001. Article 27 does not address whether 
any compensation was payable to the party affected by the losses, and it also does not 
specify the kind of losses that could be compensable or the circumstances in which 
compensation should be payable.751 Therefore it appears to be doubtful whether a 
foreign investor can qualify for compensation under Article 27 and thereby the 
tribunal’s contention in this regard becomes unconvincing.   
 
LG&E established the existence of an emergency, which seems relevant to the 
interpretation of what is fair and equitable in a given situation. What is fair and equitable 
in a state of emergency might thus differ from what is fair and equitable in the normal 
                                                          
749 Ibid Para 257.  
750 Ibid Para (n) 123. 
751 Article 27 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts states, ‘The invocation 
of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to (a) 
Compliance with the obligation in question; if and to the extent that the circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness no longer exists; (b) The question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act 
in question.’ 
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course of business.752 It acknowledged the importance of necessity in interpreting FET 
when it took the severe economic crisis and state of necessity into account.  
 
In a specific departure from CMS, the tribunal did consider the issue of state 
responsibility. Despite the similarities in fact and law between CMS and LG&E, the 
Tribunals reached opposite conclusions on assessing the extent of the state of necessity.  
 
Kriebaum argues that LG&E applies an ‘unspecified reduced FET.’753Such unspecified 
reduction in the standard might raise concern for developing countries. As this does not 
allow the developing countries to understand under what conditions the standard would 
be reduced in future and predict the scope of the FET standard. Schill criticises that 
LG&E gives a host country almost unfettered flexibility to change any policy, given 
that the state is the only authority to decide whether such measures are the ‘only way’ to 
protect the national interest.754 He further opines that by analysing this requirement on 
the basis of burden of proof, the LG&E award leaves host countries too much scope. 
Generally a party relying on an exception bears the burden of proof; CMS took this 
approach. LG&E reverses this rule; Schill thinks that this was done with ‘tenuous 
                                                          
752 In both CMS (n 119) and LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) the Tribunals disagree on the issue of 
burden of proof concerning exceptions to the state of necessity, in particular the question as to whether 
the investor or host state must prove that less restrictive measures could not have been taken and that the 
host state did not contribute to this crisis.  For a detailed discussion on the issue of state of necessity see 
e.g. Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E’ (n 125); Forji (n 125); 
Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises 
–Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina’ (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration  
265; Argañarás, ‘CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina – The Defense Raised 
by Argentina’ (n 125); G Falkof, ‘‘‘State of Necessity” Defence Accepted in LG&E v. Argentina ICSID 
Tribunal’ (2006) 3 Transnational Dispute Management; LF Castillo Argañarás, ‘The State of Necessity as 
International Defense Raised by a State Undergoing a Financial Crisis. A Case Study’ (2007) 4 
Transnational Dispute Management.  
753 Kriebaum, ‘Are Investment Treaty Standards Flexible Enough to Meet the Needs of Developing 
Countries’ (n 85) 335.  
754 See e.g. Schill, ‘International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises 
– Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina’ (n 752).   
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justification’.755 He fears that LG&E invites abuse by the state of the classification of a 
state of necessity.  
 
However, states do have that latitude of inherent sovereign power to self-judge its state 
of necessity. No one outside the state machinery or the investment tribunals is in a 
position to evaluate a country’s macroeconomic policies under a state of necessity, 
which is very complex. If a host country wants to confiscate the rights of foreign 
investors it can do so by expropriation subject to certain conditions of compensation 
prescribed under international law, which, however, is very rare in today’s world. 
Necessity has been accepted only in exceptional circumstances, like that of threat to the 
security or existence of states. The idea that it will become a principle that can be 
utilised by host countries to defend any policy measure they want to take is far-fetched.  
Therefore Schill’s apprehension that host countries will abuse their right of invoking a 
state of necessity in the investment law context do not appear to be convincing in light 
of reality. 
 
Despite LG&E making the defence of necessity available in terms of compensation, 
some scholars have already predicted that it would be looked upon as an aberration.756 
This assumption seems to be true. Apart from National Grid PLC vs. Argentina,757 which 
also arose in a similar context, no subsequent tribunals on the Argentine economic crisis 
cases followed the path of the LG&E award. The tribunal in National Grid also held 
that Argentina was not liable for breach of FET and the losses thereby incurred by the 
                                                          
755 Ibid.    
756 See e.g. Schneiderman (n1).   
757 National Grid (n 543). The British firm National Grid P.L.C invested in Argentina through two 
subsidiary companies Transener and Transba, in the electricity sector. This sector was also subject to the 
benefits under the same Peso-Dollar Convertibility laws. The National Grid also initiated proceeding 
against Argentina that such measures had violated amongst others the FET obligation under the UK-
Argentina BIT. The Tribunal concluded that Argentina had violated the FET obligation on the grounds 
that it had ‘fundamentally changed the legal framework on the basis of which the Respondent itself had 
solicited investments and the Claimant had made them.’ Para 179.  
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investors during the first six months when the crisis started.758 The National Grid 
tribunal also emphasised that the FET standard must be qualified in time and stated 
that, ‘what would be unfair and inequitable in normal circumstances may not be so in a 
situation of an economic and social crisis.’759 The majority of the subsequent awards 
against Argentina did not recognise the economic crisis as the basis for a defence of 
necessity or a ground to exempt the host country from liability either fully or partially.  
 
Though there is no scope for precedent in international Investment Tribunals, the 
ICSID Tribunals often rely on persuasive authority from previous awards. Therefore 
two aspects of the LG&E decision are particularly striking. Firstly it mentions CMS 
only once,760 and not in relation to necessity. It undertakes no explanation as to why the 
tribunal differs from the CMS tribunal, although both the tribunals consider the same 
economic crisis, the same facts, the same convertibility law, and the same BIT and it 
was adjudicated eighteen months later. Secondly, the ICJ Judge Francisco Rezek served 
as Argentine appointed Arbitrator in both cases. LG&E should clearly have referred 
more extensively to CMS and specifically stated why it came to different conclusions. 
Reinisch observes that in fact both the CMS and LG&E Tribunals ‘disregarded less 
about the interpretation of the law of state responsibility than on the qualification of the 
actual facts’.761 He notes,  
‘While it may be understandable that reasonable persons disagree about such 
fundamental issues like whether an economic crisis amounted to a state of 
necessity in international law, it is hardly understandable that the tribunal 
                                                          
758 Ibid Paras 179–180. 
759 Ibid Para 180. 
760 LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) Para 125. The only reference to CMS (n 119) in LG&E is in the 
discussion of FET.  
761 August Reinisch, ‘The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of 
Fragmentation vs. The Promise of a More Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of 
Investment Arbitration’ (n 728) 118.  
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deciding such an important issue disregarded the findings of a previous 
tribunal.’762  
 
Neither tribunal provided clear justification for their reasoning. This split on the 
application of the necessity plea is deeply worrying for international investment law as 
well as a matter of concern for the host developing countries, given their vulnerability 
to economic crisis.763 This inconsistency and split further undermines legal certainty and 
fuels concerns about the legitimacy and integrity of the whole system of investment 
treaty arbitration as well as being alarming for host developing countries (discussed in 
chapter 8).   
 
7.2.B.d Enron 
 
Enron vs. Argentina764 arose from the same legal changes in the convertibility laws as 
CMS and LG&E. The two US companies, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets 
LLP, both US companies, held an indirect equity interest in the Argentine gas 
transportation company TGS. The Tribunal found a violation of the FET standard 
under the US–Argentina BIT on the basis that a ‘stable legal framework for the 
investment’765 was a key element of the FET standard and that Argentina had breached 
it.766 Argentina contended that it had repealed the convertibility law in the public 
interest. It charged the claimants had the knowledge of country risk and cannot ‘pretend 
                                                          
762 Ibid. Also see e.g., August Reinisch, ‘Necessity in International Investment Arbitration – An 
Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases – Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. 
Argentina’ (2007) 8 The Journal of World Investment and Trade  191.  
763  ActionAid ‘Where does it hurt’ (n 662); ‘Feeling The Pinch: Impacts of the Financial Crisis on 
Developing Countries’ (n 661); Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (n 671); Te Velde and others (n 683); Green, 
King and Miller-Dawkins (n 678).  
764 Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets LP vs. Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 Award, 22 May 
2007. 
765 Ibid Paras 251, 252 and 260. 
766 Ibid Paras 251–268. 
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to charge higher tariffs for a risk, and later, if that risk materialized argue that such risk 
should not be borne by them.’767  
 
The Tribunal rejected this argument. It observed that ‘country risk or default risk is 
related exclusively to the risk of default of a given country on its foreign debt’ and that 
such risks ‘may in some way interact’ but they operate ‘independently from each other 
and are subject to different safeguards.’768 It described currency devaluation as a 
‘different kind of risk’ that ‘responds to a different rationale.’769 It also rejected the 
relevance of country risk in the damages phase, stating that the risk of freeze and 
pesification of tariffs cannot constitute a risk when the regulatory framework separately 
and specially protects it.770 The Tribunal further observed that,  
‘This is not to say that the Government did not have the sovereign authority to 
change its mind later, as in fact it did. The rationale for this change might be 
perfectly reasonable in light of changing economic conditions in the country, a 
matter which is not for the Tribunal to judge.’771 
 
The defence of necessity is a well-accepted principle in international law and grounds 
for exemption from certain liabilities. While judging the macroeconomic policies of a 
host country exceeds the purview of an investment tribunal, it could nonetheless 
respect measures a state takes in a time of necessity. The host country itself is the only 
authority to decide the particular measures it needs to undertake for the greater public 
good.  Tribunals could apply the ‘margin of appreciation’ principle, which the European 
                                                          
767 Ibid Para 120.  
768 Ibid Para 149. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Ibid Para 378. 
771 Ibid Para 104.  
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Court on Human Rights uses, to disputes that involve sovereign state actions,772 which 
includes the host country’s cultural and historical context.773 The principle would allow 
the investment tribunal to judge whether the host country applied due process and 
acted in a manner that was not outright arbitrary and unfair.774  
 
As in the CMS award, the tribunal acknowledged the economic reality of the crisis775 but 
found that the government’s unilateral action breached the FET standard.776 It found 
the economic crisis was insufficient grounds for the state’s action777 and it provided no 
‘legal excuse’.778 The Enron Tribunal totally discarded any such defence of necessity.  
 
7.2.B.e Sempra  
 
In Sempra Energy vs. Argentina779Sempra Energy, a US company, had invested an equity 
interest in two Argentine gas distribution companies, Camuzzi Gas Pampeana and 
Camuzzi Gas del Sur, during the privatization of Argentina’s national gas sector. Like 
the other Argentine cases in this chapter, the dispute in this case related to the 
convertibility laws. The tribunal’s award found a violation of the FET obligation under 
                                                          
772 Burke-White WW and Von Staden A, ‘Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ 
(2007) 48(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 307, 348–349. For details on the notion of ‘margin of 
appreciation’ see e.g. Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ 
(1998) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Policy  843; Howard C Yourow, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, vol. 28 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1996); Thomas A O’Donnell, ‘Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1982) 4 The Human Rights Quarterly  474. 
773 See e.g. Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law  907. 
774 Fair and Equitable Treatment, Series on the Issues in International Investment Agreements Vo. III (n 
259) 40. Also see Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law  (n 52) 637–638;  Vasciannie, ‘The Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ (n 47) 133. 
775 Enron (n 764) Para 143. 
776 Ibid Para 144. 
777 Ibid Paras 221 and 222. 
778 Ibid Para 232. 
779 Sempra Energy International vs. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 Award, 28 
September 2007.  
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the US–Argentina BIT, stating, ‘The measures in question in this case have beyond any 
doubt substantially changed the legal and business framework under which the 
investment was decided and implemented.’780 Accordingly it decided that Argentina had 
committed ‘an objective breach of the fair and equitable treatment due under the 
Treaty…to the detriment of the Claimant’s rights.’781 It did not accept Argentina’s 
defence of necessity, but did consider the effects of the economic crisis in relation to 
valuation. It acknowledged that the economic crisis was serious. On the one hand it 
considered that such ‘unfortunate events do not in themselves amount to a legal excuse’ 
and while on the other, ‘neither would it be reasonable for the Claimant to believe it 
remains wholly unaffected by them.’782 The Tribunal also observed,  
‘the manner in which the law has to be applied cannot ignore the realities 
resulting from a crisis situation, including how a crisis affects the normal 
functioning of any given society. This is the measure of justice that the Tribunal 
is bound to respect.’783 
 
Here the tribunal took account of the economic crisis in the process of a Discounted 
Cash Flow (DCF) valuation of the investment. It predicted a ‘but for scenario’ to decide 
what the government would reasonably have done under the circumstances, as well as 
the objective effects of the crisis784 and reduced the amount of compensation785 which 
reflects the influence of the crisis in the damages phase.  
 
7.2.B.f Sempra ad hoc Committee on Annulment Proceeding  
 
                                                          
780 Ibid Para 303. 
781 Ibid Para 303. 
782 Ibid Para 269. 
783 Ibid Para 397. 
784 Ibid Paras 416–450. 
785 Ibid Paras 458 and 478. 
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Argentina challenged the Sempra award before the ad hoc Committee on Annulment 
Proceeding.786 Unlike the ad hoc Committee in the Annulment Proceeding against the 
CMS Award, it annulled the tribunal’s findings entirely. Argentina challenged the award 
based on the argument that the tribunal had exercised manifest excess of powers and 
that it failed to apply Article XI of the BIT.787 The committee deemed that tribunal was 
unclear on the application and scope of Article XI of the Treaty.788 It discussed the 
tribunal’s findings in relation to Article XI of the BIT in detail, observing,  
‘The Tribunal has held, in effect, that the substantive criteria of Article XI 
simply cannot find application where rules of customary international law – as 
enunciated in the ILC Articles – do not lead to exoneration in case of 
wrongfulness, and that Article 25 “trumps” Article XI in providing the 
mandatory legal norm to be applied. Thus, the Tribunal adopted Article 25 of 
the ILC Articles as the primary law to be applied, rather than Article XI of the 
BIT, and in so doing made a fundamental error in identifying and applying the 
applicable law. 
‘The Committee is therefore driven to the conclusion that the Tribunal has 
failed to conduct its review on the basis that the applicable legal norm is to be 
found in Article XI of the BIT, and that this failure constitutes an excess of 
powers within the meaning of the ICSID Convention.’789  
  
                                                          
786 Sempra Energy International vs. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (Annulment 
Proceedings), Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine 
Republic dated 29 June 2010.  
787 Ibid Para 165. 
788 Ibid Para 194. 
789 Ibid Paras 208–209. 
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On the invocation of state of necessity the committee observed that Article 25 of the 
ILC does not provide any useful guidance to interpreting Article XI of the BIT.790 The 
Committee further observed that,  
‘More importantly, Article 25 is concerned with the invocation by a State Party 
of necessity “as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in 
conformity with an international obligation of that State”. Article 25 
presupposes that an act has been committed that is incompatible with the 
State’s international obligations and is therefore “wrongful”. Article XI, on the 
other hand, provides that “This Treaty shall not preclude” certain measures so 
that, where Article XI applies, the taking of such measures is not incompatible 
with the State’s international obligations and is not therefore “wrongful”. Article 
25 and Article XI therefore deal with quite different situations. Article 25 cannot 
therefore be assumed to “define necessity and the conditions for its operation” 
for the purpose of interpreting Article XI, still less to do so as a mandatory 
norm of international law.’791 
 
The committee also found that the excess of powers by the Tribunal was also 
manifest.792 However it did not discuss the tribunal’s finding on the breach of the FET 
standard, although its annulment of the award annulled the tribunal’s findings on breach 
of the FET standard. However, on the issue of breach of treaty obligation, the 
committee found that,  
‘It is true that that BIT does not prescribe who is to determine whether the 
measures in question are or were “necessary” for the purpose so invoked – 
whether, in other words, Article XI is or is not self-judging. But if the measures 
                                                          
790 Ibid Para 199. 
791 Ibid Para 200. 
792 See e.g. Ibid Paras 211–219. 
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in question are properly judged to be “necessary”, then there is no breach of any 
Treaty obligation. In that event, it is not the case that “judicial control must 
be…concerned with whether the requirements under customary law or the 
Treaty have been met and can thereby preclude wrongfulness”’.793 
 
Out of all the disputes on the Argentine economic crisis the Sempra Award seems to be 
the only example which has been annulled in its entirety, thereby recognising that the 
economic crisis presented a state of necessity and the actions did not breach the treaty 
obligations. This finding of the ad hoc Committee is certainly a positive outcome for 
host developing countries for future reference.  
 
7.2.B.g AWG  
 
AWG vs. Argentina794 also arose because of the repeal of the convertibility laws.795 The 
British investor Anglian Water Group Ltd. (AWG) had entered into a concession 
agreement through its Argentinian subsidiary, Augus Argentinas SA (AASA), with the 
Argentine government for one of the world’s largest water distribution and waste water 
treatment projects in the city of Buenos Aires. The government’s actions under the 
emergency law had a serious impact on AASA’s business, and the claimants alleged that 
the government had indirectly expropriated the investment project and breached FET 
and other standards under the UK–Argentina BIT.796  
 
                                                          
793 Ibid Para 204. 
794 AGW Group Ltd. vs. Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Award, 30 July 2010. 
795 See e.g. Ibid Para 44. 
796 UK–Argentina BIT, 11 December 1990.  
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The tribunal found that Argentina had breached its FET obligation. It examined the 
investor’s legitimate expectations from an ‘objective and reasonable point of view,’797 
noting the host country need only to respect those expectations which are ‘legitimate 
and reasonable in the circumstances,’798 and argued the host country had breached 
them. Thus the tribunal seems to have adopted an approach that any state action 
contravening the investor’s legitimate expectation of the stability of the legal framework 
per se violated the FET obligation.  Thereby the tribunal raised a fundamental question 
as to the legitimate and reasonable expectation of the investors about the investment 
over a period of thirty years in Argentina, bearing in mind the country’s ‘history and its 
political, economic, and social circumstances?’799 Despite these acknowledgements of 
the country characteristics of instability in its economic and socio-political context, the 
tribunal did find a breach of FET standard.   
 
Arbitrator Pedro Nikken rendered a separate opinion that took an alternate view .800 He 
said that the unpredictability of the emergency laws does not make them illegitimate; 
that their legitimacy depends on whether the actions the government took were 
‘unreasonable, disproportionate, discriminatory, or in any way arbitrary.’801 He 
emphasised that a state of emergency such as Argentina faced at the time is an 
unpredictable situation, and this uncertainty does not make the state action illegal. This 
view appears to be a more reasonable interpretation of legitimate expectation of the 
investors as part of the FET obligation, particularly in the context of a developing 
country in an emergency situation.  
 
                                                          
797 AGW (n 794) Para 228. 
798 Ibid Para 229.  
799 Ibid Para 228.  
800 Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken in AWG (n 794) < 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0056.pdf> accessed 26 July 2014. 
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7.2.B.h El Paso  
 
The US company El Paso Energy International Company invested in four Argentinian 
companies involved in electricity and hydrocarbons: Compańías Asociadas Petroleras 
S.A (CAPSA), Capex, S.A (Capex), Servicios El Paso S.R.L (Servicios) and Central 
Costanera S.A (Costanera).802 In El Paso Energy vs. Argentina803 El Paso claimed that the 
‘demise of [the] convertibility regime and the “pesification” of the economy’804 had 
violated various treaty obligations under the US–Argentina BIT, including the FET 
standard. The tribunal held that the standard involves a consideration of reasonableness 
and proportionality and that all the surrounding circumstances should be taken into 
consideration.805 With respect to investors’ legitimate expectations, it observed that ‘the 
general proposition that the state should not unreasonably modify the legal framework 
or modify it in contradiction with a specific commitment not to do so’ should hold.806 It 
noted that legitimate expectations of foreign investors are part of the definition of the 
FET standard, but set a limit by stating that it  
‘considers that the notion of “legitimate expectations” is an objective concept, 
that it is the result of a balancing of interests and rights, and that it varies 
according to the context.’807 
 
Further, it observed that,  
‘There can be no legitimate expectation for anyone that the legal framework will 
remain unchanged in the face of an extremely severe economic crisis. No 
                                                          
802 El Paso Energy International Company vs. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 
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803 Ibid.  
804 Julien Fouret and Dany Khayat, ‘International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
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reasonable investor can have such an expectation unless very specific 
commitments have been made towards it or unless the alternation of the legal 
framework is total.’808 
 
Referring to Parkerings-Compagniet AS vs. Lithunia809 the Tribunal also observed,  
‘In the Tribunal’s understanding, FET cannot be designed to ensure the 
immutability of the legal order, the economic world and the social universe and 
play the role assumed by stabilisation clauses specifically granted to foreign 
investors with whom the State has signed investment agreements.’810  
 
The tribunal laid out a detailed analysis of the facts of the case.811 It found that, on the 
basis of the legitimate expectation described in the above dictum, Argentina’s actions 
were not undertaken in violation of El Paso’s rights guaranteed under the relevant BIT. 
The tribunal considered the gravity of the crisis in Argentina in relation to the legitimate 
expectation as part of the FET obligation. By doing this it struck a balance between the 
investor’s legitimate expectation and the host country’s right to change laws and 
regulation in the face of a crisis. It found that, the ‘pesification’ of the Argentinian 
economy ‘cannot be characterised in isolation, as a violation of the FET standard.’812  
 
Despite these observations, the tribunal took a very different position on the cumulative 
effect of measures which devalued the US dollar.813 Referring to LG&E, that the host 
country ‘went too far’,814 the tribunal stated that,  
                                                          
808 Ibid Para 374. 
809 Parkerings (n 468). 
810 El Paso (n 802) Para 368. 
811 Ibid Paras 365–415. 
812 Ibid Para 416. 
813 Ibid Paras 510–518. 
814 Ibid Para 517 referring to LG & E (Decision on Liability) (n 121).   
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‘It cannot be denied that in the matter before this Tribunal the cumulative effect of 
the measures was a total alteration of the entire legal setup for foreign investments, 
and that all the different elements and guarantees just mentioned can be 
analysed as a special commitment of Argentina that such a total alteration would 
not take place.’815 [Emphasis added] 
 
This way of describing the violation of FET standard, as stemming from the totality of 
a number of actions rather than any single action, represents a departure from other 
cases. The tribunal found that Argentina had created a ‘creeping violation of FET 
standard.’ It stated that,  
‘The Tribunal considers that, in the same way as one can speak of creeping 
expropriation, there can also be creeping violations of the FET standard. 
According to the case-law, a creeping expropriation is a process extending over 
time and composed of a succession or accumulation of measures which, taken 
separately, would not have the effect of dispossessing the investor but, when 
viewed as a whole, do lead to that result. A creeping violation of FET standard could 
thus be described as a process extending over time and comprising a succession 
or an accumulation of measures which, taken separately, would not breach that 
standard but, when taken together, do lead to such a result.’816 [Emphasis 
original]  
 
Accordingly the tribunal found that taking an all-encompassing view of the 
consequences of the state measures, which also contributed to El Paso’s decision to sell 
its investments in Argentina by their cumulative effect, amounted to a breach of the 
                                                          
815 El Paso (n 802) Para 517. 
816 Ibid Para 518. 
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FET standard.817 It acknowledged the seriousness of the crisis and its impact in relation 
to the investor’s legitimate expectation in relation to the FET standard. This differs 
slightly from the award in CMS and Enron, and while it amounts to an approach more 
sympathetic to the host developing country, it presents an unsound and unconvincing 
interpretation of the FET standard by envisaging a ‘creeping violation of the FET standard’. 
The approach adopted by the tribunal to the crisis that appears flexible in fact emerges 
as restrictive.  Therefore it appears that the tribunal was very much determined to find a 
breach of the FET standard.  
 
Professor Sornarajah provided a Legal Opinion818 as an expert on behalf of Argentina 
which Argentina attached to their rejoinder819 and used as a basis for their arguments.820 
He argued that the parties to the NAFTA Treaty intended to invoke the FET standard 
equivalent to the international minimum standard without definite content; he charged 
that ‘new, expansionary trends’ of interpretation characterized its use by some 
investment tribunals.821 On the issue of investors’ legitimate expectation that host 
countries will not change their policies, he observed that ‘no prudent investor can have 
such an expectation’822 and that,  
‘where the change of policy is due to an economic crisis the ability of all in the 
state to make profits would be severely curtailed. It is not the function of an 
                                                          
817 Ibid Para 519. 
818 Legal Opinion of M Sornarajah in El Paso (n 802) 5 March 2007. 
819 El Paso (n 802).  
820 Ibid Para 563. 
821 He stated that, ‘When attempted in the context of NAFTA’s reference to fair and equitable standards, 
the effort at expansion met with a swift reaction from the parties who promptly redefined the fair and 
equitable standard as indistinct from the international minimum standard, which has been in exercise for 
over a century without definite content. That reinterpretation is to be found in the US Model Treaty as 
well as in the newer American treaties such as the US–Singapore FTA. In that context, the Argentine–US 
Treaty must be understood in the light of the American view as to what fair and equitable treatment 
standard is. The American practice simply does not accommodate the new, expansionary trends to be 
found in some arbitral awards on which the Claimant builds its case. As pointed out, the American 
interpretation is more relevant than that of arbitrators as the United States was a party to the Treaty on 
which this claim is based’. See e.g. Legal Opinion of M Sornarajah in El Paso (n 818) Para 78. 
822 Ibid Para 91. 
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arbitral tribunal to indicate policy preferences in favour of certain economic 
theories on foreign investment and devise a law that favours the interests of the 
foreign investor on the basis of nebulous notions such as legitimate expectations 
and fair and equitable standard. Even such standards, when applied fairly and 
equitably, would require that the circumstances of the change in policy be taken 
into account.’823  
 
He indicated the tribunal should have considered the issue of fairness and equity in the 
context of the economic crisis in Argentina.824 However, the Tribunal referred to 
Sornarajah’s legal opinion in explaining the respondent’s case825 but did not heed its 
arguments or Argentina’s plea of defence of necessity. It made no direct reference to 
Sornarajah’s argument in favour of context and thus did not explain why the 
contentions raised by him are not sustainable. The award’s main contribution to existing 
laws is the creation of the ‘creeping violation’ concept based on cumulative consequences 
of a host country’s actions, which is alarming for the host developing countries in 
future.  
 
7.2.B.i Waste Management No. 2 
 
In contrast with the Argentine cases discussed above, in Waste Management vs. Mexico826 
the tribunal acknowledged the state of economic crisis in Mexico in addressing a claim 
of breach of the FET obligation under NAFTA Article 1105. In this case the US 
company Waste Management invested in the Mexican city of Acapulco for a fifteen-year 
concession through its Mexican subsidiary Acaverde SA de CV for public waste 
                                                          
823 Ibid.  
824 See e.g. Ibid Para 94. 
825 El Paso (n 802) Paras 159–168. 
826 Waste Management (n 292).  
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disposal services. A state owned bank, Banco National de Obras y Servicios Públicos 
(Banobras) guaranteed the concession agreement, but Acapulco and Banobras failed to 
pay Waste Management for services under the concession agreement during an economic 
crisis in 1994. Waste Management claimed compensation for breach of NAFTA Article 
1105 (FET) and Article 1110 (expropriation). The tribunal found no violation of breach 
of FET on the premise that the economic crisis was important background to the 
dispute, had caused substantial devaluation of the currency and impact on the city, and 
had led to decline in the city’s revenues and the federal bank failing to pay the 
investors.827 
 
The tribunal further observed that this decline of revenues and failure to pay by the 
bank did not amount to a breach of the investor’s expectation.828 It rejected Waste 
Management’s claim that it had suffered grossly arbitrary conduct and gross 
unfairness.829 It acknowledged the state’s genuine difficulty, and judged the failure by 
the city to perform its contractual obligation could be ‘explained, albeit not excused, by 
the financial crisis which meant that at key points the City could hardly pay its own 
payroll.’ 830 It emphasised, ‘There is no evidence that it [the City] was motivated by 
sectoral or local prejudice.’831 
 
In relation to NAFTA Article 1110 on expropriation, it described the commercial risk 
for the business choice made by the investors. It stated,  
‘In the Tribunal’s view, it is not the function of the international law of 
expropriation as reflected in Article 1110 to eliminate the normal commercial 
                                                          
827 Ibid Para 101.  
828 Ibid Para 102. 
829 Ibid Para 115. 
830 Ibid Para 115. 
831 Ibid Para 115. 
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risks of the foreign investor, or to place on Mexico the burden of compensating 
for the failure of a business plan which was in the circumstances, founded on 
too narrow a client base and dependent for its success on unsustainable 
assumptions about customer uptake and contractual performance. A failing 
enterprise is not expropriated just because debts are not paid or other 
contractual obligations are not fulfilled.’832 
 
Thus the tribunal took a view that legitimate expectation will not function when the 
investor is accountable for its own business choice. Thus it considered that the 
investors had taken the risk that the company could not convince its customers to use 
its system, or that an economic crisis would lead to financial loss,833 and that investors 
bear the loss that arise out of an inaccurate risk assessment. They will not be 
recoverable under the terms of the investment treaty. Such a duty would appear to be 
entirely consonant with an analysis of the FET standard, given the inherent balancing 
process that lies at its heart.834 While the tribunal made this dictum in relation to 
expropriation, its logic could readily apply to redress under the FET standard as well.  
 
Therefore the tribunal took a holistic approach and adopted a reasonable and 
sympathetic approach to the economic crisis. The tribunal in the Argentine cases 
discussed above dealt with disputes which arose out of an economic crisis in Argentina 
far more severe than Mexico’s in 1994, yet these tribunals made no reference to the 
findings of Waste Management No. 2. Though there is no scope for precedent in 
                                                          
832 Ibid Para 177. Also see Feldman vs. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 Award, 16 December 
2002; (2003) 18 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal  488 Para 111. 
833 However a different result may be feasible under the MIGA not yet signed or ratified by states: 
‘foreign investors on the other hand, need a greater measure of security and protection against non-
commercial risks in the face of growing economic and political uncertainties.’ See e.g. Ibrahim FI Shihata, 
‘The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’(1986) 20(2) The International Lawyer 485. It is 
questionable whether such non-commercial risks include protection from political and economic changes 
in a state.  
834 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 542. 
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international investment law, the subsequent Argentine tribunals did not explain why 
they differed from the findings in Waste Management No.2 on the economic crisis, or the 
special features of the Argentine economic crisis that did not deserve to be considered 
as an excuse for exempting the host developing country from liability during its crisis 
period.  
 
 
7.2.B. j Olguín 
 
In Olguín vs. Republic of Paraguay835 the tribunal acknowledged the fragile economy of the 
host country. The dispute arose from the suspension of operations of La Mercantil bank 
by the government. Mr Olguín had made deposits in the bank to set up a food 
production and distribution company in Paraguay, and he claimed the Republic of 
Paraguay had expropriated his assets and negligently failed to supervise the bank, in 
breach of FET under Article 4(2) of the Peru–Paraguay BIT.836  
 
The tribunal found that ‘Paraguay’s general conduct in relation to the operations of La 
Mercantil Bank was not overly sound’ and also that ‘there are serious shortcomings in the 
Paraguayan legal system and in the functioning of various State agencies.’837 It also 
found that Paraguay’s public bodies had exhibited irregular conduct and considerable 
omissions had led to the bankruptcy of the bank, and that these bodies had not acted in 
accordance with their duty to preserve the integrity of the state’s financial system and 
protect foreign investment. 838 
                                                          
835 Eudoro Armando Olguín vs Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award, 26 July 2001. 
836 Peru–Paraguay BIT, 31 January 1994 <http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/WGroups/WGIN/English/toc_ppee.asp> accessed 25 March 2014.   
837 Olguín (n 835) Para 65 (b). 
838 Ibid Paras 69–70. 
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Despite these severe shortcomings in Paraguay’s conduct, the Tribunal did not find a 
breach of the BIT. It observed that, 
‘in the future, of strict rules that impose economic sanctions on States that fail 
to closely monitor their financial entities is desirable, the truth is that these rules 
do not now exist in either Paraguayan law or in the BIT. The Tribunal adds that 
they do not exist in the majority of the countries in the region either.’839 [Emphasis added] 
 
The tribunal acknowledged the state of Paraguay’s economic crisis and its difficulties 
and therefore the investor’s duty to make a prudent business decision. It stated that it 
‘feels that prudence would have prompted a foreigner arriving in a country that had 
suffered severe economic problems to be much more conservative in his 
investments.’840 It observed that an experienced businessman such as the investor in this 
case cannot reasonably seek compensation for losses that he had suffered when he 
made a speculative investment in a country fully knowing the situation in Paraguay.841 It 
continued, ‘the Claimant contributed significantly, within his own individual circle of 
action, to the occurrence of the facts that he is also censuring.’842 It referred to 
Maffezini843 which had specified that BITs are not insurance policies against bad business 
judgment844 urging prudence in investors in relation to countries with severe economic 
problems,845 calling Olguín’s investment ‘speculative or at best not a very prudent 
investment.’846   
 
                                                          
839 Ibid Para 74. 
840 Ibid Para 75.  
841 Ibid Para 65 (b).  
842 Ibid Para 73. 
843 Maffezeni (n 120).  
844 Olguín (n 835) Para 73. 
845 Ibid Para 75. 
846 Gritsenko (n 85) 345. 
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Therefore the tribunal emphasised an investor’s obligation to make prudent decisions 
when investing in a country which has a history of an unsound economy and bear the 
cost of making that imprudent decisions.847 It recognised shortcomings in Paraguay’s 
legal system and functioning of various state agencies, but denied all the investor’s 
claims. The award provides an example of the tribunal shifting the burden of risk on to 
the investor for investing in a country which is suffering from a fragile economic 
condition; rather than imposing a burden upon the host country for not meeting the 
investor’s legitimate expectation of a stable legal framework even during a severe 
economic crisis. Considering the similarities in terms of socio-political and economic 
culture that exists in Latin America, between Paraguay and Argentina, this finding 
stands in sharp contrast to that of the tribunals dealing with disputes arising from the 
Argentine economic crisis.  
 
7.2.B.k Himpurna 
 
In Himpura vs. PLN848 the dispute did not involve a claim of breach of the FET 
standard, but nevertheless the findings of the tribunal are significant for this chapter’s 
discussion as the dispute also arose out of an economic crisis, which occurred in 
Indonesia. In this case the two US subsidiary companies, Himpurna California Energy 
(Himpurna) and Patuha Power Ltd, entered into a contract with the Indonesian state 
electricity corporation, PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (PLN), for exploration 
and development of geothermal resources in Indonesia for energy resources. The 
contract also provided that the US corporation would construct a power plant and sell 
                                                          
847 Ibid.  
848 Himpurna California Energy Ltd. vs. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, Ad hoc UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 4 May 1999.  
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the electricity it produced to PLN. However, due to a severe economic crisis in 1997,849 
PLN failed to purchase the electricity. Himpurna claimed damages for breach of 
contract. Though the case did not involve a claim of breach of the FET clause and the 
tribunal ruled in favour of the investor, and some observations made by the tribunal are 
relevant for this discussion. It observed, ‘The fact remains that it is riskier to enter into a 
30 year venture in Indonesia than in more mature economies.’850 Accordingly the 
Tribunal increased the discount rate to 19 percent from the claimant’s proposed 8.5 
percent, which the tribunal described as ‘absurd’851  in light of the present value of the 
lost profits.852 In relation to its calculus, the tribunal observed,  
‘First there is a risk of default, not by intentional breach which is excluded in 
principle, but by default due to large forces – political, social and in any event 
macroeconomic – which de facto paralyses contractual performance in a 
manner which makes it fatuous to imagine the creditor is protected by paper 
entitlements. This is the fundamental issue of country risk, obvious to the least 
sophisticated businessman.’853 
 
The tribunal further observed:  
‘Finally one can hardly ignore that PLN is not a purely commercial enterprise 
engaged in venture capitalism for the sole benefit of its shareholders, but an 
instrument of State policy in the interest of public welfare. To view the terms of 
                                                          
849 See e.g. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘The Onset of The East Asian Financial Crisis’ (National 
bureau of economic research, 1998) 
 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w6680>  accesssed 5 April 2014; Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti and 
Nouriel Roubini, ‘What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?’ (1999) 11 Japan and the World 
Economy  305; David C Cole and Betty F Slade, ‘Why has Indonesia’s Financial Crisis been so Bad?’ 
(1998) 34 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies  61.  
850 Himpurna (n 848) Para 358.  
851 Ibid Para 365. 
852 Ibid Paras 348, 364, 370 and 371. 
853 Ibid Para 364. 
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a contract of this duration as establishing immutable quantities and prices seems 
quite unrealistic.’854 
 
Here the tribunal took into account of Indonesia’s particular economic crisis and the 
problems sustaining a thirty-year contract in that context. Accordingly it held that the 
claimant had proposed a wildly high interest rate under the circumstances. It reduced 
the interest rate because of the economic crisis the country was facing. While the 
dispute did not involve a claim of breach of the FET standard, the tribunal’s willingness 
to reduce the proposed interest rate based on the economic crisis situation suggests that 
the investment tribunals in future could address economic crises or other crisis 
situations with the same approach adopted in this case which is a better reflection of 
fair and equitable calculation of the damages than other cases.   
 
7.2.B.l Synopsis of Awards on Economic Crisis   
 
The awards discussed in part 7.2.B reveal the wide range of approaches of the current 
investment tribunals in addressing disputes against host developing countries under an 
economic crisis. Largely these awards demonstrate the inadequate approach of the 
tribunals towards such severe circumstances. They also represent inconsistent 
approaches on some substantive issues. The tribunal in CMS, even after undertaking a 
comprehensive discussion in relation to the economic crisis background of the dispute 
and acknowledging that the country was going through a crisis period, nevertheless 
rejected the plea of Argentina of defence of necessity and came to a conclusion that 
Argentina had breached the FET standard. The AWG tribunal also took the same 
approach like CMS, wherein they did recognise the economic turmoil of the host state 
                                                          
854 Ibid Para 365. 
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but nevertheless found a breach of the FET standard. But the tribunal in Enron took a 
position that a “country risk” is a different kind of risk which operates separately and 
cannot be a plea for the host country in an economic crisis. Surprisingly, the tribunal in  
El Paso considered that the FET standard involves consideration of ‘reasonableness’ 
and ‘proportionality’ and that all the surrounding circumstances should be taken into 
account, but nevertheless played a very dubious role and found a “creeping violation of 
the FET standard.” These tribunals considered that though the crisis was ‘severe’, it was 
not ‘severe enough’ to provide a ‘legal excuse’ and exempt the host country from its 
liability for taking emergency measures in public interest. Only the tribunals in LG&E 
and National Grid have accepted partially the defence of necessity and excluded the host 
country from liability for certain periods during the emergency.  The discussion 
undertaken above also show that there is a clear contrast between the findings of the 
CMS and LG&E tribunals. This is unconvincing considering the fact that, less than a 
year after CMS, the tribunal in LG&E found under the same BIT and the same 
situation that the host country was under a state of necessity for certain period. The 
Sempra tribunal was reluctant to accept the defence of necessity plea due to the 
economic crisis but did consider the effects of the crisis at the valuation stage. 
However, the Sempra award has been annulled entirely by the ad hoc Committee and 
thereby is the only example on Argentine economic crisis cases where the host state has 
been fully exempt from any liability due to the actions taken on the basis of defence of 
necessity.   
 
Besides the Argentine economic crisis disputes, in Waste Management No.2 the tribunal 
did recognise the Mexican economic crisis and considered that this was an important 
part of the background of the dispute. But none of the tribunals dealing with the 
Argentine economic crisis situation engaged in any discussions on the findings of Waste 
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Management No.2. In Olguín the tribunal emphasised the investor’s duty to make a proper 
business judgment as to where it is investing and accordingly have stressed the fact that 
if the investors were aware of the fragile economic conditions of the host country as 
well as the other conditions of Paraguay as a developing country then the burden of 
investing in a speculative venture lies with him.  None of the awards in the Argentine 
disputes mentioned anything relating to the investor’s conduct or their liability in 
investing in a country which has a long history of economic and political turmoil. The 
Himpurna award, though not in the context of FET, recognised that risk of investing in 
an immature economy and accordingly increased the discount rate for value of lost 
profit which could be a good reference for future tribunals dealing with economic crisis. 
The tribunals dealing with the Argentine cases did not adopt any such method of 
calculation of damages or compensation or rate of interest considering the economic 
crisis that prevailed in the host country.    
 
7.3 Conclusion  
 
In summarising Awards addressing economic crises in host developing countries, this 
chapter has shown the degree to which tribunals have recognised the role of an 
economic crisis in generating disputes and moderating foreign investors’ legitimate 
expectations and rights under the FET standard. Despite the reference to the magnitude 
of the crisis and acknowledging its socio-political consequences, in general the tribunals 
have declined the defence of necessity and dismissed the severity of economic crisis, 
employing logic that is largely inadequate and inconsistent. In the Argentine cases, 
tribunals invariably found the breach of the FET obligation even where it had partially 
accepted a defence of necessity. From the majority of the awards discussed in this 
chapter it appears that the tribunals were overly enthusiastic to protect the interests of 
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the foreign investors ignoring the perspectives of the host developing countries 
suffering from economic crises. The recent awards in relation to the Argentine 
economic crisis raise concern for host developing countries, considering their 
vulnerability to economic crises, including those that originate in developed countries. 
Many developing countries across Latin America, Asia and Africa in the recent past 
have faced economic crises of the kind that arose in Argentina. These countries are 
more likely to be severely affected by any economic crisis in comparison to any 
developed country. Certainly such economic crises might not be an issue for investor 
protection for a country like the USA or Canada but this was certainly a factor for a 
country like Argentina or other developing countries which already have a fragile 
economy.855 With their limited resources and capabilities developing countries run the 
risk of being overburdened with liabilities to comply with the legitimate expectations of 
the foreign investors under such economic crisis situations. The current investment 
tribunals have failed to appreciate this vulnerability, and the resulting awards were test 
cases before the tribunals which raise alarms for developing countries in the future.   
  
                                                          
855  See e.g., ActionAid (n 662); Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (n 671). 
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Chapter 8 
Key Problems in the Interpretation of the FET Standard by Current 
Arbitral Tribunals and Reconceptualising the FET Standard from 
Developing Countries’ Perspectives 
  
8.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter will address the overarching argument of this thesis that there is a 
pressing need to reconceptualise the FET standard from the perspectives of host 
developing countries and will describe how investment tribunals might achieve such 
reconceptualisation. Chapter 1 introduced the importance of this goal; Chapter 2 
provided context by describing the historical development of the standard in the 
investment treaties; Chapter 3 addressed the various constructions of the FET as a 
standard. With this foundation, Chapter 4 introduced the developmental issues, 
challenges, and circumstances developing countries face that affect investment 
protection, such as limited resources or administrative capacity, political instability, 
social unrest, post-conflict situations, economic crisis, their transitory status, and policy 
in need of reform. Chapter 5, 6, and 7 built on this information to substantiate the key 
argument by demonstrating that arbitrators have used their discretionary power 
inconsistently and unfairly in favour of foreign investors. Tribunals have rarely given 
due consideration to the conditions, circumstances, and challenges that host developing 
countries face.  
 
This chapter will conclude the thesis by demonstrating the key problems with the 
approach investment tribunals have taken to date. Part 8.2.A will discuss the key 
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problems with the interpretation of the FET standard tribunals have been employing 
with specific reference to the awards which Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have described. Part 
8.2.B will discuss how investment tribunals might reconceptualise the FET standard to 
take into account the perspectives of the host developing countries relevant to the 
investment disputes more appropriately.  
 
8.2.A Key Problems in the Interpretation of the FET Standard by Current 
Arbitral Tribunals  
 
Due to its breadth and flexibility, foreign investors’ complaints cite breaches of the FET 
standard more than other investment protection standards. Investment tribunals have 
likewise relied on it more than any other obligation as a basis for awarding damages 
against host countries.856 In bringing claims citing measures ranging from regulatory 
changes adopted by the host country involving public sectors such as highway 
construction,857 water and sewerage projects,858 telecommunication services,859 and waste 
disposal860 and natural resources like gas and oil861 to finance and banking regulation,862 
foreign investors have frequently achieved the aim of recovering damages while 
tribunals subordinate the public interest.863 Interpretations of the legitimate expectations 
of the investors have failed to adequately account for developing countries’ limited 
                                                          
856 Harten, ‘Investment Treaties as Constraining Framework’ (n 24) 164.  
857 See e.g. Bayinder (n 446) in 5.2.A.a Bayindir Insaat Turizm 117; Pantechniki (n 491) 5.2.A.d 
Pantechniki 125; Toto (n 462) in 5.2.A.b Toto 120.Current Arbitral Practice Relating to Social and 
Political Circumstances in Host Developing Countries: FET Standard in Context 
858 See e.g., Azurix (n 116) in 5.2.B.e Azurix 143; AWG (n 794) in 7.2.B.g AWG 197.   
859 See Nagel (n 577) in 6.2.b Nagel 152. 
860 See Tecmed (n 118) in 5.2.B.c  137; Waste Management No.2 (n 292) in 7.2.B.i Waste Management 
No. 2 203. 
861 See Duke Energy (n 122) in 5.2.B.d Duke Energy 141; Kardassopoulos (n 646) in 6.2.i Kardassopoulos 
166; CMS (n 119) in 7.2.B.a CMS 177; LG &E (Decision on Liability) (n121) in 7.2.B.c LG&E (Decision 
on Liability)184; Enron (n764) in 7.2.B.d Enron 191;  Sempra Energy (n779) in 7.2.B.e Sempra 193 and 
Himpurna (n 848) in 7.2.B.k Himpurna 208.  
862 See Genin (n 599) in 6.2.e Genin 156; Olguín (n 835) in 7.2.B. j Olguín 206.  
863 See e.g. Sands (n 18) Chapter 6: ‘A Safer World For Investors’. Sands also criticises the system as being 
at times a subordination of public interests to commercial interests. 
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capacity in terms of resources, infrastructure, technology, experience, and administrative 
efficiency and the challenges that they face due to circumstances like political instability, 
social unrest, and economic crisis. 
 
The awards rendered against the host developing countries and the large amount of 
damages rendered against them864 send a strong signal that a wide range of regulatory 
measures adopted by host developing countries could eventually trigger an investor 
claim. As Chapter 1 discusses,865 the outcomes of the disputes also bring a potentially 
devastating overall economic impact upon these countries. Therefore this thesis will 
analyse the key problems in the interpretation of the FET standard by the tribunals at 
the current time, and make proposals for how these can be remedied.  This thesis has 
identified two key problems of the tribunal’s interpretation, namely (a) inconsistency, 
(b) an inadequate approach to consider the issues host developing countries face and 
their relevance to investment disputes.  
 
8.2.A.a Inconsistency  
 
The awards discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 clearly suffer from lack of consistency on 
substantive issues. Even decisions based on similar facts and issues were sometimes 
decided in contrary ways. This section will highlight some key inconsistencies and 
describe the particular concerns they raise for host developing countries.   
 
                                                          
864 For the amount of different Awards see e.g. Harten, ‘Investment Treaties as Constraining Framework’ 
(n 24) 158 and 170 (references made in footnote 4 of the text).  
865 See e.g. Ibid 158.   
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It should be noted that in the context of international investment disputes, no rule of 
precedent or a formal rule of stare decisis binds arbitrators.866 Tribunals make substantial 
reference to previous decisions867 and to some extent they do have persuasive value, 
they do not create any precedents for future tribunals. These efforts to consider past 
decisions obviously aim at increasing persuasive authority, and hence the legitimacy of 
the award. They are certainly absolutely vital in order to achieve an appropriate level of 
consistency.868 Further, the inconsistency of interpretation and application of the FET 
standard raises questions about the legitimacy of the whole system.869  
 
For example, the outcomes of Bayinder and Pantechniki discussed in Chapter 5 reveal 
inconsistency in the approach towards breaches of the FET standard in the event of a 
political instability in a host country. The tribunal decided these cases in the same 
period, concerning disputes arising out of a similar kind of political instability—in 
Pakistan and Albania respectively—and took completely different approaches to 
interpretation of the FET standard. The political turmoil in Pakistan was a major 
ground for the tribunal’s finding that the host country did not breach the FET standard 
in Bayinder, but the tribunal in Pantechniki did not even consider the context of a similar 
political crisis in Albania.  
 
                                                          
866 See e.g. Tai-Heng Cheng,  ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’  (2006) 30(4) 
Fordham International Law Journal 1014, 1031–1037; Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore, and 
Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2007) 71 (et seq); Also see 
discussion in AES Corporation vs. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005 Para 18; Jeffery P Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence’ (2007) 24(4) Journal of International Arbitration 129. 
867 McLachlan, Shore, Weininger International Investment Arbitration (n 866) 74, speaking of a ‘de facto 
doctrine of precedent’. 
868 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and 
Fairness’ (n 47) 451. 
869 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 141.  
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Similarly, as Chapter 6 described, the tribunal in Parkerings considered the transitory 
status of Lithuania and recognised its challenges. It found that the host country did not 
breach the FET standard because of this context. Other awards discussed in Chapter 6 
did not do this. In particular there exists a sharp contrast of approach to the 
Kardassopoulos award. In Kardassopoulos, the tribunal overlooked discussion of these 
challenges of the host country and totally ignored the transitory status of Georgia.  
 
Another major issue of inconsistency relates to host countries’ raising of the defence of 
necessity in crisis situations. This defence is a well-established doctrine of international 
law, which can be of significant importance for developing countries.  The awards in 
Chapter 7, particularly on the Argentine economic crises, reveal clear inconsistencies in 
the tribunals’ interpretation of the defence of necessity. In addressing several disputes 
arising from a single measure Argentina took to address a particular economic crisis, the 
Convertibility Laws, the tribunal partially accepted the defence of necessity in two cases, 
but not in a third, though all invoked the same BIT. The awards in LG&E870 and 
National Grid871 are clearly inconsistent with the award in CMS. As Chapter 7 describes, 
the differences of facts between the CMS and LG&E awards do not account for this 
inconsistency. Chapter 7 also describes the approach of the tribunal in Waste Management 
No.2, which considered the Mexican economic crisis as a ground for determining the 
liability of the host country for breach of FET standard, and the approach of Olguín, 
which considered Paraguay’s economic crisis as a reason to shift the burden of loss on 
to the foreign investors. A number of awards including CMS approached economic 
crises in a very different way from Waste Management No.2, and Olguín as Chapter 7 
revealed.  
 
                                                          
870 LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 121) Para 259. 
871 National Grid (n 543) Paras 179–180. 
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While international investment arbitration renders inconsistent decisions in relation to a 
variety of standards, this thesis focuses on interpretation of the FET standard for a 
number of reasons.872 The vagueness of the FET standard leaves it particularly 
vulnerable to inconsistencies, and means that it cannot guide behaviour without 
consistent interpretation. While the FET standard’s inherent flexibility makes it 
impossible for arbitrators to achieve full consistency, citing justifiable reasons would 
make it internally coherent. The flexibility of FET certainly allows different outcomes in 
different factual situations, since one of the standard’s purposes is to guide 
interpretation of a variety of possible facts.873 When contradictory decisions address the 
same facts and issues (as in LG&E and CMS) or facts that are virtually 
indistinguishable (as in Bayinder and Pantechiniki) or even with the same case,874 the 
rational basis for justifying the distinction becomes questionable. Then it appears that at 
least one of the decisions is suffering from a legitimacy deficit.   
 
When tribunals render inconsistent awards on similar facts or issues, the only way to 
maintain their legitimacy is to justify their reasons for differing from the previous 
tribunals, or explain the conditions of the particular disputes which merit different 
conclusions from previous tribunals dealing with similar kinds of issues. In this respect 
Kläger’s observation is worth mentioning:   
                                                          
872 Susan Franck categorises these inconsistencies into three groups, namely (i) cases involving the same 
facts, related parties and similar investment rights, (ii) cases involving similar commercial situations and 
similar investment rights (iii) cases involving different parties, different commercial situations and the 
same investment rights. See e.g., Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham 
Law Review 1521, 1558 et seq.  
873 See Chapter 1 in 1.2.5 The Importance of the Arbitrators’ Discretionary Powers in Interpreting FET 
18.  
874 Contradictory decisions in Roland S. Lauder vs. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 2 
September 2001 and CME Czech Republic vs Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award, 13 September 
2001 exemplify this problem.  See e.g. CMS (n 119) in 7.2.B.a CMS 177 and LG&E (Decision on 
Liability) (n 121) in 7.2.B.c LG&E (Decision on Liability) 184; Franck ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 872).   
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‘Since fair and equitable treatment does not encapsulate an intrinsic meaning or 
justice waiting out for discovery, it is even more important to display clearly the 
arguments and correspondent background politics being adduced to justify a 
particular decision. If the ensuing balancing of those arguments is not fully 
rational or objective, this only reveals that the legal discourse, searching for the 
best reasons, also involves a political quest for the best concepts and 
arguments.’875  
 
As Kläger observes, the flexibility of the FET standard particularly demands clear 
reasons for inconsistent decisions. When investment tribunals address complaints 
arising from similar kinds of issues and situations, if outcomes differ, the later tribunal 
needs to justify their different interpretation on the facts with a fully rational 
justification. If this is not done properly then the interpretation of a flexible standard 
like FET becomes too fluid, which raises concerns about the system as a whole.876  
 
The frequent use of the FET standard by foreign investors against host developing 
countries means that inconsistent and imprecise interpretations of the standard by the 
arbitral tribunals put the host developing countries at considerable risk of bearing heavy 
costs.877  Chapters 5, 6, and 7 touched on the crisis situations host developing countries 
face and their importance, including economic crises, political instability and social 
unrest, and the lack of experience and limited resources to cope with the requirements 
of investment protection standards attending transitory status. The uncertainty host 
developing countries experience as to the approach of the investment tribunals hinders 
                                                          
875 Kläger ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 255–256.  
876 See e.g., Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 872) 1558 et seq.  
877 See Chapter 1 in 1.2.2 Developing Countries in Investment Dispute Arbitration 5; Sornarajah, ‘The 
Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n1) 287; UNCTAD ‘Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development’ (n 45) 43.  
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the smooth and pressure-free functioning of the host developing countries and their 
state machinery in dealing with the foreign investment regime.  
  
Inconsistency will also impact the developing countries’ trust in the investment 
arbitration system and complicate the investor–host country relationship. The host 
developing countries are at the mercy of the investment tribunals when the state makes 
decisions they may consider necessary to protect the state and the public interest. 
Inconsistency in the decisions of investment tribunals make it impossible to make 
informed judgments about likely outcomes.  As Kläger has rightly pointed out, FET 
could act as a black box containing unwelcome surprises within the BITs and IIAs.878 
The activities of all branches of state machinery, legislature, executive, and judiciary, 
potentially could violate the FET standard if the tribunals do not explain their logic.879 
Furthermore, Dolzer states, if the tribunals interpret and apply the FET standard too 
loosely, it ‘has the potential to reach further into the traditional domaine reserve of the host 
state than any one of other rules of [investment] treaties.’880 Such surprises will tax 
heavily the host developing countries if there is no consistency in the tribunals to 
address the issues and challenges these countries face in the investment dispute context.  
 
8.2.A.b Inadequate Approach to the Substantive Issues of the Host Developing 
Countries  Relevant to the Investment Disputes 
 
Tribunals in general have been inadequate in their approach in rendering the awards and 
their awareness of the conditions, such as social and political instability, transitory 
status, economic crisis, lack of resources, and limited administrative capacity, that host 
                                                          
878 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 242. 
879 Ibid 252. 
880 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law’ 
(2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 954. 
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developing countries face. The majority of the tribunals ignored or marginalised these 
challenges in interpreting the alleged breach of the FET standard, as this section will 
discuss.881 This section will also focus on why such approaches were inadequate 
considering the particular contextual background of the disputes and why such 
inadequate approaches raise concerns for host developing countries in the future.  
 
8.2.A.b.i Inadequate approach to lack of resources, administrative capacity, and 
experience of host developing countries  
 
The limited resources and capabilities of host developing countries should affect any 
assessment of the country’s obligations to investors. The AMT Award typifies tribunals’ 
inadequate approach to this principle. The tribunal acknowledged that Zaire differed 
from developed countries in terms of the environment for investment, but did not 
reference Zaire’s political turmoil to the state’s resulting inability to offer the investor 
the protection he desired under the BIT.882 Similarly the tribunal in Pantechniki held that 
lack of state resources provides no defence for denial of justice.883 The GAMI tribunal 
also rejected Mexico’s defence based on its administrative capacities, saying that these 
capabilities had no bearing on the liability of the host country.884 Such a limitation of 
resources becomes a pivotal factor, particularly in the context of their ability to satisfy 
the treaty obligation of foreign investors, as the disputes that arose out of the Argentine 
economic crisis discussed in Chapter 7 illustrate. They also reflect the tribunals’ failure 
to address this lack of resources and administrative capacity in relation to crisis 
situations. Similarly, Chapter 6 described only one award, Parkerings, in which the 
tribunal considered these issues. The tribunals dealing with countries in transition have 
                                                          
881 See Chapter 4 in 4.2.C Perspectives of Host Developing Countries in Investment Disputes 108.   
882 AMT (n 471) Para 7.14–7.15. 
883 Pantechniki (n 491) Para 76. 
884 GAMI (n 513) Para 94.  
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been largely inadequate in their approach to considering the lack of resources, 
administrative capacity, and experience of these countries in the process of socio-
political and economic transition. In Kardassopoulos the tribunal did not even mention the 
transitory status of the host country, creating a troubling precedent for future tribunals 
dealing with countries in transition.  
 
Developing countries commonly lack resources, and therefore face challenges in 
ensuring appropriate investor protection mechanisms under the investment treaties. 
The current tribunals have not adequately considered this issue in interpreting the FET 
standard. 
 
8.2.A.b.ii Inadequate approach to recognising how a crisis situation affects the 
ability of host developing countries in an investment dispute context  
 
Apart from the award in LG&E and National Grid, which partially exempted the host 
country for the crisis, and the Annulment Committee’s decision on the award in Sempra 
which entirely annulled the findings of the tribunal, the awards in Chapter 7 reveal an 
inadequate approach to addressing the challenges of economic crisis. Chapter 7 part 
7.2.A describes the severity and impact of economic crises for developing countries, 
revealing that the approach which the majority of the tribunals took in relation to the 
Argentine economic crisis inappropriately rejected the defence of necessity raised by 
Argentina. While they acknowledged the severity of the crisis that existed in Argentina 
to varying degrees, and that grave situations affect legitimate expectations of 
investors,885 they dismissed its influence on the proper liability of the host country.886 
                                                          
885 See e.g. CMS (n 119) Para 248; AWG (n 794) Para 228; El Paso (n 802) Para 374.  
886 See the discussion on CMS (n 119), AWG (n 794), El Paso (n 802) and Enron (n 764) in Chapter 7. 
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The Argentine economic crisis disputes serve as a litmus test for host developing 
countries to examine the approaches of the current investment tribunals.  
 
The tribunals’ dismissal of Argentina’s invocation of the defence of necessity could 
have wide-ranging effects. Developing countries that host foreign investment will have 
to be cautious in undertaking actions in extreme situations, lest investment tribunals 
worsen their position with large amount of compensation in rendering awards. The 
tribunals’ prioritisation of the protection of foreign investors leaves host developing 
countries extremely vulnerable in times of crises.  
 
Burke-White notes this dynamic when he opines that the Argentine cases test the 
flexibility available to host countries to respond to crisis situations and the scope of 
investor protections under such circumstances.887 Developing countries are vulnerable 
to a broader range of scenarios than developed countries, and the tribunals’ response to 
political instability and social unrest, as discussed in Chapter 5, and disruption for the 
conditions that attend transition as discussed in Chapter 6 creates similar level of 
disruption and can put a similar chill on host developing countries’ ability to act in the 
public interest. In the era of globalisation, host developing countries can encounter 
many crisis situations, such as terrorist attacks (as in Nigeria and Kenya in 2014), rising 
militancy (as in contemporary Syria and Iraq), debt crisis (as in the Czech Republic in 
1990s888), severe health crises (such as AIDS in South Africa since the 1980s889 and 
                                                          
887 See e.g., Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy 
of the ICSID System’ (n 654).    
888 See e.g. Helena Tang, Edda Zoli and Irina Klytchnikova, ‘Banking Crises in Transition Countries: 
Fiscal Costs and Related Issues’ (Policy research working paper) (World Bank, Europe and Central Asia 
Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit 2000) <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/12/15/000094946_00111805313297/
additional/104504323_20041118114551.pdf> accessed 25 September 2014.  
889 See e.g. Solomon R. Benatar, ‘Health Care Reform and the Crisis of HIV and AIDS in South Africa’ 
(2004) 351(1) New England Journal of Medicine 81; John C Cadwell, ‘Rethinking the African AIDS 
Epidemic’ (2000) 26(1) Population and Development Review 117.  
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Ebola in West Africa890 in 2014), insurgency (as in Ukraine in 2014) and cyber-attacks 
(as in Estonia in 2007).  Political instability and rise of militancy more easily becomes 
civil war in developing countries than in developed countries. Such problems that are 
major in developing countries make it impossible for host developing countries to 
provide the climate for foreign investment that investor’s desire.891 Such crises pressure 
host developing countries to respond to hitherto unforeseen challenges and take actions 
investors may view as protectionist and threatening to their interests.892  
 
As Burke-White rightly describes, the narrow approach the tribunals adopted in the 
Argentinian cases raise concerns that host countries will be at risk of breaching the FET 
standard in taking any policy response to tackle such difficult situations. He further 
argues that the investment tribunals’ responses in the Argentine economic crisis cases 
put the entire investment arbitration system at risk.893He concludes that in rendering 
these awards, tribunals have made it almost impossible for the host country to invoke 
the state of necessity defence under customary international law in a situation of 
economic crisis.894 Further, he argues that the tribunals have failed to provide an 
adequate margin of appreciation for the host countries relying on the necessity doctrine, 
despite the fact that he argues that this was contrary to the intent of the state parties to 
the relevant BIT.895 He comments:  
                                                          
890 See e.g. M. J. Friedrich, ‘World Bank Pledges $200 Million to Stem Ebola Outbreak in West Africa’ 
(2014) 312(11) The Journal of American Medical Association 1088; Joan Stephenson, ‘Largest-Ever 
Ebola Outbreak Still Simmering in West Africa’ (2014) 312(5) The American Journal of Medical 
Association 476; M. J. Friedrich, ‘Ebola Outbreak in West Africa’ (2014) 311(19) The American Journal 
of Medical Association 1958.  
891 For a brief discussion on the impact of political crises in developing countries see Chapter 5 and on 
economic crisis see Chapter 7.   
892 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n) 248–249.  
893 See e.g., Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy 
of the ICSID System’ (n 654).    
894 Ibid 432.   
895 Ibid.   
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‘In an ever more globalized world in which exceptional circumstances such as 
financial crisis, terrorist threats, and public health emergencies are all too 
common, the ability of states to craft viable policy responses becomes ever 
more critical. In this context, the Argentine ICSID cases test the extent of state 
freedom to craft critical policies and the reach of investor protection under 
BITs and customary law in the face of exceptional, but far from uncommon, 
emergencies.’896 
 
Investment tribunals have not addressed adequately states’ need to take emergency 
actions that might appear to breach the FET standard from an investor’s point of view.  
 
8.2.A.b.iii Inadequate approach to recognising the challenges that host 
developing countries face due to political instability, post-conflict situations, and 
social unrest  
 
Political instability, conflict and its aftermath, and social unrest impose risks on 
investment in host developing countries. Of the tribunals discussed in Chapter 5, only 
those serving in Bayinder and Toto paid adequate attention to political instability in the 
host country.897 For example, the tribunal in Pantechniki made no acknowledgement of 
political instability in Albania as a cause of the investor’s losses. Further, AMT 
presented a particularly severe case of instability, and Zaire raised the issue of its 
political crisis as a defence. The tribunal did not acknowledge the role of several bloody 
civil wars in determining Zaire’s liability. It also did not provide any reason for the 
omission.898 This absence of discussion represents a very inadequate approach to the 
                                                          
896 Ibid 411.     
897 See e.g. Bayinder (n 446) Paras 192–193. 
898 AMT (n 471) Paras 6.06–6.08.  
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gravity of the situation that existed in Zaire for decades.899 The tribunal did reduce the 
amount of compensation in recognition of the crisis,900 but the finding of liability 
nonetheless puts host developing countries at risk.  
 
Confounding host developing countries’ efforts to avoid paying large amounts of 
compensation to foreign investors while maintaining law and order, investment disputes 
often concern highly politically and socially sensitive sectors such as public utility 
services or natural resources. The tribunals’ approach to the political and social 
concerns such disputes incur has not adequately addressed the issues. For example the 
tribunal in GAMI did not evaluate the circumstances under which the government 
made the decision the investor alleged violated its FET obligation. The tribunal itself 
noted that the Mexican sugar industry had a ‘considerable political dimension’,901 but it 
did not engage in any detailed discussion of this dimension as significant background to 
the dispute.  Similarly in Tecmed, the tribunal deemed the social protest of the local 
community against the landfill project as irrelevant, considering it not to be ‘real’.902 It 
did not address the logic behind this distinction, or describe what it would find in the 
case of a ‘real’ protest. The implicit acknowledgement that a ‘real’ protest permits a state 
to act in the public interest at investors’ expense becomes meaningless without a 
standard for a ‘real’ protest. The pattern of investment in developing countries renders 
this an important point, but the Tecmed tribunal did not engage in any discussion on the 
issue and this question is unanswered. Similarly in Azurix, the tribunal ignored the 
socio-political circumstances of the public utility sectors and the sensitive issues 
surrounding the sectors from a broader perspective of the host country.  
 
                                                          
899 See 5.2.A.c AMT 119.  
900 AMT (n 471) Para 7.13. 
901 GAMI (n 513) Para 46. 
902 TECMED (n 118) Para 144. 
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Social and political protest on a large scale are quite common in the developing world, 
and citizens often see foreign investments as a camouflaged form of colonial 
exploitation perpetuated by foreign investors with no concern for the social problems 
of a society in which they have no real stake.903 The investment tribunals exacerbate 
these problems, by protecting foreign investors from risk—they ensure that foreign 
investors don’t have to care about social problems.  This makes the natural resources 
sector in host developing countries a particularly sensitive issue politically. The oil and 
gas sector in Nigeria,904 the diamond mining sector, dubbed ‘conflict diamonds’ in 
Congo and Sierra Leon,905 the Phulbari coal mine protest in Bangladesh,906 the 
‘Conchabama Water Wars’ in Bolivia,907 the movement for the survival of the Ogoni 
people against oil companies in Nigeria,908 the Costa Rican communities protesting 
against US oil companies,909  and the recent protest in Liberia against land grabbing by 
British palm oil company all exemplify the politically high stakes around natural 
resources in developing countries.910 Tribunals’ reluctance to take into account the 
perspectives of the governments of host developing countries in investment disputes 
arising out of such politically sensitive sectors potentially limit such countries’ ability to 
                                                          
903 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 106) 438. Also see e.g. Graeme B. Robertson and 
Emmanuel Teitelbaum, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing 
Countries’ (2011) 55(3) American Journal of Political Science 665. 
904 See e.g. Augustine Ikelegbe, ‘Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: 
Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle’ (2001) 39(3) The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 437; Eghosa E. Osaghae, ‘The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the 
Future of the Nigerian State’ (1995) 94(376) African Affairs 325; Peter M. Lewis,  Growing Apart: Oil, 
Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria (The University of Michigan Press 2007).   
905 See e.g. <http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds> accessed 24 
September 2014.  
906 See e.g. <http://accproject.live.radicaldesigns.org/section.php?id=43> accessed 17 September 2014.  
907 See e.g. <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html> accessed 17 September 
2014. Also see e.g. Oscar Olivera and Tom Lewis, ¡Cochabamba!: Water War in Bolivia ( South End Press 
2008).  
908 Osaghae (n 904). Also see e.g.  
< http://wiwavshell.org/about/about-wiwa-v-shell/ > accessed 17 September 2014. Also see e.g. < 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ogoni-people-struggle-shell-oil-nigeria-1990-1995 > 
accessed 17 September, 2014.  
909 See e.g. <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/costa-rican-communities-defeat-us-oil-
companies-protect-local-environment-1999-2002 > accessed 17 September 2004.  
910 See e.g.<https://www.rainforest-rescue.org/mailalert/950/liberia-land-grabbing-for-palm-oil-no-
means-no > accessed 17 September 2014.  
229 
 
accept investment. Neglecting these factors under those circumstances in interpretation 
of the FET standard fails to serve the purpose of the standard.  
 
The tribunals’ approach to political instability, post-conflict circumstances, and social 
unrest in developing countries raises concern for a large group of countries. Countries 
engaged in civil wars like Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine or experiencing political conflict like 
South Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, and Egypt have reason to fear the consequences of 
these rulings. A trend towards investment in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban regime suggests 
that foreign investors may soon show interest in these countries as political crises in 
those countries lessen.911 The inadequate approach of the investment tribunals towards 
the political crises and post-conflict vulnerability of the host developing countries will 
have a negative impact on these countries’ trust in the whole system.  
 
8.2.A.b.iv Inadequate approach to recognising the host developing countries’ 
need to change policy  
 
The awards discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 reveal that tribunals approach substantive 
issues like host developing countries’ state regulatory powers and change of policy in 
public utility services and sectors such as exploration of national resources with a lack 
of sensitivity. It described broad interpretations of FET by tribunals to impede all kind 
of actions taken by the host country. Subedi rightly opined that the tribunals have gone 
too far in intruding into the policy space of developing countries, limiting host 
                                                          
911 See e.g. <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/205289.htm> accessed 23 September 2014. 
Also see e.g. Al Jazeera, 'Afghanistan Moves To Entice Foreign Investors: New Incentive Package To 
Include Low Land Costs, Tax Exempt Status, And Multiple Entry Visas For Investors' (21 July 2014) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201372113053618886.html> accessed 23 
September 2014; <http://www.aisa.org.af/> accessed 23 September 2014.  
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countries’ sovereign rights in the event of various situations of emergency and crisis.912 
These powers of the state are based on its inherent international legal right to regulate 
conduct in its territory; such rights supersede any limitation imposed by international 
agreements and treaties.913 Subedi identifies the FET standard as a ‘catch all’ provision 
that current investment tribunals have interpreted so broadly that a wide variety of state 
activities fall within it.914  
 
If tribunals’ will not take the needs of host developing countries into account, the FET 
standard then significantly limits the regulatory freedom of host country. As Kläger 
argues, the current tribunals have framed legitimate expectation in such a way as to 
conflict with the sovereignty of a host country, and deemed exercise of sovereignty as a 
breach of investment treaties.915  As Kriebaum points out, developing countries have a 
pressing need to be able to change policies.916 She argues the FET standard allows for a 
balance between the investor protections and the host country’s public interest and that 
tribunals should therefore address the conditions prevailing in the host country in 
relation to legitimate expectations.917 She argues that the legitimate expectation of the 
foreign investor must not jeopardise developing countries’ need to change policy in 
areas like labour law or environmental law, or the protection of cultural heritage, and 
human rights.918 Since developing countries lack the same level of development in these 
areas, Kriebaum argues that developing countries should not be penalised for striving to 
implement protections in these areas. Further, she argues that foreign investors should 
                                                          
912 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 1) 2.  
913 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 533.  
914 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n1) 168.   
915 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 251. 
916 Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113) 404.  
917 Ibid.  
918 Ibid.  
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have limited expectations as to the stability of the domestic legal system in relation to 
these areas.919  
 
Subedi identifies the FET standard as a ‘catch-all’ provision that current investment 
tribunals have interpreted so broadly that a wide variety of state activities fall within it. 
While foreign investors might regard such actions as a breach of the FET obligation, 
considering the particular conditions and circumstances as the contextual background 
of the dispute supports a different view. Accommodating host developing countries’ 
need to change policy in certain sectors, even if they have direct impact upon the 
profitability of a foreign investment, will conform to international law as to the 
sovereignty of states.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 sought to construct the full story behind selected awards that 
arbitrators have neglected. Arbitrators have not typically considered the substantive 
background facts of the investment disputes, and therefore they often render awards 
that neglect the situations that led to host countries’ behaviour. While tribunals were 
often aware of the situation of the host developing country and its bearing on the 
investment disputes, they typically did not make this knowledge part of interpretation of 
the FET obligation. Tribunals that compromised by ignoring the context in finding 
liability while reducing damages or rate of interest on the basis of that context do not 
satisfy the needs of host developing countries.920  
 
Tribunals’ refusal to acknowledge the challenges of lack of resources, administrative 
capacity, challenges due to crisis, political instability, social unrest, and post-conflict 
                                                          
919 Ibid.  
 
920 See LG&E (Decision on Liability) (n 118) and National Grid (n 543) in 7.2.B.c LG&E (Decision on 
Liability)18 184; Lemire (n 629) in 6.2.g Lemire (Award) 161; Himpurna (n 848) in 7.2.B.k Himpurna 208. 
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situations neglects the fact that these issues and challenges play a catalyst role in host 
developing countries’ ability to provide a fertile environment for investment.  
 
The key problems in the interpretation of the FET standard by the current investment 
tribunals that Part 8.2.A has identified have a far reaching impact upon host developing 
countries. There is a pressing need to revisit the concept of the FET standard from the 
perspectives of host developing countries. Part 8.2.B below will focus on how the FET 
standard can be reconceptualised from the perspectives of host developing countries.   
 
8.2.B Reconceptualising the FET Standard from Host Developing 
Countries’ Perspectives  
 
Tribunals’ interpretation of the FET standard has been for the most part rendered it an 
investor-oriented protection standard in investment disputes. As Chapter 1 described, a 
large volume of investment disputes involve host developing countries, and the awards 
have a large economic impact on these countries. Chapter 1 also discussed the 
importance of an arbitrator’s discretionary power in relation to host developing 
countries’ perspectives in interpreting the FET standard. However, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 
reveal that the arbitrators have exercised their discretionary powers in an inappropriate 
manner to largely prioritise the needs of foreign investors and neglect the perspectives 
of host developing countries in their interpretation of the FET standard. Gritsenko 
rightly points out:  
‘There seems to be a divergence of approaches among arbitrators when faced 
with a defence arising out of the host State’s developing status; it remains to be 
seen whether future decisions will seek to harmonize the varying strands. In 
practice, absent a generally recognised ‘level of development’ standard, parties 
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will likely continue to make the argument that conditions prevailing in the host 
state should be factored into the arbitrator’s decision, to an extent depending on 
the factual circumstances of the case.’921 
 
The awards this thesis has discussed illustrate the prevalence of the argument Gritsenko 
describes. Current arbitral jurisprudence clearly lacks consensus on the issue of a host 
country’s developmental issues and the challenges they face and their impact on foreign 
investment.  
 
The clear inconsistency and inadequacy this chapter has described should prompt a 
reconceptualisation of the standard from the perspectives of the host developing 
countries, accommodating their developmental issues and challenges with a view to 
ensuring consistent and adequate approaches by the tribunals to interpret the FET 
standard. Such a reconceptualisation is a vital part of dealing with difficult cases, which 
often involve host developing countries, due to the challenges they face. Such difficult 
cases might involve particular challenges that host developing countries face due to 
their development issues in the investment context identified in this thesis or the 
challenges that they might face due to some unforeseen crises of a socio-political or 
economic nature that this thesis has discussed or those crises identified above. Ensuring 
a certain level of certainty as to the scope of the standard for host developing countries 
would make a material difference in these countries’ ability to encourage foreign 
investment. As Sornarajah rightly points out, they have been a vulnerable target of the 
‘catch-all’ nature of the FET standard.922  For all these reasons, it is important to 
consider how to reconceptualise the FET standard to appropriately take into account 
                                                          
921 Gritsenko (n 85) 351. 
922 Sornarajah, ‘The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 1) 287.  
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the developmental perspectives of host developing countries in investment dispute 
context.  
 
8.2.B.a The Perspectives of Host Developing Countries in an Investment 
Dispute Context  
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis highlighted the classifications of countries different 
international organisations have forwarded, guided by GDP, GNI, or HDI. These 
categorisations reflect the social and economic level of development of countries and 
are useful in explaining their social and economic developmental status. But these 
classifications do not provide much insight into the difficulties and challenges that the 
host developing countries face in the investment dispute context. Therefore tribunals 
need to identify the developmental issues and challenges host developing countries face. 
This reconceptualised understanding of developmental issues in the investment dispute 
context would not rely primarily on criteria such as GDP, GNI, or HDI but on factors 
relevant to developing countries, which form a vital contextual background to the 
disputes in question. These factors include the issues and challenges of limited resources 
and lack of infrastructure, technological support, and administrative capabilities, as well 
as the struggles related to extreme circumstances such as political instability, conflict 
and its aftermath, social unrest, social and political transitions, and economic crises.  
 
The huge volume of claims against Argentina in the wake of the country’s severe 
economic crisis, as well as in disputes initiated against countries in transition, brought 
attention of the governments of developing countries and scholars to the particular 
needs of developing countries. It seems likely that national crises will continue to bring 
about situations that lead to large numbers of claims against host developing countries, 
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given their lack of administrative capacity, resources, infrastructure, technological 
support, and legal capacities, all of which affect their ability to protect investor’s 
interests.  Crises weaken these systems and prompt decisions in the public interest that 
can negatively affect the value of foreign investments.  
 
Under such circumstances, foreign investors should no longer expect that host 
countries will maintain unchanged regulatory policies. Kriebaum supports the view that 
tribunals should assess legitimate expectations against the background of the host 
countries’ prevailing circumstances. She argues that the conditions prevailing in the host 
country are highly relevant in determining the legitimate expectation of foreign 
investors.923 Similarly, Muchlinski argues in favour of the principle of ‘caveat investor’—
that is, that investors should have realistic expectations about the profitability of 
investing in a high risk-high return location and be aware of both the prospects and 
pitfalls of the investment. He argues that investor should bear any losses that arise as a 
result of an inaccurate risk assessment and should not be recoverable under the terms of 
the investment treaty. Muchlinski argues that imposing such a duty on investors would 
be entirely consonant with the FET standard, reflecting the inherent balancing process 
at the heart of the concept.924 He argues that investors should take the regulatory and 
political environment into account and that regulations not explicitly stabilised in the 
relevant investment treaty might change, especially in areas of high levels of 
regulation,925 such as natural resources and public utility services.  
 
Given the inherent nature of international investment, political instability, social unrest, 
crises and an inefficient systems of administration, exacerbate the risks associated with 
                                                          
923 Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113) 404.  
924 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor?’ (n 47) 542.  
925 Ibid 546.  
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investment. The facts in the AMT, Bayinder, and Parkerings disputes illustrate this. Even 
large multinational corporations can experience a high level of risk investing in 
unfamiliar host countries.926 Muchlinski argues the tribunals should assess alleged 
breaches of the FET standard in light of such risks.927 The tribunal in Genin conformed 
to this logic when it suggested that investors must take the degree of sophistication of 
the local authorities into account when investing in foreign country.928 The awards in 
the Bayinder, Parkerings, and Toto, as well as the decision of the annulment committee on 
the Sempra award, also followed this approach to limited resources and capabilities 
under the existing circumstances of the host developing countries. Unfortunately, 
tribunals have not always approached the FET standard in the manner, and the body of 
awards do not provide developing countries any guidance as to how the future tribunals 
will address the complicated situations in which developing countries host foreign 
investment in a complex, globalised world.  
 
The complexities of this environment are likely to lead to an increase in difficult cases in 
which the host developing countries are in particularly dire straits. Kläger points out the 
deficiencies in this when he states that,  
 ‘A doctrinal approach that amounts to nothing more than the categorisation of 
lines of jurisprudence, in order to simplify fair and equitable treatment by the 
specification of factors and fact situations possibly indicating a breach of the 
standard, is unable to guide arbitrators in difficult cases. This is because such a 
lowering of complexity will never lead to a scheme that is detailed enough so as 
to cover all difficult cases. Therefore, a comprehensive doctrinal concept needs 
                                                          
926 Ibid 534.  
927 Ibid.  
928 Genin (n 599) Para 348.  
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to go beyond a mere analysis of case law and be capable of indicating, in 
difficult cases as well, what justificatory arguments are admissible.’929 
 
Kläger points out that the current approaches of the investment tribunals do not 
address the difficult situations that host developing countries might face in their 
obligation towards foreign investors.930 The current approach is to simplify the FET 
standard by categorisation of lines of jurisprudence—topoi931 as Klager terms them 
(these are legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, fair-procedure, transparency, and 
proportionality). These topoi are not sufficient to address the difficult and the 
unforeseen situations described above.  
 
The current approach of simplifying the standard and applying it to specific fact 
situations, does not provide future tribunals any guidelines with which to deal with 
investment disputes that are likely to occur in relation to host developing countries, 
especially as national and global crisis situations or post-crisis situations affect host 
developing countries. These difficult situations are largely unforeseen, so without clearer 
application of the FET standard, host developing countries will remain vulnerable in 
increasingly complicated investment disputes. Therefore, this thesis argues that the 
tribunals need to reconceptualise the FET standard to accommodate the developmental 
issues and challenges that host developing countries will face in the investment dispute 
context. This means that factors such as limited resources and lack of infrastructure, 
technological support, and administrative capabilities, as well as the struggles related to 
extreme circumstances such as political instability, conflict and its aftermath, social 
                                                          
929 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in International’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 121. 
930 Ibid. Also see discussion in 1.2.5 The Importance of the Arbitrators’ Discretionary Powers in 
Interpreting FET  18.   
931 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in International’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 116-117.  
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unrest, social and political transitions, and economic crises should form essential 
elements in consideration of the FET standard. If the tribunals adopt such an approach 
to the FET standard that accommodates the difficult situations and development issues 
that host countries face in relation to foreign investment then this will provide a better 
reflection of the interpretation of the standard ‘fairly’ and ‘equitably’. This will also 
enhance the trust of the developing countries in the international investment arbitration 
system as well as eliminate their fear of the ‘catch-all’ nature of the standard.  
 
Considering the issues host developing countries face, would resolve the uncertainty of 
the scope of the standard and also give some clear guidance as to the role these 
perspectives should play in the interpretation of the FET standard. The inherent 
vagueness of the standard has given the arbitrators much leeway to interpret the 
standard. Kriebaum’s examination of how tribunals have used this flexibility, which, as 
she notes, provide ‘enough flexibility…to take account of the different stages of 
development across nations’, concludes that tribunals have not made it clear whether 
the economic and political circumstances of host developing countries have any 
influence in the application of the standards or in the assessment of violation of even 
lower standards.932 Thereby Kriebaum suggests that the flexibility in the substantive 
investment treaty standards allows the tribunals to consider the special situation 
prevailing in the developing countries, firstly in the liability stage, and secondly in the 
damages stage.933 However no clear indication has emerged in their awards as to 
whether the investment tribunals will consider the conditions prevailing in the host 
countries and their developmental issues in future investment disputes. The resulting 
uncertainty raises concerns for host developing countries, which reconceptualising the 
                                                          
932 Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113) 402.  
933 Ibid 339.  
239 
 
standard from the perspective of the host developing countries can overcome. This 
reconceptualised standard should be considered at both the liability and damages stages 
of the proceedings. 
 
8.2.B.b The Perspectives of Developing Countries in Investment Treaties 
 
The international investment treaties currently lack useful guidance as to the role of 
level of development or developmental issues of the host countries. IIAs in particular 
suffer from this deficiency.934 Other specialised development cooperation agreements, 
which aim to balance the particular needs of the developing countries with the 
modalities of economic development, and include aid and investment, may be better 
suited to the task. The IIAs and BITs cover a narrow range of interests and are usually 
silent on the level of development of signers and their developmental needs.935 
 
The aim of using individual treaties to clarify the FET standard suffers from the fact 
that the purpose of investment treaties depends solely on the individual treaty, and 
treaty language diverges. Therefore this thesis cannot draw a general conclusion about 
their sensitivity to development issues. However, certain commonalities enable some 
concerns to be raised. Very broadly speaking, investment treaties aim to encourage and 
promote investment and cooperation for economic growth and development. Very few 
investment treaties make any concrete reference to the particular challenges that host 
countries face in an investment context.  
 
                                                          
934 See e.g. Scope and Definition: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
(UNCTAD 2011) 120 < http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20102_en.pdf> accessed 6 October 2014.   
935 Ibid. 
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Article 19 of the IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development936  presents an exception. It incorporates this idea of considering the host 
country’s level of development in applying the FET standard. Article 19 (C) of the 
Model Agreement states that ‘Administrative decision making processes shall include 
the right of administrative appeals of decisions, commensurate with the level of development of 
the host state….’ (emphasis added). Commentary on Article 19 states the concern that 
some arbitration decisions tend to disregard the level of development of a host state as 
a factor in assessing the standard of procedural fairness the investor should expect.937 
The commentary also refers to the fact that some tribunals have held expressly that the 
‘level of development and the political history of a state are relevant factors’ in assessing 
the level or quality of the whole process that an investor should expect from a host state 
and thus legally be entitled to it.938 
 
The Investment Agreement for Common Market for Eastern and Southern African 
(COMESA) 2010 has similar language.939 In its Article on the FET standard, the 
COMESA Agreement refers to the different level of development of the host states. It 
states,  
 
‘1. Member States shall accord fair and equitable treatment to COMESA 
investors and their investments, in accordance with customary international law. 
Fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in 
                                                          
936 IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (International 
Institute for Sustainable Development 2006)  
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_handbook.pdf> accessed 6 October 2014.  
937 Ibid 32.  
938 Ibid 33.  
939 Investment Agreement for Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA). 
<http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/Exercise%20Materials/invagreecomesa.p
df > accessed 8 October 2014.  
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criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world. 
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article prescribes the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment 
to be afforded to covered investments and does not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond what is required by that standard. 
3. For greater certainty, Member States understand that different Member States have 
different forms of administrative, legislative and judicial systems and that Member States at 
different levels of development may not achieve the same standards at the same time. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article do not establish a single international standard in this 
context.’940 [Emphasis added]  
 
The factors that impact host countries’ treatment of foreign investors could never be 
entirely integrated into the text of investment treaties; many might be unforeseeable at 
the time of drafting, signing or executing and making an exhaustive list of even the 
foreseeable situations is impracticable. Therefore even investment treaties that mention 
the relationship of developing countries’ situation in the FET clause require arbitrators 
to articulate an understanding of that relationship.  Therefore there is still a need to 
specify the specific development factors which arbitrators should take into account in 
their decision-making processes, and thereby to reconceptualise the FET standard from 
host developing countries perspectives. This will ensure that the host developing 
countries will be free to encourage and protect foreign investment without bearing 
excessive risk for the challenges due to developmental issues and difficult 
circumstances that they face.  
 
                                                          
940 Ibid.  
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8.3 Conclusion  
 
The core argument of this thesis has been that in their interpretation of the FET 
standard, the investment tribunals prioritise the interests of the foreign investors over 
the perspectives of the host developing countries, and that this imposes a high cost on 
developing countries. This thesis has discussed in depth the pressing need to 
reconceptualise the standard from the perspectives of the host developing countries to 
accommodate the developmental issues and challenges they face in the interpretation of 
the FET standard. With that aim, Chapter 1 highlighted the fact that FET serves as a 
core (if not the core) investment protection standard for foreign investors in the 
investment treaties. It also provided a statistical account to justify the choice to focus 
the thesis on the treatment of host developing countries due to the high volume of 
disputes initiated against them and also the economic impact of those awards against 
them.941 It discussed the extensive literature on the standard and showed that scholars 
have not defined the standard according to fundamental principles of justice, but rather 
empirically studied past arbitral awards in an effort to define the standard. The first 
chapter also emphasises the fact that scholars engaging in the literature have invariably 
identified the inherent vagueness of the standard. It has also emphasised the fact that as 
a ‘catch-all’ standard in investment treaties, FET can virtually invite foreign investors to 
invoke claims against governmental actions in any instance of loss.  
 
Chapter 1 also emphasised the importance of the arbitrator’s discretionary power to 
interpret the standard.942 It stressed the fact that the inherent vagueness of the standard 
gives the arbitrators a good deal of leeway to interpret the standard from the 
                                                          
941 See Discussion in 1.2.2 Developing Countries in Investment Dispute Arbitration 5.  
942 See Discussion in 1.2.5 The Importance of the Arbitrators’ Discretionary Powers in Interpreting FET 
18.  
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perspective of the host developing countries.943 It has highlighted the question as to 
whether the arbitrators have adequately considered the issue in their interpretation of 
the standard to date. While Kläger describes the similarities between the FET standard 
and justice,944 nevertheless he has rightly observed that FET ‘does not yet represent an 
embodiment of justice, but rather symbolises an “expectation of justice” and it is 
questionable whether this is fully achieved.’945 This thesis has revealed that although 
they cannot decide disputes ex aequo et bono, the equity and fairness element inherent in 
the standard and its inherent vagueness allows plenty of room for the tribunals to 
exercise their discretionary powers, as in Hart’s concept of a ‘penumbra of 
uncertainty’.946 In this way, they balance the inevitable tension between the foreign 
investors and host developing countries, which Franck has described as a balancing 
between ‘stability and change.’947  
 
Chapter 2 provided an account of the standard’s genealogy and historical development. 
It describes the roles developed and developing countries have played in the process of 
advancement of the standard in investment treaties, revealing that at its initial stage, 
developing countries, particularly in Latin America opposed the standard. Their shift in 
approach does not necessarily reflect a change in their understanding that the flexibility 
of the standard potentially prioritises the needs of foreign investors over those of 
developing countries. This chapter showed that the standard emerged in the multilateral 
setting and later entered the bilateral setting, where it proliferated. Most importantly, it 
highlighted the fact that an investment treaty with an FET clause has, over time, 
become an almost ever-present feature of international investment law.  
                                                          
943 See discussion in   1.2.4 Scholarship on the FET standard 10.  
944 Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (n 47) 143-144; Also see e.g. Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 106) 34. 
945 Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (n 47) 256.  
946 Hart, Concept of Law (n 101) 12.  
947 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 106) 438.   
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Chapter 3 argued that limiting the standard with vague principles of international law, 
like that of the minimum standard, does not clearly limit the scope of FET. It 
demonstrated that no body of rules clearly establishes the minimum standard of 
international law or customary international law, and therefore argues that these 
principles cannot encompass an ever-evolving standard like FET in a way that addresses 
the present–day, highly complicated investor-state relationship. Therefore the chapter 
has made it clear in its discussion of FET minus that combining the standard with the 
minimum standard does not create a secure guarantee for developing countries that the 
scope of the standard will be significantly restricted.948 It also points out that in some 
treaties, the parties have made an attempt to limit the FET standard by definitional 
restriction and by combining it with more specific standards. However given the vast 
majority of treaty constructions of the text of the standard, these are exceptional 
instances. Therefore, in the vast majority of the treaties, the host developing countries 
need to assume that the tribunals will interpret the FET standard as an independent and 
autonomous standard. The chapter also explained that combining the FET standard 
with an additional substantive obligation (FET plus) does not limit or help to shape the 
scope of the standard, rather, the sphere of the standard goes beyond these 
restrictions.949 Kläger describes these constructions of FET as a ‘stylistic question rather 
than one of substance’.950 Therefore, despite the different constructions of the standard 
in different investment treaties, this thesis argues that for the majority of the treaties, 
FET needs to be construed as a separate and independent clause, allowing the 
arbitrators to exercise their discretionary powers to interpret the standard.  
 
                                                          
948  See discussion in 3.2.A FET Minus 62.  
949 See discussion in 3.2.C FET Plus 84.   
950 Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (n 47) 17.  
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Chapter 4 highlighted the fact that adopting a single phrase like ‘developing countries’ 
to address the vast majority of the countries in the world means that a wide range of 
disparities among these countries remain.951 It argues that the classifications 
international organisations have used provide a broader perspective on a wide range of 
issues developing countries face and the developmental level of a country in social and 
economic terms such as GDP, GNI, or HDI. But these classifications and criteria do 
not provide adequate assistance in understanding the developmental issues and 
challenges host developing countries face in the investment dispute context. Therefore 
this thesis proposes that investment tribunals need to identify an appropriate concept of 
development relevant to host developing countries in the investment context. 
Accordingly, Chapter 4 highlights the relevance of issues such as lack of administrative 
capacity, resources, infrastructure, and technological support; of the particular 
challenges these countries face due to political instability, social unrest, conflict and its 
aftermath, transitory status, and economic crisis; and of the need to change policy in 
sectors related to foreign investments. It argues that the FET standard should reflect 
these issues.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide in-depth analysis of some selected arbitral awards to 
demonstrate the wide range of approaches that the tribunals have adopted to address 
the developmental issues and challenges of the host developing countries in three 
different situations—socio-political instability, transitory status, and economic crisis. 
These case studies demonstrated that the tribunals have been inconsistent, and largely 
inadequate, in their approach to the developmental issues and challenges of the host 
developing countries. As Kläger rightly states, the approaches investment tribunals have 
                                                          
951 See discussion in 4.2.B Disparities and Differences Across Developing Countries and the Concept of 
Development 104.  
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taken to date are not adequate to address the difficult situations in investment 
disputes952 like those discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7.   
 
Finally, part 8.2.A of the present chapter summarised the key cross-cutting problems of 
interpretation by the tribunals in addressing the issues and challenges host developing 
counties face on the basis of the analysis of the arbitral awards. In investigating the 
loopholes of those interpretations, the present chapter has identified two major areas in 
which the problem lies, i.e. the inconsistency and the inadequate approach on 
substantive issues of the host developing countries relevant to foreign investment. Part 
8.2.A of the chapter has highlighted that these problems can have a significant impact 
on host developing countries, which might put the investment arbitration system as a 
whole at risk. It has also highlighted the fact that in a more globalised world, new 
exceptional circumstances, crises, and national disasters are more likely to emerge to 
disrupt the socio-political and economic life of the developing countries similar to those 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Therefore this part argues that if the tribunals do not 
adopt an approach to address these difficult situations, the interpretation of a flexible 
standard like FET will have a far-reaching impact upon host developing countries. As 
Kläger has rightly identified, there is pressing need for a comprehensive doctrinal 
approach that goes beyond case law analysis to address the difficult cases and crisis 
situations of some examples given above.  
 
In line with Kriebaum’s point that the conditions prevailing in the host country are 
highly relevant and that foreign investors’ legitimate expectation should not restrict 
developing countries’ need to change policy in sectors which are likely to affect foreign 
                                                          
952 See Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law (n 47) 121. 
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investment,953 part 8.2.B of the present chapter proposes a reconceptualised 
interpretation of the FET standard which would address the developmental issues and 
challenges host developing countries face in the investment disputes context. It has also 
highlighted the fact that the current investment treaties do not provide the arbitrators 
enough guidance as to the role of development in host countries. Therefore, in the 
absence of treaty guidance, the tribunals need to exercise their discretionary powers to 
reconceptualise the FET standard to accommodate the developmental issues in their 
interpretation of the standard. Future lines of interpretation need to consider the 
developmental issues and the challenges of the host developing countries in more 
complicated situations in a complex world, to better clarify the application of the 
standard. In this complex globalised world, developing countries are more vulnerable to 
situations like the rise of militancy, social unrest, and outbreak of epidemic diseases, and 
their lack of resources and administrative capacity to face these crises mean that such 
events threaten the very functioning of host developing countries’ state machinery. This 
vulnerability of developing countries is significant in the investment dispute context. 
Therefore, this thesis argues for a reconceptualisation of the FET standard from the 
perspective of host developing countries. It argues that the developmental issues and 
challenges of these countries require this. Such a reconceptualised standard would 
provide future investment tribunals with consistent and clear guidance as to how to 
address disputes against host developing countries.  By accommodating developing 
country–specific conditions in a particular investment dispute, this thesis argues, the 
investment tribunals can ensure greater the certainty of the interpretation of the FET 
standard against host developing countries which would ensure the stability of the 
investment arbitration system, and with it, global investment.   
                                                          
953 Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under Investment 
Treaties’ (n 113) 404. 
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